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Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, both Austria and Persia were each repeatedly 
at war with the Ottoman Turks. Diplomats travelled between the two countries in an 
attempt to forge an alliance against their common enemy. Although the alliance never 
materialized  the  relationship  broadened  to  cover  other  concerns.  Despite  cultural 
differences,  both  countries  tried  to  work  together  and  approached  each-other  as 
equals.  Contact  between  the  countries  exposed  both  cultures  to  wider  influences. 
Their changing relationship illustrates the priorities of both parties. This thesis, for 
the first time, uses primary sources to view the evolution of the relationship over the 
two century reign of  the Safavid dynasty.  It  charts  the course  of  their  diplomatic 
relationship, examines the turning point in this relationship, and explores why the 
alliance  both  sides  wanted  never  materialized.  By  examining  Austria's  diplomatic 
initiatives  to  the  east  this  thesis  helps  correct  the  historiographical  imbalance  in 
central European history of concentration on only European affairs, and shows that 
their understanding of the east was more nuanced than is often credited. 
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Chapter One
Introduction
The  Austrian  Habsburgs  and  the  Safavid  Persians  maintained  a  diplomatic 
relationship over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Diplomats from both sides 
travelled between the two countries, what could be a difficult and dangerous journey. 
The relationship started in the search for a military alliance against their common 
enemy, the Ottoman Turks. Military cooperation was never successfully realised, but 
over time the relationship developed into other areas of common interest,  such as 
trade and cultural exchange. The two cultures were very different, and they did not 
perfectly understand each other. However, during the period, great strides were made 
in the knowledge each had of the other. The contact brought about by their diplomatic 
activity facilitated this growth in knowledge. Despite occasional difficulties in their 
relationship, the two dynasties always regarded each other as friends and worked to 
maintain their  relationship through changing circumstances.  This thesis charts the 
evolution of this relationship. 
The scholar of early modern Austria, R. J. W. Evans, wrote when describing 
Austrian  missionary  activities,  "My  concern  here  is  to  illustrate  an  ambitious 
mentality,  not  to chart the modest returns".1 Similarly,  since the proposed alliance 
which was at the centre of their relationship never materialised, my focus must rest 
more on the attitudes and efforts of the participants than on the outcomes. What is 
important to show is that Austria and Persia tried to work together and that they 
approached each other as equals. In later years, the power differential between Europe 
and the East would be different, but during the centuries in question, it was possible 
for  the two to enter into a relationship of  mutual  cooperation rather than one of  
domination and exploitation. 
1 R.J.W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy: 1550-1700, (Oxford, 1979), p. 427. 
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Although the alliance effort failed, the study of the relationship between two 
countries  is  still  important.  These  relationships  are  important  because  overlooked 
details  of  a familiar  country might  be  seen more clearly  in the light  of  a foreign 
culture.  The very 'otherness'  of  the cultures  from each other  makes them a more 
useful mirror. Every culture determines their self-image partially in contrast with an 
outside 'Other'. In the case of both the Austrian Habsburgs and the Safavid Persians,  
the primary 'Other' was the Ottoman Turks. Since they both defined themselves in 
contrast to the Turks, they were drawn to one another, despite their great differences. 
In both cultures,  there was curiosity as well  as ignorance about the foreign. Most 
information they had about the foreign culture came by way of travellers between the  
two countries, and most of the travellers between sixteenth century Austria and Persia 
were diplomats. By studying the relationship over the span of two centuries we can 
identify how and when the relationship changed. We can see why the proposed goal  
pursued by both sides was not achieved, but how that goal was replaced by other 
initiatives.  We  can  discover  where  relationships,  which  were  important  to  the 
participants,  have  been  overlooked  by  later  historians,  and  begin  to  redress  the 
balance. 
Relations  between  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  have  long  been  filled  with 
tensions,  from  the  medieval  crusades  through  to  modern  times.  However,  the 
relationships  have  been  complex  and  defy  explanation  as  a  simple  clash  of 
civilizations.  During  the  period  covered  in  this  work,  France  was  allied  with  the 
Ottoman Turks, while Austria was frequently threatened by the Turks and courted an 
alliance with Persia. All were participants in a shifting network of relationships at a 
time when contact, communication and trade were beginning to expand. A bi-polar 
discourse of East versus West completely misses the complexity of the interactions. 
While scholars and politicians of the time struggled to make sense of foreign cultures 
with limited information, they recognised the complexity because it was their lived 
experience. Later observers of the events, historians and orientalists, as well as critics  
of their work, such as Edward Saïd,2 are in danger of losing sight of this complexity. 
2 Edward W. Saïd, Orientalsim, (Penguin Books, 2003), originally published 1978. 
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Background of the Cultures
Despite  cultural  differences,  Habsburg  Austria  and  Safavid  Persia  shared  certain 
similarities.  Both  were  large,  multi-ethnic  empires.  Each  dynasty  maintained  its 
authority over these mixed polities by negotiating between the interests of various 
groups. They headed a coalition of supporters by making themselves appear the one, 
indispensable source of leadership, backed by propaganda and the judicious use of 
force when necessary.3 Both dynasties had, at times during the period, strong religious 
identities.  Their  religious  piety  and  their  doctrinal  distinctions  were  part  of  their 
justification for their position. Each evangelized their beliefs: the Safavids converted 
their  country  from Sunni  to  Twelver  Shi'a  Islam,  the  Habsburgs  maintained  their 
Catholicism  when  most  of  their  population  was  converting  to  Protestantism  and 
eventually turned their lands back to the Catholic church. And importantly for their 
cooperation, both Austrian Habsburgs and Safavids derived part of their identity from 
their  opposition  to  the  Ottoman  Turks.  Each  justified  their  power  through  their  
determination  to  combat  the  Turkish  threat,  serving  as  a  counterweight  to  the 
expansionist  Ottoman  Empire,  which  would  otherwise  engulf  their  region.  This 
affinity went beyond simply  Realpolitik and 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. 
Opposition to the Turkish 'other' was a core part of their respective identities, and this 
shared identity created affinity despite their otherwise quite differing cultures.
The Safavids 
The Safavid dynasty had its origins as the leaders of a militaristic Sufi religious order.  
The Safavid order was named after its fourteenth century founder, Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn 
Isḥāq.  A fifteenth century descendant  of  Shaikh  Ṣafī,  Junaid,  aligned himself  with 
Uzun Ḥasan, who ruled most of Persia in the 1450s-70s, and Junaid led the Safavid 
3 Andrew J. Newman, Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire, (London, 2006);  R.J.W. Evans, The 
Making of the Habsburg Monarchy.
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Turkmen  faithful  in  battles  against  Uzun  Ḥasan's  rivals.  Uzun  Ḥasan  began  an 
imperial political discourse which united and tribal, religious and royal elements of 
Persian society; this discourse would be picked up by the Safavids when Ḥasan's Āq 
Qoyūnlū descendants were unable to peacefully settle on a successor. Junaid married 
Uzun Ḥasan's sister, and Junaid's son Ḥaidar married one of Uzun Ḥasan's daughters, 
linking  the  Safavid  leadership  with  political  power.  Ḥaidar's  son  Ismā'īl  led  his 
followers into the chaos which followed Uzun Ḥasan's death and became the new 
Persian ruler,  founder  of  the  Safavid  dynasty,  crowned in  Tabriz  in  1501.4 At  his 
coronation he declared Twelver Shi'ism the new state religion, a conversion which has 
remained to this day. Ismā'īl I's descendants ruled Persia for over two hundred years,  
leading its transformation from a medieval realm to an early modern dynasty - one of 
the 'Gunpowder Empires' described by Marshall Hodgson.5 This designation marks the 
Ottoman, Mughul,  and Safavid Empires which arose in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries at the time of the spread gunpowder warfare. These empires represented a 
break from the older continuum of Islamic polities to set of empires, each possessing 
its own territorial spheres (often overlapping on the edges), and developing separate 
institutions and markers of political and cultural identity. The Safavids developed such 
identity, through their propagation of distinct religious, linguistic, political, and even 
artistic institutions. The institutions founded in the Safavid period continued to shape 
Iranian consciousness into modern times. 
The Safavid regime drew together the two main polities in Persian politics: the 
Turkic tribes who provided military power through their horsemen provided provided 
by the tribal leaders in a tributary relationship with the Shah, and the Indo-European 
Irani  who had the administrative  traditions to  run a  large state.  Over  time,  other 
groups were added to this coalition of interests:  ghulām servants of the royal court, 
4 H.R. Roemer, "The Safavid Period", Chp. 5 in The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 6 "The Timurid 
and Safavid Periods" (henceforth CHI), ed. Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, Cambridge 1986, 
pp. 190-205.  Newman, Safavid Iran, pp. 9-12. 
5 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Vol. 3, "The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times", 
(Chicago, 1974), esp. pp. 3-15; Bert Fragner, "The Safavid Empire and the Sixteenth- and 
Seventeenth-Century Political and Strategic Balance of Power within the World System", in Iran 
and the World in the Safavid Age, ed. Willem Floor and Edmund Herzig, (London, 2012), pp. 17-29. 
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Armenian merchant families, and Shi'ite religious teachers, among others. Although 
they each manoeuvred for power within the government, all of these groups had a 
stake in maintaining the stability  of  the society.6 The diversity  of  interests  in the 
Safavid coalition was a source of strength; but also, presented a challenge, a constant 
centrifugal  force  which,  in  the  absence  of  confidence  in  the  Shah,  could  rip  the 
coalition to pieces.7
A major source of income for the Safavid regime was silk, which was produced 
in the provinces around the Caspian Sea. This commodity became a desired luxury in 
Europe  and  was  the  major  export  from  Persia  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries.  It  was a  major  source of  revenue for  the regime.  Armenian merchants,  
whose companies had been trading with Europe for generations, took a leading role in 
brokering trade deals and transporting the products to European merchants. Desire 
for profits from the silk trade drew the interest of the emerging European trading 
companies, such as the British East India Company. Control of the silk trade was a 
major issue in Safavid foreign policy of the seventeenth century.
The Habsburgs
The  Habsburgs  started  as  minor  nobility  in  Alsace  in  the  tenth  century.  They 
gradually  gained  more  power  through  advantageous  marriage  arrangements  and 
alliances. Rudolf, Count of Habsburg was elected as German King in 1273 to become 
Rudolf I, known as The Founder.8 It was he who obtained the Austrian lands for the 
family's  patrimony. Habsburg fortune fluctuated in the following generations until 
1452,  when Frederick III  was crowned Holy Roman Emperor,  a  title  which would 
6 Newman, Safavid Iran, p. 123.
7 Rudi Matthee, Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan, (London, 2012), pp. 8-10.
8 Rudolf I was never crowned by the Pope and so was not called Holy Roman Emperor, but he 
exercised similar powers. Jean Bérenger, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1273-1700, trans. C. A. 
Simpson, (London, 1994), pp. 13-19, 49-52. 
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remain with the Habsburg family until the Empire's dissolution in 1806. Frederick also 
continued the family tradition of favourable marriage alliances by wedding his son, 
Maximilian, to the heiress of the Duke of Burgundy, Charles the Bold. An epigram 
describing their marriage success reads,  Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube! - "Let 
others wage war, you - happy Austria - marry!" As Emperor, Maximilian I (reign 1493-
1519)  tried  to  reform  the  governance  of  both  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  and  the 
Habsburg's Austrian lands, but opposition from the nobility who sought to maintain 
their  privileges  limited  him to  only  minor  results.  Maximilian  arranged marriages 
between his two children and the children of the Spanish royals. After a series of 
premature deaths, this left Maximilian's grandson Charles as heir to Spain, including 
its lands in the New World, the Burgundian Low Countries, Naples and Sicily, the 
Austrian patrimony, and various other small territories scattered about Europe. As 
Emperor Charles V (reign 1519-1556), he aspired to a universal monarchy - uniting all  
of Christendom under his rule. While Charles thought the threat of the Turks would 
draw  the  rest  of  Europe  to  him  for  leadership,  the  Valois  kings  of  France,  now 
surrounded by Habsburg territories, led resistance to his hegemony. Since Charles' 
lands  were  too  scattered  to  rule  effectively  from  one  location,  he  turned 
administration  of  the  ancestral  Austrian  lands  over  to  his  brother  Ferdinand. 
Ferdinand,  with  help  of  yet  another  advantageous  marriage  arranged  by  his 
grandfather  Maximilian,  added  the  kingdoms  of  Hungary  and  Bohemia  to  the 
Austrian patrimony and created the Central European entity later recognised as the 
Austrian Empire. It is these lands ruled by Ferdinand and his successors, the Austrian 
branch of the Habsburg family, which are the focus of this thesis.  
The Habsburg Austrian monarchy was not a modern state, nor even an empire 
of conquered lands,  but was instead a loose affiliation of  lands ruled by the same 
family. The 'House of Austria' ruled over a patchwork of lands, many of which had  
separate histories as independent domains before coming under Habsburg rule.  The 
central area – as much in terms of significance to the Monarchy as geographically – 
was the  Erblande,  or Inherited Lands. These were ruled by the Habsburgs in direct 
sovereignty,  and  correspond  substantially  to  the  modern  Austrian  Republic.  They 
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comprised several medieval duchies acquired by the family in the thirteenth century,  
and this fact led the Habsburgs to take the title 'Archduke' to signify their rule over 
multiple duchies.9 In addition to their traditional inherited lands, during the sixteenth 
century  the  Habsburgs  came  to  hold  the  crowns  of  two  previously  independent 
kingdoms, Hungary and Bohemia. Hungary, for most of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, was divided into three parts: Habsburg territories to the north and west -  
including what is today Slovakia, Turkish holdings in a wedge through the centre, and 
the  effectively  independent  principality  of  Transylvania  to  the  east.  There  was  a 
mixture of languages and ethnicities, with Magyars, Slovaks, Croats, and Ruthenes in 
the  countryside,  Germans  and  Magyars  in  the  towns,  and  Romanians,  Germans, 
Szeklers and Magyars in Transylvania. As might be expected, this diverse territory 
proved difficult  to rule,  as  evidenced by the many revolts and leadership disputes 
which arose in the area.10 The Kingdom of Bohemia was itself a conglomeration of 
territories,  constituted  of  Bohemia  proper,  Moravia,  Silesia,  and  Upper  and Lower 
Lusatia. Silesia and the Lusatias had by this time substantial autonomy and greater 
cultural affiliation with the German parts of the Holy Roman Empire, while Moravia, 
a self-contained margravate maintaining its own laws and economy, was culturally 
more linked with Bohemia. Bohemia provided a source of wealth for the Habsburgs.  
The lands of the Bohemian crown formed, in the late sixteenth century, the "most 
densely populated, richest, and best developed region in Central Europe", and so it 
bore much of the burden of the cost of the Habsburgs' Turkish wars.11 In addition to 
these lands that the Habsburgs held directly, they also controlled the position of Holy  
Roman Emperor. The title of Emperor was elective, but through their influence and 
political manoeuvring, the Habsburg family held the title almost constantly from 1490 
to the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. The Empire stretched through 
the German regions,  to the North Sea and the Baltic.  It  encompassed a myriad of 
independent principalities, from the tiny and obscure to those with major influence 






the  Reichstag,  an  body  of  princes,  religious  leaders,  and  representatives  of  towns 
which  met  periodically  in  a  semi-democratic  assembly  to  set  policy  (here  'semi-
democratic' indicates votes in the Reichstag were unequal and determined by noble 
rank).  The Reichstag had to agree on new taxes  for  the Emperor and on military 
contributions  from  member  territories.  The  necessity  of  negotiating  a  balance  of 
powers between the Emperor and the Reichstag placed constraints on the power of 
the  Emperor.12 The  sixteenth  century  was  an  especially  contentious  time  for  the 
Empire, since the Protestant Reformation was sweeping the area and religious issues 
set  the  German  princes  against  one  another.  Issues  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire 
continually demanded the Habsburgs' attention, but the Empire also provided a source 
of income and prestige.
The only thing that united these various lands was Habsburg rule.  In their 
roles as Holy Roman Emperor, King of Bohemia, King of Hungary, and Archdukes of 
Austria, government of these areas rested ultimately with one family, and usually one 
single person. However, a single head of state did not imply a unified government for  
all these regions. During the sixteenth century these were still independent countries, 
with  their  own  laws,  traditions  and  institutions.  Their  different  interests  often 
conflicted with one another. The main task for the Habsburg rulers was balancing the 
demands of different constituencies and regions within the vast holdings in a way 
which attempted to produce some sort of unified policy. To be successful, this task 
required compromise, political acumen and charisma, in order to rally diverse subjects  
behind a common goal. Unfortunately, the Habsburgs were not always well-supplied 
with these qualities. Ideally, the senior male on the line of descent would hold the title 
of Emperor, and was the acknowledged head of the family. As Emperor, he did not 
directly rule anywhere, but had power as arbiter in disputes between the German 
princes and between the princes and their subjects. The Emperor could also request 
taxes from the territories of the Empire, but these would have to be approved by the 
Imperial Diet, made up of representatives of the nobility, clergy and a few towns. As 
12 On the structure of the Empire's government see Peter H. Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire 1495-
1806, 2nd Edition (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2011; original edition 1999), esp. pp. 60­89.
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head of the family, the Emperor would also fill the roles of King of Bohemia and King 
of Hungary. Of course, these positions depended on the heir being accepted by the 
Electors of the Empire and the Estates of the kingdoms. In exchange for acceptance, 
the claimant would have to negotiate an agreement of privileges for the nobility in 
each  area.  These  agreements  had  the  force  of  law  during  his  reign,  limiting  the 
Emperor's  actions  within  that  region.  Other  members  of  the  family  were  the 
Archdukes, who were given rule over various of the Inherited Lands. This was the 
Habsburgs' solution to the problem of inheritance and junior sons.
Terminology
The multi-ethnic nature of each political  entity covered in this work gives rise to 
terminological difficulties. Some explanations of terms as I use them in this thesis are 
in order. 
I call the land which the Safavids ruled  Persia, rather than Iran. This follows 
the practice used internationally in documents of the era. I use it as a geographical 
and  political  term,  with  no implied  ethnicity.  I  usually  refer  to  the  ethnic  Turkic 
supporters of the Safavids as  Qizilbāsh. While this term most specifically applies to 
followers of the Safavid religious order who wore a distinctive red hat, it aligns well 
with the Turkic tribes, many of whom followed the Safavid order, and is frequently 
found  in  the  literature.  I  will  refer  to  the  Indo-European  speaking  people  of  the  
country as  Iranians or  Irani,  as derived from the Avestan ethnic tern 'Airya'.13 This 
group gave its name to the modern name for the country Iran, but are not isometric 
with it: there are Iranian citizens of other ethnic groups and there are ethnic Iranians  
living  in  other  countries.  For  the  period  in  this  thesis  there  should  be  no  such 
confusion; I use the term purely as an ethnic category not a political term. The Persian 
13 Some other authors, particularly Newman, use the term 'Tajik' for this same group. Newman, 
Safavid Iran, p. 6.
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name for their ruler was Shāh, and I use typically use this term as well; however, in 
many European documents he was called the 'King of Persia', and I occasionally use 
this designation to maintain the tone of these texts. I  use the Library of Congress  
system for Romanisation of Farsi words. 
The Habsburg lands provide even more challenges. When I write Habsburgs, I 
typically mean specifically the Austrian branch of the Habsburg family,  descended 
from Ferdinand I. I endeavour to make it clear by context when the Spanish branch of  
the family is  also included.  I  use the term  Austria to refer to the lands of  central 
Europe  ruled  directly  by  the  Habsburgs,  including  the  Erblande,  Hungary  and 
Bohemia. This usage corresponds to what would be known as the Austrian Empire, 
and later the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the nineteenth century. When referring to 
the Habsburgs' ancestral lands which roughly correspond to the modern Republic of 
Austria,  I  will  use  the  term  Erblande,  'Inherited  Lands',  or  directly  name  specific 
provinces, such as Lower Austria. The reader should be aware that the kingdoms of 
Hungary and Bohemia also had separate parts in addition to the main provinces for  
which  they  were  named  (e.g.  the  Kingdom  of  Bohemia  also  contained  Moravia,  
Lusatia, and Silesia); however that should not be critical for the subjects covered here. 
In addition to the lands they directly ruled, the Habsburgs at this time also held the 
title  Holy Roman Emperor. The term 'King of the Romans' referred to the recognised 
heir to the Emperor, elected before one Emperor's death so as to have a clear line of  
succession. When I refer to the Empire or Germany, I indicate the larger Holy Roman 
Empire  beyond  the  lands  directly  ruled  by  the  Habsburgs,  which  included  many 
principalities,  and other  political  units  mostly  covering modern Germany but  also 
including some non-German areas. 
The Ottoman Empire was also a large multi-ethnic entity. Although the term 
Ottoman should be preferred when referring to its citizens, I interchange it with the 
word Turk frequently, especially when citing period works. Writings of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries called all members of the Ottoman Empire 'Turks', without 
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regards to their ethnicity,  so it keeps more in the spirit of the primary sources to  
translate it as such. 
Place names were a source of difficulty for writers in the period, especially 
when they heard the name of a foreign town spoken and had to render it in their own  
language. In these cases, I shall first give the name as written in the primary source,  
followed  by  the  modern  name  in  the  local  language  in  parenthesis,  e.g.  Lanzan 
(Lahījān). After the first appearance, I shall use the modern name. Where there is a 
widely used English name for a place, I shall use that instead of the local language's  
name, e.g. Vienna instead of Wien. 
Finally, I use the terms  West and  East as a form of shorthand. By the West I 
refer to the primarily Christian countries of Europe, and by East to the countries lying 
to the south and east of Austria, including Turkey, the Middle East and Central Asia, 
most, but not all of which were Islamic. China, Indo-China and other parts of East 
Asia could be considered separate under the term Far East, but as they do not appear 
frequently in this work it is of little consequence here. These terms have been often 
used  in  the  past  and  I  adopt  them  for  the  convenience  of  writing  about  broad 
geographic areas. I  do not mean to impart any  essentialism of character to people 
living in these regions or  imply any connection between the cultures.  Indeed, the 
recognition  of  distinctions  between  cultures  within  the  area  of  the  East  is  an 
important part of my thesis. 
Review of Literature
There has never been a systematic study of the relations between Austria and Safavid 
Persia.  While  archival  records  do  exist,  there  has  never  been  more  than  passing 
references to these events in the secondary literature. The subject is not unknown; 
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numerous books  on Austrian or  Persian history make reference  to  the diplomatic 
missions  between  the  two.  But  these  mentions  are  brief  -  often  no  more  than  a 
paragraph  or  a  footnote.  There  are  several  secondary  works  which  explore  the 
diplomatic  relations between Europe and Persia.  However,  all  have deficiencies  of 
some sort. 
The main work examining the efforts of European countries and Persia to form 
an alliance against  the Ottoman Turks  was  written in the 1960’s  by Barbara  von 
Palombini.14 Her book chronologically covers the diplomatic efforts by each of the 
Iranian rulers and the various European countries. Notably, writing in German, she 
thoroughly describes contacts between the Austrian court and Persia, contacts which 
are given less attention in some English works.15 Unfortunately, she ends her work at 
the arbitrary date of 1600. This is directly before the decade which contained some of 
the most promising diplomacy and the one time when both Europe and Persia were 
both at war with the Ottomans simultaneously.16
Details  of  diplomatic  activities  between  Europeans  and  Safavids  are  also 
covered  by  several  other  works,  including  The  Asian  Trade  Revolution by  Niels 
Steensgaard.17 He pays particular attention to the early decades of the 17th century. 
However, his book is primarily a work of economic history about nautical trade in the 
Indian Ocean, it just happens to cover events in Persia because it was an important  
trading  centre.  The  book  generated  controversy  when  it  was  published,  but  was 
criticised more for his economic theory and his account of peddling trade than for the 
detailed facts it contained. Another deficiency of the book for the study of Austrian-
14 Barbara von Palombini, Bündniswerben abendländischer Mächte um Persien 1453- 1600, (Wiesbaden, 
1968).
15 for instance: Lockhart, CHI, “European Contacts with Persia”, while providing a useful survey, 
devotes more space to Italian, Spanish and English contacts than to those of Austria and Germany. 
16 The paper: Jan Paul Niederkorn. “Zweifrontenkrieg gegen die Osmanen: Iranisch- christliche 
Bündnispläne in der Zeit des “Langen Türkenkriegs” 1593–1606”, In: Mitteilungen des Instituts für 
Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 104 (1996), pp. 310-323, also makes this complaint and makes 
an effort to fill the gap. 
17 Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, (Chicago, 1974), also 
published as Carracks, Caravans and Companies, Copenhagen 1973. 
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Persian diplomacy is that he draws primarily on Italian and Spanish sources, ignoring 
German sources. 
Helmut Slaby's book  Bindenschild und Sonnenloewe covers Austrian relations 
with Iran throughout history.  While  he does  mention the Safavids,  it  appears  the 
primary  focus  of  the  book  is  on  later  periods,  particularly  the  nineteenth  and 
twentieth centuries up to 1980.18
In addition to the above described books, there are also a number of papers 
about the diplomacy of particular European countries with Persia, or about specific  
diplomatic  events.  For  instance,  Giorgio  Rota  wrote  about  Safavid  relations  with 
Venice,  and R. W. Ferrier wrote about  Safavid Relations with England.19 However, 
these efforts have focused more on Italian, Spanish, and English relations; there is not 
yet a study of Austrian endeavours. So while all of the above studies are useful in 
providing  context  and  examples  of  European-Safavid  diplomacy,  none  of  them 
adequately cover the subject explored in this thesis. 
There are a number of books on the history of each of the cultures: Habsburg 
Austrian and Safavid Persian. On the early-modern Habsburg Empire, two of the most 
influential studies in English are by R. J. W. Evans.20 Also well known are books by 
Bérenger (translated from the original French) and Kahn.21 Naturally, there are many 
more works in German, for instance the recent contribution by Thomas Winkelbauer 
18 Peter C. Marboe, "Review - Bindenschild und Sonnenloewe: Die Geschichte der osterreichisch-
iranischen Beziehungen bis zur Gegenwart by Helmut Slaby", Middle East Journal, Vol. 37, No. 3 
(Summer, 1983), pp. 474-475.
19 Giorgio Rota. “Diplomatic Relations between Safavid Persia and the Republic of Venice, an 
Overview”, in: The Turks. Vol. 2. (Ankara, 2002), pp. 580–587; R. W. Ferrier. “The Terms and 
Conditions under which English Trade Was Transacted with Safavid Persia”, in: Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, 49.1 (1986). pp. 48–66. 
20 R.J.W. Evans, Rudolf II, and, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy.
21 Bérenger. A History of the Habsburg Empire 1273-1700, trans. by C. A. Simpson; Robert A. Kahn. A 
History of the Habsburg Empire,(Berkeley, 1974). 
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covering the  early-modern period  for  a  multi-volume series  on Austrian history. 22 
Safavid history is also covered in a number of books. The Safavid dynasty is included 
in David Morgan’s history of medieval Persia.23 Among those who have written about 
the Safavids in particular are William Floor, Rodger Savory, and Andrew Newman.24 
Rudolf (Rudi) Matthee has written a number of recent books and articles about the  
Safavids.25
The  development  of  diplomacy  within  Europe  during  the  Renaissance  and 
early modern periods is well represented in the literature. Klaus Müller examined the 
diplomacy of  the Holy Roman Empire  and the Viennese court.26 The classic  work 
covering all of Europe, is  Renaissance Diplomacy by Garrett Mattingly published in 
1955.27 In  it,  Mattingly  described  how  the  Italian  states  during  the  15th  century 
developed innovations,  such as  the maintenance of  permanent  ambassadors  and a 
dedicated  bureaucracy  for  analysing  foreign  policy  intelligence  provided  by  these 
ambassadors. These developments grew out of the Italian environment of many city-
states with rapidly shifting alliances and constant military threats which required the 
decision makers have access to more current information than was possible through 
the medieval institutions. Many studies have been published since Mattingly’s work, 
but while they may expand on certain points, most are respectful of his conclusions.  
For instance, Michael Mallett describes his relationship to Mattingly thus,  “Garrett 
Mattingly in his seminal book on Renaissance Diplomacy rightly countered the claims 
of the diplomatic theorists themselves that their main object was to preserve peace, 
but  he  underestimated  the  intimate  connections  between  diplomacy  and  war  in 
22 Thomas Winkelbauer. Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht: Länder und Untertanen des Hauses Habsburg  
im konfessionellen Zeitalter, 2 vol., in the series, Osterreichische Geschichte, ed. by Herwig Wolfram, 
(Vienna, 2003). 
23 David Morgan, Medieval Persia 1040 - 1797, (London, 1988). 
24 W. Floor, The Economy of Safavid Persia, (Wiesbaden, 2000); W. Floor, Safavid Government 
Institutions, (Costa Mesa, 2001);  R. Savory, Iran under the Safavids, (Cambridge, 1980); Andrew J. 
Newman, Safavid Iran. 
25 Rudolph P. Matthee. The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran, (Cambridge, 1999); Persia in Crisis, 
(London 2012); and others, see Bibliography. 
26  Klaus Müller, Das kaiserliche Gesandschaftswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden, 
1648-1740, (Bonn, 1976).
27 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, (London, 1955). 
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fifteenth-century  Italy.”28 More  recently,  some  historians  have  called  for  a  re-
evaluation of  Mattingly in order to reinvigorate the field of  diplomatic  history by 
introducing a new model. His work has been criticized for its sharp periodization of 
Renaissance  from  Medieval,  his  poor  understanding  of  the  subtleties  of  Medieval 
diplomacy,  and his  teleological  focus on the  development  of  practices.29 However, 
even  when  his  work  is  challenged,  Mattingly  remains  the  single  author  on  the 
development of Renaissance diplomacy to which everyone must refer.
Unfortunately, there exists no such seminal work on Persian diplomacy. In part 
this is due to the Safavids themselves leaving few written records of their diplomatic  
actions. Diplomacy was carried out at the verbal instruction of the Shāh, and written 
records  of  diplomacy  are  mainly  formalised  letters  to  foreign  rulers.30 Only  one 
account of a Safavid diplomatic mission written for a Persian audience is known to 
exist,  the story of  a 1685 embassy to the Court  of  Siam.31 The modern studies  of 
Persian diplomacy that do exist tend to focus on one particular aspect or relations  
with one particular country.32 While useful, these papers do not present an overall 
view  of  the  shape  of  Safavid  diplomacy.  The  Persian  chronicles  are  useful  for 
describing the events of each Shah's reign, but their primary purpose was legitimising 
and extolling the virtues of the ruler and so have little to say about European visitors.
  
28 Michael Mallett. “Diplomacy and War in Later Fifteenth-Century Italy”, in: Art and Politics in 
Renaissance Italy, ed. by George Holmes, (Oxford, 1993), pp. 137–158, quote p. 143.
29 John Watkins, "Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe", Journal 
of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, Vol. 38:1, (Winter 2008), pp. 1-5.
30 Colin P. Mitchell, The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran: Power, Religion and Rhetoric, (London, 2009, 
2012), pp. 5-6.
31 Muḥammad Rābī' ibn Muḥammad Ibrāhīm. The Ship of Sulaimān, trans. by John O’Kane, (London, 
1972). 
32 Examples include: Rudi Matthee. “Iran’s Ottoman Diplomacy During the Reign of Shah Sulayman I 
(1077-1105/1666-94)”, in: Iran and Iranian Studies, Essays in Honor of Iraj Afshar, ed. by Kambiz 
Eslami. (Princeton, NJ, 1998); Rudi Matthee. “Anti-Ottoman Concerns and Caucasian Interests: 
Diplomatic Relations Between Iran and Russia”, in: Safavid Iran and her Neighbors, ed. by M. 
Mazzaoui. (Salt Lake City, 2003), pp. 101-128; Ernest Tucker, "From Rhetoric of War to Realities of 
Peace: The Evolution of Ottoman-Iranian Diplomacy through the Safavid Era", in: Iran and the 
World in the Safavid Age, ed. Willem Floor and Edmund Herzig, (London, 2012), pp. 81-89.
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Source Materials
Because there is little literature directly on this subject, much of my work will  be  
based on reading of primary source documents. I piece together the primary sources 
with various secondary accounts in order to produce a complete account. Since my 
aim is to cover the interactions and changes over a two century relationship, there 
will inevitably be gaps in the records. I attempt to fill some of these gaps by turning to 
a wide variety of sources: primary and secondary texts, as well as other non-textual  
sources such as art.
The primary resource I use, which distinguishes this study from others, is the 
Austrian  Habsburg  court  records.  The  main  repository  of  documents  from  the 
Austrian  Habsburg  courts  is  the  Östereiches  Staatsarchiv (Austrian  State-archive), 
located in Vienna. Within the Staatsarchiv, the section of most interest for diplomatic  
and courtly issues is the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, which holds documents related 
to the Habsburg family and matters of state. Another branch of the Austrian State 
Archives, the Hofkammerarchiv, holds financial records. The Austrian State Archives 
hold many documents from the Habsburgs' diplomatic activity, including translations 
of letters sent from the Safavid Shahs. The Austrian archives unfortunately have gaps 
in their coverage. In the sixteenth century the court was not settled in one place:  
Ferdinand I spent much time in Innsbruck; Maximilian II  maintained Vienna as an 
administrative centre but he visited several residences; and Rudolf II moved his court 
to Prague before Mathias moved it back, finally, to Vienna. In the course of these 
many  moves,  along  with  the  ravages  of  time  and  war,  some  records  were  lost,  
especially  for  the  reigns  of  Rudolf  II  and  his  predecessors.  Some  stories  can  be 
assembled - one side of correspondence will exist but not the other, or documents will 
refer  to  earlier  letters  which  are  not  found.  In  other  cases,  certain  questions  can 
simply not be answered as the documentation is missing. But compared to some other 
archives from the same era, the Austrian State Archives are a remarkable resource. 
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Some  Habsburg  records  are  now  housed  in  other  locations.  When  the 
Habsburg  Empire  broke  apart  in  the  twentieth  century,  some  documents  were 
distributed to the newly independent successor  states.  Some records regarding the 
Habsburgs' role as Kings of Bohemia ended up in Prague, along with material about 
Emperor  Rudolf  II,  since  he  held  his  court  in  Prague.  The  Národní  Archiv  České  
Republiky (National Archive of the Czech Republic) has a few documents relevant to 
this thesis. 
Unfortunately,  there  are  fewer  surviving  Persian  sources  for  Safavid 
diplomacy. Persia at the time did not keep archival records in the same way as Europe. 
As explained above, those items which do survive -  official  chronicles,  theological 
tracts, letters - hold little information regarding relations with foreigners, especially 
non-Muslims.  The  scribes  of  the  Safavid  court  developed  an  elaborate  style  for 
communications  from  the  dynasty,  using  medieval  Islamic  rhetorical  science  and 
poetry to project an image of dynastic ideology.33 Safavid rulers commissioned history 
writers to legitimize their rule.34 The chronicles are useful for setting the background 
events to the diplomacy, such as the many wars with the Ottoman Empire, but have 
very little  to say about actual relations with European diplomats.  Most chronicles, 
when they refer to Europe at all, do so only in a generalized, undifferentiated way as  
Farangestan  (land  of  the  Franks).  The  biographer  of  Shah  'Abbās  I,  Iskander  Beg 
Munshi, does list the names of European countries, but he has little else to say about 
them, and he is an exceptional case.35 Therefore, my use of Persian sources is rather 
limited. Even modern Iranian books on Safavid history,  such as Naṣrallāh Falsafi's 
Zindigānī-yi Shāh 'Abbās  Avval  and Navā'i's  Ravabiṭ-i  siyāsī va iqtiṣādi-i  Irān, use 
mostly  European sources.36 While  it  is  sometimes illuminating to see  how Iranian 
33 Mitchell, Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran, pp. 11-16. 
34 Sholeh A. Quinn, Historical Writing During the Reign of Shah 'Abbas: Ideology, Imitation and 
Legitimacy in Safavid Chronicles, (Salt Lake City, 2000), p. 5, 90-91.
35 Iskander Beg Munshi, History of Shah 'Abbas, trans. Savory, Vol. 2, p. 1305; Mansur Sefatgol, 
"Farang, Farangi, and Farangestan: Safavid Historiography and the West (907-1148/1501-1736)", in 
Iran and the West in the Safavid Age, ed. Willem Floor and Edmund Herzig, (London, 2011), pp. 357-
363.
36 Naṣr Allāh Falsafī, Zindigānī-yi Shāh ʻAbbās Avval, (Tehran, 1955) Vol. 4, pp. 1423-1437. 'Abd al-
Ḥusayn Navāʼī, Ravābiṭ-i siyāsī va iqtiṣādī-i Īrān dar dawrah-i Ṣafavīyah, (Tehran, 1998), pp. 184-
200.
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scholars interpret the European sources, ultimately, it makes more sense to go straight 
to  the  original  works.  While  I  have  striven  for  balance  in  representing  the 
perspectives  of  both  cultures,  in  the  end  I  have  been  forced  to  rely  mostly  on 
European sources. 
In addition to the archival sources there are several published collections of primary 
sources,  including  correspondence  of  several  of  the  Emperors  and  Vatican 
representatives in the Imperial court, records from Christian missionaries in Persia,  
and Persian chronicles. Some of these deserve special explanation here. 
Die Prager Nuniatur des Giovanni Stefano Ferreri,  Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland 
(The  Prague  Nunctioship  of  Ferrei,  Nunctio-reports  from  Germany)  collected  and 
translated into German the letters from the Papal representative to Emperor Rudolf 
II's court in Prague in the years 1603 to 1606.37 These years included visits by several 
Persian ambassadors,  as  well  as  important  decisions  about  war  with the Ottoman 
Empire which affected the relations with Persia. Ferreri was an important advisor to 
the Emperor and quite involved with the Persian ambassadors. He kept Rome apprised 
of  the  activities  regarding the  ambassadors  and many other  details  of  the  court's  
activity. Ferreri was not a neutral observer - his job was to influence Imperial policy in 
the  way  favoured  by  the  Vatican,  and  his  perspective  must  be  taken  into 
consideration, but with this consideration his reports are a treasury of details about 
the  politics  and  activity  in  the  court.  Since  the  records  from  Rudolf's  reign  are 
particularly incomplete due to court moves and the subsequent sacking of Prague in 
the Thirty Years  War,  Ferreri's  reports  provide a  valuable record of  events  in the 
Prague court. 
A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia collected and translated into English a multitude 
of documents concerning the Carmelite order's mission in Persia in the seventeenth 
37 Die Prager Nuniatur des Giovanni Stefano Ferreri, Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland, A. O. Meyer, 
editor, Vol. IV. 3. (Berlin, 1913).
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and  eighteenth  centuries.38 Many  of  the  documents  are  letters  written  by  the 
missionaries in Persia, and they report many details about their experiences there. 
They also report on the religious and diplomatic situation in Persia and Persian-ruled 
Armenia. The collection also includes letters from the Popes to the Shahs and other 
related documents. Since the letters are from Christian missionaries, they can at times 
be unflattering about their Muslim hosts.  Nevertheless,  they provide extensive and 
detailed observations on Safavid Persia. 
Einführung  in  die  Persische  Paläographie,  101  Persische  Dokumente (Introduction  to 
Persian Paleography, 101 Persian Documents) collected Persian writing examples from 
several centuries in Many European archives.39 These include several letters from the 
Safavid  Shahs  to  the  Habsburg  Emperors,  the  Pope  and  other  European  rulers 
concerning diplomatic issues. This book includes the typeset Persian text, a German 
translation  and,  where  possible,  a  photographic  reproduction  of  the  original 
document.  It  was  notionally  published  as  a  workbook  for  study  of  the  Persian 
language, but as it collects many important source documents in one volume, it is also 
a useful resource for historical research. The Austrian archive made available many 
official translations of letters from the Shahs, usually to Latin, but this book provides  
the original language and so helps compensate for the lack of Persian sources. 
Methodological inspiration
Several recent papers have helped guide my research methodologies. John Watkins 
introduced a special issue of the Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies with the 
38 A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia and the Papal Mission of the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, 
[translated and edited by H. Chick](London, 1939). A selection of Carmelite letters have been 
translated into Persian in Manuchihr Sutūdah, Asnād-i pādaryn-i karmilī, bazmandah az ʼasr-i shah 
ʼabbās-i ṣafavī, (Tehran, 2004).
39 L Fekete. Einführung in die Persische Paläographie, 101 Persische Dokumente, ed. by G Hazai. 
(Budapest, 1977). 
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article  titled  "Toward  a  New  Diplomatic  History  of  Medieval  and  Early  Modern 
Europe".40 Watkins argues that pre-modern diplomatic history has been cut off from 
developments  in  social  and  cultural  history  by  the  dominance  of  certain  works, 
including  Mattingly's  Renaissance  Diplomacy,  which  suggest  a  teleological 
development of diplomatic practice towards modern forms. Instead, Watkins proposes, 
the field must consider the social  and cultural  conditions within the societies,  and 
between the societies in the case of international diplomacy, in order to understand 
the  behaviours  of  diplomats  representing  and  influencing  those  societies. 
"[Diplomacy's] history is inseparable from the histories of the visual arts, dramatic 
and  nondramatic  literature,  education,  race,  the  state,  marriage,  and  manners."41 
Particularly in a cross-cultural study such as this thesis, consideration of the cultural  
differences and the social perceptions of the participants towards foreign cultures are 
of  vital  importance.  I  have  attempted  to  bring  into  the  story  of  the  diplomatic 
relationship consideration of such factors, and to include information on the personal 
outlooks of individual diplomats where such is available. I include as source material 
not  just  official  papers,  but  literary  works,  material  culture,  and  art  work  in  an 
attempt to expand the range of information considered. 
The difficulty of studying cultural attitudes is more severe in the case of Persia 
and their perceptions of the west. Rudi Matthee discusses this problem in the paper, 
"Between Aloofness and Fascination: Safavid Views of the West".42 Matthee discusses 
how official Persian literature projected an "Iran centred world view" reflecting the 
political  and  religious  elites'  creation  of  an  attitude  of  cultural  superiority.  
Consequently,  the  Persian  chronicles  make  few  cursory  references  to  European 
visitors. Such a situation is a challenge to researching Persian views, since one must 
turn to foreign sources almost exclusively. However, Matthee is able to help interpret 
what sources do exist and examine Persian behaviour in order to infer their more 
40 John Watkins, "Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe", Journal 
of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, Vol. 38:1, (Winter 2008), pp. 1-14.
41 John Watkins, "Toward a New Diplomatic History", p. 13.
42 Rudi Matthee, "Between Aloofness and Fascination: Safavid Views of the West", Iranian Studies, 
Vol. 31, No. 2, (Spring 1998), pp. 219-246. 
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complex attitudes towards European visitors, which showed "an active, if selective, 
interest" in what the foreigners could offer. 
Another field which aided in the interpretation of diplomats' written accounts 
is  the  literary  study  of  travel  writing.  Peter  Hulme  and  Tim  Youngs  edited  the 
Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing,  and their introduction to this volume plus 
other contributions in the collection provide a guide to examining the sources from 
the  diplomats.43 Some  of  the  Austrian  diplomats  who  travelled  to  Persia,  notably 
Tectander and Olearius, published narrative accounts of their journeys on their return. 
These gave to the public of early modern Europe a description of Persian culture with 
the  immediate  authority  of  first-hand  experience.  However,  as  these  are  literary 
works, they must be analysed carefully, since they depict the mentality and biases of  
the author in addition to the culture they profess to describe. Even the more official 
reports are a form of travel literature, although written for the limited audience of the 
court, and these too can be analysed as such. 
Outline of Chapters
Because  the  relationship  between  Austria  and  Safavid  Persia  has  never  been 
systematically covered, establishing the events that occurred between the two is the 
first  priority.  Only  once  that  is  done  can  a  more  theoretical  discussion  of  the 
relationship be possible. This concern dictates the structure of the following text. First 
come three chronological chapters, which describe the evolution of the relationship 
through time in the order in which events occurred. This presentation establishes the 
basic facts, and also allows readers to see how earlier actions influenced later ones and 
how the interactions changed with time. Following these chronological chapters are 
two thematic  chapters,  which  examine  in  more  detail  certain  issues  raised  in  the 
43 Peter Hulme and Tim Youngs, "Introduction", in The Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing. eds. 




The  chronological  section  is  comprised  of  the  following  three  chapters: 
Chapter Two covers most of the sixteenth century, with a prelude explaining some 
events from earlier eras which influenced the relationship. In the sixteenth century 
the issue of primary importance was the attempt to form a military alliance against 
the Ottoman threat. Each generation of rulers made fresh attempts at such an alliance,  
but each was unsuccessful. Chapter Three covers the turn of the century - the decades 
immediately before and after 1600. This was the time of the rulers Emperor Rudolf II 
and  Shah 'Abbās,  and  of  Austria's  'Long Turkish  War'.  This  period  saw the most  
concentrated diplomatic effort at establishing the alliance, but also the final failure of 
such attempts. However, as the alliance effort was failing, hints of new issues in the 
relationship,  such as  religion and cultural  exchange,  were first  appearing.  Chapter  
Four  examines the remainder of the seventeenth century and up to the fall  of the 
Safavid  dynasty  in  1722.  In  this  time,  other  issues  came to  predominate  over  the 
military alliance. The relationship broadened to cover a range of subjects such as trade 
and  religion.  It  became  a  normalised  relationship  of  two  countries  dealing  with 
various common interests and points of friction, instead of being driven by a single 
concern. Since numerous issues were addressed simultaneously this chapter will not 
be as strictly chronological as the previous two, instead it separates out the various 
strands. However, it still stands as a distinct time period in the relationship compared 
to the previous chapters. 
Following these chapters are the thematic chapters. The questions addressed in 
this section require viewing the entire sweep of the Habsburg-Safavid relationship and 
so are  properly addressed here,  where the whole  of  the previous chapters  can be 
observed  and used  as  data.  Some of  these  issues  have  been touched upon in  the  
previous chapters, but are re-examined in more detail with the full context available.  
These questions follow two themes: issues about the failure of the alliance and the 
change in the relationship,  and issues  regarding what  this  relationship  can reveal 
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about historiography and theory. 
In  Chapter  Five,  the  change  in  relationship  is  examined  in  more  detail.  First  the 
opening decade of the seventeenth century is identified as the turning point for the 
relationship. While this is clear from the events in Chapter Three, here it is addressed 
more explicitly and put into context with other countries also dealing with Persia at 
the same time.  Second,  following on from the  first  point  which saw the  ultimate 
failure of the alliance attempt, we examine why the alliance that both sides desired 
was never realized. Two theories from the literature are covered: that the distance and 
difficulty  of  travel  was  too  great  an  obstacle  to  cooperation,  and  that  each  side 
preferred to use the respite given when the other side was at war with the Ottomans 
to deal with other concerns rather than to launch into a fresh war which might have 
seen longer term gains. To these theories I add my own: differences in the styles of 
diplomacy expected in each culture inhibited making a lasting arrangement. All three 
theories are valid, and combined they to lead to the historical outcome. Finally, the 
failure  of  the  Austrian-Persian  alliance  is  contrasted  with  the  more  successful 
relationship between France and the Ottoman Empire. 
Chapter Six draws some lessons for historiography from the events examined 
in the rest of the thesis. Austrian engagement with the east is observed, and it is seen 
in light of the Persian diplomacy that the Habsburg rulers paid considerable attention 
to  eastern  affairs.  Traditional  Austrian  historiography  has  concentrated  more  on 
European relations and so this section makes a small effort at a needed correction. The 
Habsburg understanding of the different nations and currents of the Middle East and 
Central Asia are seen to be more nuanced than they are often credited, perhaps even 
more  informed  than  they  themselves  realised.  Their  actions  defied  their  rhetoric. 
Finally, the existence of a nuanced view of the East is used to critique and expand  
Edward Saïd's  Orientalism.  In that work, Saïd attributed to the West a monolithic, 
stereotyped view of the Orient. However, as established above, the Habsburg view 
was quite aware of distinctions among eastern cultures. 
23
Chapter Seven is a conclusion which draws together all the events described, 
summarises their lessons and points towards future work to be done. The post-Safavid 
era is examined briefly to show how the relationships established in Safavid times 
developed later. For instance, Austrian trade with Persia was small during the Safavid 
era,  but  in later  centuries  they used contacts  established then to  become a major 
trading  partner.  Persia's  position  in  the  world  changed  in  the  era  of  European 
imperialism; however, Austria maintained a unique relationship with Persia through 
the modern era. The post-Safavid era is beyond the scope of this work, although it is  
important to quickly observe, in order to see where the trends examined in this thesis  
led. Overall, the conclusion drawn from the events described throughout this thesis is  
that,  in  the  early  modern  era,  Persia  and  European  nations  conducted  friendly 
diplomacy and attempted to work together despite cultural differences. The hostility 




In this chapter, we see how the Safavid dynasty in Persia and the Austrian branch of 
the  Habsburg  family  both  emerged  in  the  early  sixteenth  century  and  quickly 
established diplomatic contact. Both Persia and Austria faced repeated invasions by 
the Ottoman Empire, which was at the peak of its power. The primary diplomatic  
concern for  both Safavid and Habsburg rulers  was arranging military cooperation 
against their  common enemy. This one issue dominated their  contacts during this 
century. As will be seen in future chapters, it was not until the next century that the 
relationship would broaden to other issues. Several features will be seen here, and 
examined in more detail in Chapter Five. The difficulty of communicating over such 
distances,  as  well  as  missteps  and  distractions  on  both  sides,  led  to  missed 
opportunities and a failure to reach any alliance. From the beginning of their branch 
with Ferdinand I, the Austrian Habsburgs thought their destiny lay in the east and 
pushed for more attention in that direction against the reluctance of their Spanish 
cousins.  At  the start  of  the Austrian-Persian relationship neither  side  knew much 
about the other.  Their image of the other was formed more of myths and ancient  
history  rather  than  facts.  While  contact  through  the  century  did  not  create  the 
military alliance, it did gradually improve their knowledge of each other, which would 
be essential for future cooperation.
Prelude: Prester John and Europe's Myth of a Saviour from the East
Throughout the middle ages and after, Europeans hoped for an eastern force to attack 
their Muslim enemies in the rear. This fervent wish gave rise to a myth: a fictional  
character  named  Prester  John.  He  was  the  supposed  priest-king  of  a  powerful 
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Christian kingdom beyond the Islamic lands, who would join Europe in fighting the 
Muslim armies. This myth had a powerful effect on European minds. For centuries, 
various eastern nations were hailed as the followers of Prester John and the saviours  
of Christianity. Even when the story was no longer believed, the myth still exerted its  
influence on Europeans' perception of Asia, and it kept them hoping for an ally in the  
East. The Safavids would become one in a series of countries to be courted as the  
embodiment of this 'Saviour from the East'. 
The legend of Prester John began circulating in mid twelfth-century Europe. 
Otto von Friesing, a German historian, mentions him in his world chronicle of 1145. 
He described news reported by the Bishop of Syria, that a John, a priest and the king  
of people living in the extreme Orient and professing Christianity, had fought a battle  
against the kings of the Medes and Persians. He intended to come to the aid of the 
Holy Church, but was presently held up by the Tigris river.1 Details were added in 
other  German chronicles,  and  eventually  the  legend  became  accepted  as  genuine. 
Prester John leapt from rumour to celebrity in 1165, with the circulation of a letter 
claiming to be from John to the Byzantine Emperor, and forwarded to the Pope and to 
the Holy Roman Emperor.  In the letter, 'John' boasted of his power and wealth, and 
described his kingdom, with its exotic animals and monstrous inhabitants. He wrote of 
the piety and justice of his society, which he claimed far exceeded that of Europe. He 
boasted of his own Christian humility, preferring the simple title of “Prester” (priest)  
to  some  more  grand  appellation.  After  expressing  his  concerns  about  Western 
Christianity, he pledged the purity and zeal of his own religion and his desire to help 
the Europeans with their struggles with enemies of the faith.2
Modern analysis  clearly  shows the letter  was fabricated.  The language and 
1 L.N. Gumilev, Searches for an Imaginary Kingdom: The Legend of the Kingdom of Prester John, trans. 
R.E.F. Smith, (Cambridge, 1987), p. 4. Citing: Hoffmeister, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum 
scholarum, Hanover-Leipzig, 1913, p. 365. 
2 Charles E. Nowell, “The Historical Prester John”, Speculum, Vol. 28, No. 3, (July 1953), pp. 435-445; 
Gumilev, Searches, p. 6; Friedrich Zarncke gives the full Latin text in Abhandlungen der Kgl. Sach. 
Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, Bd. 7, No. 8, Leipzig, 1879, Reprint: Hildesheim 1980.
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references point to a Central European author, and the exotica described can be traced 
to various medieval bestiaries and classical sources such as Pliny and the  Alexander 
Romance.3 The author wove together elements compelling and plausible to European 
audiences.  There are several theories on the  origins of the 1165 letter:  fragmented 
knowledge of the Ethiopian Christian kingdom; garbled  reports of the Qarā-Khitāy 
ruler Yeh-lü Ta-Shih's victory over the Seljuks at Qatwan in 1141; or an allegorist's 
attempt to criticise Western Christianity by describing a distant utopian kingdom. The 
reality is probably a combination of all of these elements, with the author drawing 
upon fragments of information current in Europe to lend verisimilitude to his utopian 
creation.4 But the origins are not as important as the tale's effect on Europe. Coming 
after a series of reverses for the Crusaders, the news of a Christian power who could 
attack  the  Muslims  in  the  rear  thrilled  European  audiences.  Prester  John  was 
considered a real ruler and the letter authentic. In 1177, Pope Alexander III sent an 
emissary, the physician Master Philip, with a letter from the Pontiff to John. But while  
a copy of the Pope's letter exists, nothing is known about Master Philip's expedition.5
Europeans continued to look for Prester John's kingdom, fully expecting it to 
be  there,  somewhere  in  their  hazy  Asian  geography.  In  1221,  Crusaders  were 
encamped in Egypt when news reached them of a King David, a Christian king of 
India, who was attacking Muslims. This David was identified with Prester John's son 
or grandson. This encouraging news was passed on to the Pope in Rome in a letter by  
James of Vitry. Buoyed by the news, the Crusaders pressed ahead with their attack,  
but the rumour never materialised and the Crusaders were defeated by the Mamlūks. 
The story may have been based on Chingiz Khān's campaign against the Khwārazm-
shāh, which was occurring at that time.6 
Initial reports of the Mongols' campaigns gave rise to the idea that Chingiz 
3 Igor de Rachewiltz, "Prester John and Europe's Discovery of East Asia", East Asian History, No. 11, 
(June 1996), p. 65.
4 Nowell, “Historical Prester John”, pp. 435-445. 
5 Nowell, “Historical Prester John”, pp. 444-445. Gumilev, Searches, p. 6.
6 David Morgan, The Mongols, (Oxford, 1986), p. 178. 
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Khān might be Prester John or King David. However, after the Mongols' 1241 invasion 
of Hungary, stories of the destruction wrought made it clear that they were not the  
fabled  Christian  kingdom  of  the  east.  The  Pope  sent  emissaries  into  the  Mongol 
Empire, in part to find out what had happened to Prester John's kingdom. One, John of 
Plano Carpini, travelled to the Great Khan Güyük's court in 1245.7 But his entreaties to 
give up their massacres and become good Christians did little, and the Mongols sent 
back a letter demanding the rulers of Europe submit and send tribute. In 1248, as Louis 
IX  of  France  was  preparing  for  a  crusade  in  Egypt,  he  received  two  Nestorian 
Christian ambassadors from Eljigidei, the Mongol commander in the Middle East. The 
ambassadors hoped that the coming crusade could help Mongol efforts against the 
Muslims, and to capture Louis'  interest they emphasized the Mongols'  goodwill  to 
Christianity.  They  may  have  even  said  that  Eljigidei  and  Güyük  had  become 
Christians themselves. King Louis was impressed – the appearance of Asian Christian 
allies against Islam was exactly what was hoped for, and he sent an envoy with a  
richly decorated portable chapel as a gift. Independent accounts indicate that Güyük, 
while not Christian himself,  had several  Nestorian Christian members of his inner 
circle  and was tolerant  of  all  religions.  But  once the French envoy arrived at  the 
Mongol court, the political situation had changed; Güyük had died, and his widow and 
regent were in the middle of a power struggle. The French ambassador was given a 
frosty welcome, and for a time European hopes for relations with the Mongols faded.8
Europe and the Mongol dynasty established in Persia, the Ilkhāns, conducted 
many  diplomatic  negotiations.  As  the  Mongol  Empire  of  Chingiz  Khān  was  split 
between his heirs, his descendants the, Ilkhāns, faced hostility from both the Mamlūks 
in Egypt and their  own cousins of  the Golden Horde to the north.  This situation 
encouraged  them  to  approach  Europe  as  possible  allies.  Europe,  meanwhile,  was 
facing losing its remaining Crusader holdings, and was eager to respond. The Ilkhān 
leader Hülegü initiated contact in 1262, through a letter to King Louis IX. 9 From then 
7 de Rachewiltz, “Prester John”, p. 67.
8 Morgan, The Mongols, pp. 181-183. 
9 Morgan, The Mongols, pp. 183;  J. A. Boyle, “The Il-Khans of Persia and the princes of Europe”. 
Central Asiatic Journal, pp. 25-40.
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until into the fourteenth century, they continued negotiations, with numerous letters 
from both sides exchanged. The goal negotiated was a combined operation against the 
Mamlūks, a European crusading force acting at the same time as an Ilkhān invasion of 
Syria. If the Ilkhāns took Syria they would give Jerusalem to the Europeans.  While 
the plan appealed to both sides, the difficulty of communicating and arranging joint 
actions in that time prevented any plan coming to fruition. Even when the Ilkhāns 
converted to Islam in 1295, a fact that seemed to go unrecognised in Europe, the basic  
strategic considerations did not change. Not until a Mamlūk-Ilkhān peace treaty in 
1322 did the Ilkhāns lose interest in an alliance with Europe. The fall of Acre to the 
Mamlūks in 1291 did not eliminate European desire to strike a blow against their 
enemies; however, it reduced their ability to act in the Middle East. As the fourteenth 
century progressed,  contacts  became more  about  commercial  relations pursued by 
merchants from the Italian states, and missionary activity directed by the Vatican. 
The  next  Asiatic  conqueror  to  be  courted  by  Europeans  as  an ally  against 
Islam, this time in the late fourteenth century, was Tīmūr-i Lenk, known in Europe as 
Tamurlane. This was ironic because Tīmūr, although descended from Mongol stock, 
was a fierce Muslim, and although his personal behaviour was more based on the pre-
Islamic steppe tradition, he maintained a public piety and respect for Islamic religious 
figures. He rose to power fighting in the name of Islam against the nomadic, pagan 
people of northern Chagatai Khānate.10 But in his time, Europe and the Byzantine 
Empire were being threatened by the expanding Ottoman Turks. Another saviour was 
sought, and Tīmūr as a great war-leader fit the role admirably. Venetian and Genoese 
trading colonies on the Black Sea offered him tribute and asked for help against the  
Ottoman Turks. Ottoman Sultan Bayezid and Tīmūr, who as leaders of the two great 
powers in the Middle East were natural rivals, conducted several years of skirmish and 
bluff before they conclusively battled at Ankara in July 1402.11 The battle was a great 
victory  for  Tīmūr,  and  Sultan  Bayezid  was  captured.  As  an  effect  of  the  Turkish 
defeat, the Ottoman assault on the remnants of the Byzantine Empire was halted, and 
10 Roemer, CHI, "Tīmūr in Iran", pp. 43-46, 51-57; 
11 Debate as to whether the date was July 20th or 28th covered in Hilda Hookham, Tamburlaine the 
Conqueror, (London, 1962), p. 150. 
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Constantinople stayed in Christian hands for another half-century. Tamurlane's fame 
spread  throughout  Europe  as  the  conqueror  of  the  Turks  and  the  saviour  of 
Constantinople.  Embassies  were  exchanged  with  Spain,  France,  and  England,  and 
European merchants came eager to trade with the new conqueror.12 The most notable 
emissary of this time was Ruy González de Clavijo,  ambassador from Henry III  of 
Castile and Leon. Clavijo wrote a detailed account of his journey and stay at Tīmūr's 
court, which is a font of information about Timurid society. His narrative, written in  
1406, was very popular and many copies circulated around Europe.13 Tamurlane the 
literary  character,  as  a  contradictory  figure  who  conducted  many  massacres  and 
atrocities,  but  who  also  helped  save  Christendom  from  the  Turks,  continued  to 
capture  Europe's  imagination;  evidenced  by  (among  other  works)  Christopher 
Marlowe's play Tamburlaine the Great, written in 1587. 
The legend of Prester John pressed its influence on all these encounters. This 
influence  was  felt  either  explicitly:  when  new  forces  were  believed  to  be  the 
embodiment of the priest-king, or indirectly: as the legend encouraged Europe to hope 
for an eastern saviour and to pursue Christian evangelism in the east. Eastern rulers, 
such as the Ilkhāns or Tīmūr, fit a western archetypal role established by the Prester 
John legend. Diplomatic contacts were at their most intense at times of defeats for the 
Christian forces, when fear drove them look for the desired rescuer. Between these 
defeats,  the contacts  established turned  to other  concerns,  such  as  commerce and 
religion, which thrived in times of lessened anxiety. But here too the legend of Prester  
John made an impact. The idea of an eastern Christian kingdom, coupled with the 
presence  of  Nestorian  Christians  in  courts  of  many  of  the  rulers,  encouraged 
European  religious  leaders  to  seek  converts  in  the  east,  even  when  the  realistic 
prospects for success were minimal. This pattern, in which contacts established for 
military alliance in times of threat developed into commercial and religious pursuits, 
also marks relations with the Safavids. 
12 Adam Knobler, "The Rise of Tīmūr and Western Diplomatic Response, 1390-1405", Journal of the 
Royal Asiatic Society, 3rd Series, Vol. 5, No. 3, (Nov., 1995), pp. 341-349.
13 Le Strange, Guy, trans., Clavijo; Embassy to Tamerlane 1403-1406, The Broadway Travellers series, 
(London, 1928). Discussion of publication history in the Introduction, pp. 20-21.  
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Emperor Charles V and Shah Ismā'īl I: The Opening of Relations
Shah Ismā'īl  had diplomatic  contacts  with European powers  right  from the 
start of the Safavid dynasty period.14 Venice had prior diplomatic relations with Persia 
during the reign of Uzan Husan (1453-1478), and sent an envoy, Constantino Lascari,  
to Persia in 1502, while Venice was at war with Ottoman Turkey. 15 Lascari brought 
information about the new ruler back to Europe. Although the Venetian-Turkish war 
was resolved before an alliance could be formed, Venice and Persia continued to have 
trade relations and occasional diplomatic exchanges throughout the decade.16 Ismā'īl 
also  had  contact  with  the  Vatican,  with  the  Knights  of  St.  John  on  Rhodes,  and 
received an envoy from King Louis of Hungary.17 They discussed the possibility of a 
military alliance against the Turks; however, these plans were interrupted in 1514 by 
the Persian defeat at the Battle of Chaldiran. Meanwhile,  Portuguese sailors seized 
control of the island of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, which put them into 
direct contact with Shah Ismā'īl.18 But two decades into the sixteenth century and the 
reign of the Safavid Dynasty, there had been no direct contact between the Safavids 
and what was becoming arguably the most powerful family in Europe, the Habsburgs. 
The Habsburg rulers were informed of Persian affairs and even included in alliance 
plans by the Popes. Emperor Charles V raised the alliance issue himself with German 
nobles of the Holy Roman Empire at a meeting of the Reichstag in 1524.19 But direct 
contact  between the  two houses  did  not  occur  until  Ismā'īl  took  the  initiative  to 
contact Charles.
14 Ismā'īl was crowned in Tabriz and declared “Twelver” Shi'ism the state religion in 1501, see Savory, 
Roger, Iran Under the Safavids, Cambridge, 1980, pp. 25-27. 
15 Barbara von Palombini, Bündniswerben abendländischer Mächte um Persien 1453- 1600, (Wiesbaden, 
1968), p. 41-43,  For Venetian relations with Uzan Hasan see pp. 16-31.; Rota, Giorgio, “Diplomatic 
Relations Between Safavid Persia and the Republic of Venice, an Overview”, in The Turks, Hasan 
Celâl Güzel, C. Cem Oğuz, and Osman Karatay, eds., vol. 2, (Ankara, 2002), p. 580-581.
16 Rota, “Relations Between Persia and Venice”, p. 581. 
17 Palombini, Bündniswerben, p. 44, 50-56; Lockhart, CHI, “European Contacts with Persia, 1350-1736” 
pp. 382.
18 Lockhart, CHI,“European Contacts”, pp. 380-381. 
19 Palombini, Bündniswerben, p.63. 
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Shah Ismā'īl composed letters to King Louis II of Hungary - with whom he had 
prior contact - and to Emperor Charles V in late summer 1523, as he was preparing an 
attack against the Turks the following year.20 These letters were entrusted to Maronite 
Friar Petrus de Monte Libano, who had previously undertaken other missions for the  
Shah and the Patriarch of Antioch. Petrus first took the letters to Rome, where they 
were translated from Persian to Latin in October 1523.21 Petrus travelled to Hungary to 
visit King Louis, then back to Germany and on to Spain in June 1524 to meet Charles 
V, following the movements of Charles' itinerant court. Thus, Charles did not receive 
the letter until almost a year had passed since it was written. Charles received Petrus 
with honour, but was not interested in pursuing the Turkish question until after he 
concluded the ongoing war with François I of France.
Shah  Ismā'īl  began  his  letter  to  Emperor  Charles  V  with  a  long,  religious 
greeting.22 In  the  midst  of  this  introduction,  which  seems  at  first  to  be  a  prayer 
praising God, Ismā'īl sprinkled lines designed to elicit feelings of commonality with 
Charles: he said God has honoured them both to be kings and therefore they are closer 
than brothers; he described Charles as wearing the crown of Emperor Constantine 
who brought Christianity to the Empire, with the subtext that Constantine's city is 
now held by the Turks; and he prayed for God's protection of those kings who punish 
the wicked and the heretics, suggesting an obligation for Charles to punish the heretic  
Turks. While this opening appears to be the standard religiously themed, flattering 
greeting  which  open  most  royal  letters  of  the  age,  it  reveals  Ismā'īl  as  a  subtle 
manipulator and quite knowledgeable of western history and theology.23
20 Lockhart, CHI, “European Contacts”, p. 382; Palombini, Bündniswerben, p. 63. 
21 The date of this letter is stated incorrectly with the Hirja year 924, corresponding to A.D. 1518, in 
Lanz, Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V. But Neck, “Diplomatische Beziehungen zum Vorderen 
Orient unter Karl V.” and Lockhart, CHI, "European Contacts", argue that this is wrong and the 
proper date, as backed by a Persian publication of the letter by Falsafī, Tārīkh-i ravābīt, pp. 163-164, 
as Shawwāl 929, or 13 August – 10 September 1523 A.D. See Lockhart, CHI, "European Contacts", p. 
382, note 1. 
22 Lanz, Karl, Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V., (Leipzig, 1844). Vol. 1, No. 29, pp. 52-53. 
23 The rhetorical techniques used by Ismā'īl's chancellery are discussed in Colin P. Mitchell, The 
Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran: Power, Religion and Rhetoric, (London, 2009, 2012), pp. 46-58. This 
letter demonstrates many of these techniques. 
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After the greeting, Ismā'īl then continued to the heart of the matter. He said 
that  he  planed  to  attack  the  Turks  in  April  and  he  “most  vehemently”  implored 
Charles  to  do  also  at  the  same  time.24 If  they  attacked  together,  they  should  rid 
themselves of their enemy, he wrote. Ismā'īl then chastised the Christian kings for  
warring among themselves. He said he marvels at this, because it will encourage the  
Turks. He informed Charles that he has written to the King of Hungary, asking him to  
join in the attack. Ismā'īl  acknowledged that letters cannot easily be sent between 
them, since the Turks control the seas (the eastern Mediterranean); therefore not to 
expect  another  letter  beyond this one.  He ended with a screed against  the Turks, 
warning that they are not to be trusted. In the midst of excoriating the Turks, Ismā'īl  
wrote, “But he who forsakes a partner will be punished greatly by God.”25 While this 
could be part of his warnings that the Turks do not honour their treaties, it could also  
be seen as a challenge to Charles not to shrink from the partnership with Persia. 
In his letter to Louis Jagiełłon of Hungary, Ismā'īl covered the same points, but 
with a different tone.26 The Shah knew that Hungary did not want to start another 
war,  and  so  he  highlighted  their  past  relationship  in  order  to  gently  coax  the 
Hungarian king to join. Ismā'īl warned, correctly it turned out, that the Turks would 
soon attack Hungary and thus it would be better for Louis to fight the war on his own 
terms and with Persian allies. In contrast, Ismā'īl was more forceful with Charles V.  
Where with Louis he coaxed and reasoned, Charles he challenged to action. With both 
of these letters Shah Ismā'īl showed that he urgently wanted an alliance. But he was 
let down by both his envoy as well as his own unrealistic schedule. Once Petrus had  
stopped in Rome, travelled to Hungary, then searched for the peripatetic  Emperor 
across Germany, he did not deliver the letter to Charles until after the proposed date  
for action had passed. Even if Petrus had gone straight to Charles in the autumn of  
1523,  this  would have left  Charles little  time to raise an army for  a new military 
undertaking.  The  plan  was  unrealistic  from  the  start,  even  without  the  logistical 
24 Lanz, Correspondenz Karl V, Vol. 1, No. 29, pp. 52-53.
25 Lanz, Correspondenz Karl V, Vol. 1, No. 29, pp. 52-53. "Qui autem fefellerit socium eumque 
deseruerit a deo optimo maximo puniatur."
26 Palombini,  Bündniswerben, p. 64.
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complications which prevented it from proceeding. However, by sending his letter to 
the Emperor, Ismā'īl initiated a relationship between dynasties that would continue 
over following years.
Charles V did not reply to the Shah's letter for half a year after the Battle of  
Pavia,  where  his  Imperial  army defeated  the  French.  Once  Charles  did  reply,  the 
proposed date for action was over a year past and Shah Ismā'īl  himself  was dead. 
Ismā'īl died in May 1524 and Charles did not write his reply until August 1525. But  
news of Ismā'īl's death was not received in Europe, so Charles' 1525 letter, and also his 
1529 follow-up, were addressed to Ismā'īl rather than his successor Ṭahmāsp I.27 
In August 1525, Petrus was sent back to the Safavid court with Charles V's  
reply. Charles begins the letter by explaining his delay in responding.28 He wrote they 
had reason to  doubt  the authenticity  of  the Shah's  letter,  since it  did  not  contain 
certain  customary  signatures  and  seals;  therefore  he  waited  in  hope  of  receiving 
additional contacts. This may indeed have been a concern - the early sixteenth century 
saw  many  false  ambassadors  and  imposters  appearing  at  the  courts  of  Europe 
claiming to  be from Prester  John or  lost  Jewish kingdoms.29 But  Charles  received 
Petrus  graciously in the court,  which seems to undermine his  statement of  doubt 
regarding  the  envoy's  authenticity.  He  then  continued  in  the  letter  to  his  other 
excuses, which were potentially more important in determining his actions. He wrote 
that he was sick for many months, and, most critically, that he was at war with the 
King of France. He described at some length the treachery of the French attack, their  
vast number of troops, and the seriousness of the situation, but how he was able to 
win with the grace of God. By the weight of text, the French war was the primary  
factor delaying Charles'  response. “But now Christians have peace,”  Charles wrote 
after describing his victory, “...and nothing remains such that we cannot satisfy the 
27 Palombini,  Bündniswerben, p. 65; Lockhart, CHI, “European Contacts", p. 382. 
28 Lanz, Correspondenz Karl V., Vol. 1, No. 75, pp. 168-169. 
29 Imposters and the concerns they raised for Renaissance courts is examined by Miriam Eliav-Feldon, 
Renaissance Impostors and Proofs of Identity, (Hampshire, 2012), for diplomats particularly see  Chp. 
3, "False Ambassadors, Fabulous Lands", pp. 68-96. 
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common desire to oppose the Turks.”30 He concluded that he longs for nothing more 
than to join their strength in war against the common enemy. But he then abruptly 
ends the letter and says no more. 
Charles did not propose any dates or ideas about possible actions. He did not 
give any indication about how such a project could be organised. He stated that he did 
not receive the letter in time for the April 1524 offensive, but he made no counter-
proposal. The majority of his letter is taken up with excuses for not replying sooner, 
followed by a short statement in general terms professing enthusiasm for fighting the 
Turks. He does make one brief comment about sending back the envoy (Petrus) so 
Ismā'īl can understand the state of Charles' council of war. Perhaps Petrus was briefed 
with more details about possible plans, which he was to convey personally. However, 
no instructions to Petrus remain, in contrast to the later mission of Balbi (see below),  
so we must not read too much into this. More likely, Petrus, who was a monk not a  
military man, would be able to confirm his stay in the Imperial court, explain the 
delays, and convey Charles' friendship. Charles had other reasons for not wanting to 
make tangible promises of action against the Turks. He admitted in a letter to his  
brother  Ferdinand the following year  that  he was more concerned with affairs  in 
England and France, and that he feared action against the Turks would poison his 
relations with Pope Clement who would see such activity as a threat to the Pope's 
own power by strengthening the Imperial position in Italy.31 Charles may also have 
had religious qualms to allying with a non-Christian power; he told his brother that 
he was loath to negotiate a settlement with the Turks because of their religion. 32 What 
remains  is  that  the  1525  letter  offered  not  much  beyond  excuses  and  ambiguous 
promises. It did, however, complete the contact between the two courts and thereby 
establish grounds for further diplomacy in the future. 
30 Lanz, Correspondenz Karl V, pp. 168-169.,  christianorum paci iam...nihil reliqui esse, quin possimus 
communi desiderio adversum Turcam satisfacere.
31 Paula Sutter Fitchner, Ferdinand I of Austria, (New York, 1982), p. 49.




The later  half  of  the  1520s  held  political  changes  in  both  Persia  and  Austria.  As 
mentioned above, Shah Ismā'īl, the charismatic founder of the Safavid dynasty, died in 
1524. His son and heir, Shah Ṭahmāsp, was only ten years old at the time.33 For the 
following ten years a regency of various Qizilbāsh amirs ruled the Safavid state. This 
period was marked by infighting, political treachery, and occasional civil war as the 
leaders of various Qizilbāsh tribes vied for supremacy within the state and influence 
over the young Shah. During this time, Persia was faced with challenges from both the 
Uzbegs and the Ottomans. But at the same time, any diplomatic visitors arriving in 
this period would have found no single authority in the country with the power to 
speak for the whole of the state; thus the initiatives of this time were almost doomed 
to certain failure from the start. 
On the death of Shah Ismā'īl, the chief of the Rūmlū Qizilbāsh tribe assumed 
the  guardianship  of  the  young  Ṭahmāsp,  citing  testament  of  the  late  Shah  and 
challenging the previous Ustājlū and Shāmlū tribes' dominance of state offices.34 He 
was supported by the Rūmlū, Takkalū, and Ẕū'l-Qadar tribes. Tense manoeuvrings led 
to  a  triumvirate  rule  between  the  Rūmlū  chief,  his  Takkalū  supporter,  and  the 
powerful Ustājlū amir. However the Ustājlū's were marginalized from the beginning, 
and Ustājlū lands and titles were parcelled out to supporters of the other two rulers.  
By spring 1526, this situation led the Ustājlū to rebel, and battles were fought between  
this  tribe  and  others.  The  country  was  plunged  into  chaos  and  the  diversion  of 
military forces  encouraged the Uzbegs to  raid  the north-east  frontier.  The Ustājlū 
were defeated and their leader killed but troubles were just beginning. Sultān Takkalū 
33 Savory, Roger, Iran Under the Safavids, (Cambridge, 1980), p. 51. 
34 For the following on the regency see: Savory, Iran under Safavids, pp. 50-56; Roemer, CHI, vol. 6, 
chp. 5 “The Safavid Period”, pp. 233-235; Newman, Safavid Iran, pp. 26-27. 
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convinced the young Shah that the co-regent Div Sultān Rūmlū was the real cause of 
unrest, and so in July 1527 on a signal from Ṭahmāsp, Div Sultān Rūmlū, the original 
regent,  was killed.  The Takkalū  amir then assumed leadership of  the country and 
slighted the other tribes in favour of his own. He went so far as to deny assistance 
when the Shāmlū governor of Herat was besieged by the Uzbegs. In 1530-31 Takkalū 
and Shāmlū forces clashed in the royal camp. The Takkalū leader was killed and in the  
aftermath  the  exasperated  Ṭahmāsp,  who  was  now  old  enough  to  assert  some 
authority on his own,  ordered the execution of the entire Takkalū clan.  Although 
some Takkalū were able to prove their loyalty and escape slaughter, the tribe was 
never again a force in Safavid politics. Then Husayn Khan, the previously mentioned 
governor of  Herat,  began a Shāmlū regency.  However,  Husayn Khan repeated his 
predecessor's mistakes: favouring his own tribe above all the others and denying the 
Shah a role in governing. By 1533, he had aroused Shah Ṭahmāsp's suspicions. The 
Shah  was  now  old  enough  to  assume  his  own  authority  and  had  Husayn  Khan 
executed, ending the period of regencies. 
The  infighting  between  the  most  powerful  families  in  the  land  weakened 
Persia substantially and opened it to invasion from both Ottomans and Uzbegs. The 
Safavid dynasty was in peril of disintegrating after the first generation, as had the 
previous century's  dynasty of  Uzun Ḥasan and many others  before  and after.  But 
while the Qizilbāsh tribes vied with each other for influence over the regime, all were 
dedicated to the idea of Safavid rule. The Irani administrative officials continued their 
support for the dynasty as well, continuing to work with the Qizilbāsh in the 'Safavid 
Project'.35 None disputed Ṭahmāsp's right to inherit his father's crown. As Andrew 
Newman describes the episode,36 
"The civil war which raged for more than a decade after Ismail's passing did not 
reflect serious serious questioning of the legitimacy and authority of the Safavid 
house itself  but  was in the main a  struggle...to construct  a new hierarchical 
alignment of those interests around Ismail's son."
35 Newman, Safavid Iran, pp. 29-31.
36 Newman, Safavid Iran, p. 26.
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Austrian Developments
Meanwhile, in Austria dynastic changes transpired that would affect the region for 
centuries. In the early sixteenth century there were two ruling families in Christian 
south-central Europe: the Habsburgs, whose origins lay in Austria but whose fortunes 
had grown to include much of Europe; and the Jagiełłons, who were related to the  
Polish-Lithuanian dynasty and who were elected in 1490 to fill the vacant kingships of  
Hungary and Bohemia. The head of the Habsburg family was Emperor Charles V, 
whose vast holdings included Spain and its  New World colonies,  the Netherlands, 
Germany and Italian states. These lands were too much for Charles to rule on his own, 
so provinces were given over to the administration of other family members in his 
name. His younger brother, Ferdinand, was given the Arch-ducal title to the Austrian 
“inherited  lands”.  A  double  marriage  was  arranged  between  the  two  houses  by 
Emperor Maximilian I, grandfather of Charles and Ferdinand. Ferdinand married Anne 
Jagiełłon,  sister of  King Louis  of  Hungary and Bohemia,  and Louis  married Maria 
Habsburg, sister of Charles and Ferdinand. A mutual succession pact was part of the 
marriage deal, such that if either line were to become vacant the other family would 
inherit the thrones.37 This marriage was just one of many Maximilian arranged for his 
children and grandchildren, but it soon reaped major benefits for the Habsburgs.
In 1526, Süleyman the Magnificent led the Ottoman army into Hungary.38 King 
Louis Jagiełłon struggled to meet this threat, for he ruled a country torn by internal 
conflicts. Much of the aristocracy opposed his presence as a foreign king, and refused 
to support his call to arms. The peasantry was still resentful after a 1514 rebellion had 
been brutally suppressed, and cared little about defending the ruling class. Ferdinand 
in Austria tried to rally help for his Hungarian neighbour from Bohemia, Germany 
and his Imperial brother Charles, but religious and social divisions meant that little 
37 Jean Bérenger, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1273-1700, trans. C. A. Simpson, (London, 1994), p. 
136; Fitchner, Ferdinand I, pp. 13-20.
38 Bérenger, History of the Habsburg Empire, p. 156. V. J. Parry, A History of the Ottoman Empire to 
1730, ed. M.A. Cook, (Cambridge, 1976). p. 81.
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assistance was forthcoming.39 Louis was left to face the Ottoman invasion with only a 
small  army of  feudal  levies  – the  insurrectio.  The Battle of  Mohàcs on the 29th of 
August 1526 destroyed the Hungarian army and, while fleeing after the defeat, King 
Louis was killed. 
On learning of Louis' death, Ferdinand moved quickly to secure his inheritance 
of the thrones formerly held by the childless Louis. Although the marriage agreement 
offered inheritance to Ferdinand, both countries had traditionally elective monarchies; 
the agreement would mean nothing without the consent of the noble estates. He first  
settled the question of Bohemia and its attached territories through a combination of 
legal arguments, promises to support local privileges, and outright bribes.40 He called 
on the nobles' loyalty to the old monarchy through his wife Anne; appealed to those 
who desired a stronger monarch and who hoped for better ties to the Empire through 
his brother Charles; and he agreed to uphold the 1438 religious  Compactata,  which 
established liberties for the Czech Utraquist church, something the nobles feared other 
candidates  might  not.  Ferdinand secured his unanimous election by the Bohemian 
estates  on 23 October  1526.  The Hungarian succession,  however,  was  much more 
difficult. A Transylvanian nobleman, Jànos Zapolya, had already led a 'national party'  
of nobles demanding a native king during the reign of Louis.41 Zapolya now moved to 
assert his own claim to the throne, and had himself crowned by a splinter group of the 
Hungarian  estates  on  10  November  1526.42 Ferdinand  denounced  this  move  as 
illegitimate, and tried to undermine Zapolya's reputation, since Zapolya and his forces 
had missed the battle at Mohàcs. With the active assistance of his sister, the widowed 
Maria, Ferdinand made promises and paid bribes to any of the Hungarian nobility who 
would  support  him.  He had  himself  elected at  another  meeting of  the Hungarian 
estates, this time on the 17th December. With two elected kings the situation remained 
unstable into 1527, as both sides tried to distribute privileges and make constitutional  
arguments trying to rally supporters. Many nobles, in the meantime, flowed back and 
39 Fitchner, Ferdinand I, pp. 49-50.
40 Bérenger, History of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 158-159; Fitchner, Ferdinand I,  pp. 53-58.
41 Transylvania was at this time a part of Hungary.
42 Bérenger, History of the Habsburg Empire, p. 159; Fitchner, Ferdinand I,  p. 60.
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forth between the two parties seeking the best deals for their own fortunes. Finally, 
Ferdinand had enough and,  against the wishes of  his brother Charles,  moved into 
Hungary with his own troops. Several of Zapolya's former adherents now turned to 
Ferdinand's side as he moved through the kingdom. Zapolya was defeated on the 20th 
of  August 1627,  and fled back to his  power-base in Transylvania.43 Ferdinand had 
secured  the  Hungarian  crown,  but  Zapolya  remained  a  difficulty,  and  Hungarian 
loyalty continued to be a problem throughout the history of the monarchy until its 
dissolution in 1918. 
By uniting the Austrian 'inherited lands' with the kingdoms of Bohemia and 
Hungary (which included many attached provinces such as Moravia, Silesia, Slovakia,  
and Croatia) Ferdinand substantially increased Habsburg holdings. Their interlocking 
borders  also  created  a  substantial  power  bloc  in  south-central  Europe.  Ferdinand 
became a  king in his  own right,  no longer  holding power  only  from his  brother. 
Traditionally, the split between the Austrian and Spanish branches of the House of 
Habsburg dates from this moment. But now, by adding these new lands the Habsburgs 
were directly on the front line of Ottoman expansion. Zapolya turned to the Turks, 
allying  his  Transylvanian  lands  to  the  Ottoman  Empire  with  hopes  of  one  day 
regaining the  Hungarian crown.  Ferdinand's  new country  was  weak and loyalties 
were still questioned. It was clear that Süleyman would soon return to continue his 
conquests. Thus Habsburg diplomacy to find potential allies assumed a new urgency. 
A New Round of Diplomacy
The two Habsburg brothers  differed  on their  approaches to  anti-Turkish  strategy. 
Ferdinand thought that defending the Hungarian territory he had won and extending 
western rule to all of Hungary was the best way to defend the interior of western 
Europe from Ottoman expansion. His elder brother Charles, on the other hand, was 
43 Fitchner, Ferdinand I, p. 64; Winkelbauer, Thomas, Ständerfreiheit und Fürstenmacht, Länder und 
Untertanen des Hauses Habsburg in Kofessionellen Zeitalter, Vol. 1, (Vienna, 2003), p. 125-128.
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more  focused  on  the  Mediterranean  and  Italy  where  his  own  ambitions  lay,  and 
viewed  the  Hungarian  situation  as  an  unwelcome  diversion.44 This  underlying 
difference in views would plague Habsburg efforts for the rest of the century, but it  
did not completely foreclose cooperation, particularly on diplomatic issues. 
When,  in  early  1529,  word  came  to  Ferdinand  from  the  envoy  in 
Constantinople that the Ottoman Sultan was preparing a large-scale invasion in the 
west -  an invasion which would culminate in October with the siege of  Vienna -  
Ferdinand searched for troops and aid from his various allies. The resources of his 
own lands, even though now greatly enlarged, were limited. The German members of 
the Holy Roman Empire, while sympathetic and nervous about further Ottoman gains, 
were embroiled in the religious disputes of the Reformation; the Protestant nobles 
withheld  their  troop commitments  demanding clarification of  religious  rights.  His 
brother Charles also did not send any troops;  in fact,  he asked Ferdinand to send 
troops to Italy. But Charles did intervene diplomatically. He sent embassies to various 
courts  begging  aid  for  Ferdinand,  which  helped  move  the  German Protestants  to 
release their  troops.45 As a part of  this initiative,  Charles also sent an embassy to 
Persia in the form of the diplomat Jean de Balbi.
Balbi was a nobleman and Knight of St. John who had held military command 
and diplomatic missions for the Emperor before.  He was familiar with the Levant,  
which would be of great advantage in his travels, and he was personally interested in 
the mission.46 Charles sent with Balbi a letter addressed to Shah Ismā'īl, whom Charles 
still did not know was dead. This letter greets Ismā'īl and introduces Balbi. He calls 
Balbi, “...a valiant soldier, a noble of our hall,  a Caesar among men, and a faithful  
friend...” Balbi was to explain Charles' position to the Shah and the letter said, “We 
beg of you to trust that the things he has to say comes in our name...” 47 The rest of his 
44 Fitchner, Ferdinand I, p. 81.
45 Fitchner, Ferdinand I, pp. 80-84. Winkelbauer, Ständerfreiheit und Fürstenmacht, Vol. 1, p. 128-129.
46 Palombini, Bündniswerben, p. 66.
47 Lanz, Correspondenz Karl V, Vol. 1, No. 113, pp. 292-293. 
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message he trusts to Balbi to deliver in person, and Charles detailed what Balbi should 
say in his instructions. 
Balbi's  oration was to begin with again offering explanations for  the delay 
upon receipt of the 1524 letter from Shah Ismā'īl. These were much the same as listed 
in the August 1525 reply sent with Petrus de Monte Libano. However, he added that 
Charles had received rumour that Shah Ismā'īl had died, and that they waited, hoping 
to determine if this news was reliable.48 Indeed, this would have been at the time of 
Ismā'īl's actual death. However, this issue was not mentioned in the 1525 letter, and 
the 1529 letter is addressed to Shah Ismā'īl. So, even if the court had received news of 
Ismā'īl's death in 1524, they did not believe it five years later and seems unlikely to  
have been the major factor in delaying action on Charles' part. At most, the rumour 
introduced further  confusion into a situation where Charles  was more focused on 
other matters anyway. Charles then had Balbi describe the situation in Europe since 
1525. He said how Charles had defeated the King of France, and then released him in  
anticipation of producing a united front against the Turks. But at this point, France 
had  formed  alliances  with  other  European  powers,  including  Venice,  and  were 
working together with the Turks against Charles. He also described how the Turks 
killed the King of Hungary, and how Charles' brother now held that crown and faced 
Turkish invasion. The point of this litany of problems was to show, “Such have been 
our hardships and those of our esteemed brother that we have found little opportunity 
anywhere else to work together on the enterprise against Turkey.”49 But now they 
were united in a plan to face the Turks, and wish to embark on a joint effort with the 
King of Persia. However, Charles listed his plan for this endeavor as, “...to pass with 
all our forces and powers into Italy.”50 Charles differed with his brother Ferdinand, 
who was facing invasion through Hungary, and while Charles saw fighting France, 
Venice, the Turks and other allies as all part of his same struggle, it is not likely the 
Persians would have agreed. He then exhorted the Shah to stand up to the Turks,  
48 Lanz, Correspondenz Karl V, Vol. 1, No. 114, pp. 293-296. 
49 Lanz, Correspondenz Karl V, p. 294. “Tellement que pour les empeschemens susdicts et de nous et de 
nostredict frere nauons peu trouuer lopportunite deslors, dentendre en lemprince contre ledict 
Turcq.”
50 Lanz, Correspondenz Karl V, p. 294. “de passer auec toutes noz forces et puissances en Ytallie”
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avenge their usurpations, and join forces so that together they may have victory. The 
instructions ended by telling Balbi to frequently update the court with reports of his  
journey and any useful news he may hear along the way. 
Balbi's trip was filled with difficulties and adventures, which he detailed in a 
series of letters to the court.  He sailed from Venice,  through Cyprus,  and reached 
Aleppo on the 16th of August 1529. Balbi reported on civil unrest along the Turkish-
Persian  border,  and  of  rebellious  attitudes  in  several  Syrian  towns  recently 
incorporated into the Ottoman Empire.  Balbi  was able  to  take advantage of  these 
sentiments. The Governor of Aleppo had been assigned to take his troops to observe 
Persian troops along the border, and they took Balbi along with them so that he may 
reach the Persian border. However, when the troops from Aleppo learned that the 
Persians  were  not  preparing  to  invade  Ottoman territory  but  were  putting  down 
rebellions in their own territory, they returned to Syria and Balbi went with them, 
afraid to cross the dessert border alone. In Amman, Balbi contracted with a caravan to  
cross the border, but then he fell ill. By February 1530, he wrote that he was back in 
Aleppo, sick and penniless. Here he was taken in by a Venetian merchant, Andreas  
Morosini, who let Balbi recover in his house, lent him money, and gave him a horse so 
that he may undertake the journey again.51 Balbi eventually made his way to Baghdad 
and tracked down the Shah for an audience. We do not have a detailed account of 
Balbi's  eventual  audience with Shah Ṭahmāsp,  or  of  his  return journey.  However, 
Ṭahmāsp was not adverse to an alliance, and this was demonstrated in his response to 
two other Habsburg diplomats sent by Charles' brother Ferdinand. 
Diplomacy of Shah Ṭahmāsp and Archduke Ferdinand of Austria
After the mission of  Jean de Balbi,  initiative  in diplomatic  relations with the East 
passed from Emperor Charles V to his brother Ferdinand. It is at this point that a  
51 Morosini was arrested by Ottoman agents for assisting Balbi and for writing his own letter given to 
Balbi to deliver to Shah Ṭahmāsp, tried for treason and killed. See Palombini, Bündniswerben, p. 68.
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specifically “Austrian” diplomacy with Persia truly begins. 
Sometime  in  1529,  as  the  Ottoman  army  was  marching  into  Hungary, 
Ferdinand dispatched two envoys to the Shah: Pietro de Negro and Simon de Lillis.52 
Pietro de Negro originally came from the Levant and after a trade mission to Europe 
came into the service of King Ferdinand.53 Not much is known about Simon de Lillis: 
the report of his mission indicates he was from Dalmatia.54 Little information about 
these missions has survived, neither Instructions nor Credentials, only a single report 
of each written after the mission was concluded.55
Pietro de Negro reported that he met with Shah Ṭahmāsp in Babylon (Baghdad). This 
meeting must have taken place before the end of May 1530 when the Shah was in 
Mesopotamia, because he soon left to face the threat on the Uzbek border.56 At this 
time,  Ṭahmāsp  would  have  been  16  years  old,  and  while  he  was  beginning  to 
participate in government, he was not yet fully in control of policy. So presumably he 
spoke with the approval of his regents. Ṭahmāsp replied to Pietro's oration that his 
country had no peace treaty with the Turks and that he was willing to stage a joint  
attack with  King Ferdinand.57 When Ferdinand attacked into the Turkish lands  in 
Hungary so would Ṭahmāsp attack into Syria. Ferdinand should provide a ship with 
supplies, then Persian troops in Egypt could attack the Turks as well. Considerable 
time was devoted to explaining the actions of “Sulphi Can”, which must refer to Ẕū'l-
Faqār  Beg  Mausillū,  whose  revolt  in  Baghdad  was  the  reason  Ṭahmāsp  was  in 
Mesopotamia in then first place.58 This Qizilbāsh tribal leader had rebelled and sided 
with the Ottomans, had made statements declaring Persian neutrality in the Ottoman-
Austrian fight,  and  had  claimed the  Turkish  army in  Hungary  were  within  their 
52 Neck, “Diplomatische Beziehungen zum Vorderen Orient unter Karl V.” Mitteilungen des 
Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 5 (1952), p. 72 and 85-86; Palombini, Bündniswerben, p. 70-71.
53 Neck, “Diplomatische Beziehungen”, p. 85, note 112. 
54 Neck, “Diplomatische Beziehungen”, p. 86.
55 Neck, “Diplomatische Beziehungen”, pp.85- 86.
56 Palombini, Bündniswerben, p. 70.
57 HHStA, Aufzeichnungen, Feb 1531, Türkei I, Karton 2; reprinted in Neck, “Diplomatische 
Beziehungen”, p.85.
58   Roemer, CHI, “Safavid Period”, pp. 236-237.
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rightful territory. However, by the time Pietro arrived, Ẕū'l-Faqār had been murdered 
and  Ṭahmāsp  made  a  point  of  denying  his  statements.  Finally,  Ṭahmāsp  invited 
another envoy in the future, suggesting that they take a safer route through Russia,  
and that  future envoys bring items from their  country.  This  last  piece is  a subtle 
request for diplomatic gifts. It seems that the two 1529 envoys from Ferdinand did not  
bring any presents for the Shah, and although they were still graciously received, it  
was perceived by the Safavid court as a faux-pas. 
The  second  envoy,  Simon  de  Lillis,  departed  from  Prague  and  travelled 
overland through eastern Europe to reach the Safavid capital of Tabriz. 59 He stayed in 
Tabriz for two months waiting for the Shah who was with the army, and eventually 
journeyed to Baghdad to meet him. Simon's  report claims Ṭahmāsp was besieging 
Babylon (Baghdad) which was held by his brother who had handed it  over to the 
Turks,  while  in  reality  this  would  have  been  the  incident  involving  Zu'l-Faqār.60 
(Ṭahmāsp did fight against his rebellious brothers Sām Mīrzā and Alqās Mīrzā, but this 
occurred  later.)  Simon  presented  his  credentials,  which  were  translated  by  a 
Portuguese visitor to the court. Once again, the court marvelled that an envoy arrived 
with no gifts, but again he was received graciously anyway. Ṭahmāsp stated that he 
wished to remain constant and steadfast in his friendship with King Ferdinand. He 
promised  to  provide  military  assistance,  “provided  they  [the  Austrians]  quickly 
prepared and moved against the Turk.”61 He promised to act on the plan his father, 
Ismā'īl, had presented to Charles, and as he had presented at more length to Simon's  
colleague Pietro. One final note in the report, available because of Simon's travel route 
through Russia and the Caucasus, was that the King of Georgia prayed that Ferdinand 
would advance against the Turks and that the city of Trapezntum (Trabzon) was ready 
to rebel against the Turkish rulers.
59 Neck, “Diplomatische Beziehungen”, p. 72; Palombini, Bündniswerben, p. 71.
60 Roemer, CHI, “Safavid Period”, pp. 236-237.
61 HHStA, Aufzeichnungen, Feb 1531, Türkei I, Karton 2; reprinted in Neck, “ Diplomatische 
Beziehungen”, p.86.
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The receipt of these envoys' reports was heartening to King Ferdinand and 
Emperor Charles as they faced continued war. During the time the envoys were away, 
Vienna had withstood siege in 1529 but the threat of a return of the Turkish army still  
remained.62 The Habsburg siblings continued to disagree over strategy towards the 
Turks: Ferdinand wanting a bold offensive to regain all of Hungary, while Charles and 
their  sister  Mary  urged  negotiation  and  defensive  operations.63 The  reports  from 
Persia  by  Balbi,  Pietro  and  Simon  had  some  influence  in  altering  the  Emperor's  
position, along with signs of increased military preparations within Turkey. In 1531 
Charles sent messages to the German Diet urging support for Ferdinand, and pledging 
unspecified aid himself. In April 1532, Charles appeared at the Diet in Regensburg in 
person and helped raise an army from the German princes.64 This army, led by the 
Emperor in person, was ready to confront the advancing Süleyman. But the Ottoman 
army was  delayed  at  a  small  fortress  and  with  the  season  getting  late  Süleyman 
decided to turn back the invasion. The German, Bohemian, and many other forces in 
the Imperial army then deserted; they were willing to help stop a Turkish invasion but 
were not willing to help Ferdinand conquer more Hungarian territory.65 Charles also 
withdrew his support, leaving Ferdinand with only a small force and forcing him to 
enter negotiations with the Sultan. As this was happening, confusing rumours came 
through  Venetian  ambassadors  in  Constantinople  about  a  peace-treaty  between 
Ṭahmāsp and the Sultan.66 Although these rumours were false – there were Persian 
ambassadors in Constantinople but they resolved no treaty and were, in fact, on the 
brink  of  war  –  they  contributed  to  an  air  of  doubt  in  European  courts  about  
continuing the conflict with the Turks at that time. Ferdinand agreed to a truce with 
both Zapolya and the Turks in December 1532, which freed Süleyman to turn his 
military attention towards the Persians.67
62 Winkelbauer, Ständerfreiheit und Fürstenmacht, Vol. 1, p. 128-130; Bérenger, History of the Habsburg 
Empire, p.185, 189.
63 Fitchner, Ferdinand I, p. 91.
64 Fitchner, Ferdinand I, p. 95-98.
65 Bérenger, History of the Habsburg Empire, p. 189; Fitchner, Ferdinand I,  p. 99.
66 Neck, “Diplomatische Beziehungen”, p. 72; Palombini, Bündniswerben, p. 72.
67 Fitchner, Ferdinand I, pp. 100-101. 
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Ṭahmāsp in Persia faced two decades of hostility from the Ottoman Turks, 
with three direct invasions: the first in 1533-1535, the following in 1548-1549, and the 
third in 1553-1555. The first of these occurred because Süleyman sensed weakness in 
the position of the young Shah. Ṭahmāsp had been in the east fighting the Uzbeks, and 
many of the Qizilbāsh leaders, who provided the bulk of his military strength, were 
rebellious. Ṭahmāsp could muster only a small force to face the Ottoman invasion, so 
he turned to a scorched-earth strategy, which deprived Turkish army of supplies. The 
Turks captured Baghdad and Tabriz, but lack of supplies forced them to retreat from 
Tabriz to Baghdad, where they negotiated an armistice. Baghdad remained in Ottoman 
hands  henceforth,  except  for  a  small  period  in  the  seventeenth  century,  but  the 
Safavids recovered their capital Tabriz and most of their territories south-west of the  
Caspian Sea.68 One effect from Ottoman control of Baghdad, as well as their gains in 
the Levant made during the 1520s, was to effectively close the overland route between 
Europe and Persia. Thereafter, diplomats would have to either journey by sea around 
Africa  or  through  Russia  and  the  Caucasus,  or  travel  incognito  through  enemy 
territory.
Persia faced the Turkish invasion with no European assistance. In 1535 Charles 
captured Tunis in an effort  to halt  the attacks of  Hayrettin Paşa Barbarossa upon 
Habsburg Mediterranean shipping. But this action was directed against an Ottoman 
Mediterranean ally; Barbarossa evaded capture and soon returned to raiding, and it 
did  not  have  much  influence  on  land  actions  in  the  east.69 But  once  Ṭahmāsp 
concluded the 1535 armistice, Süleyman, under the urging of the King of France, was 
again to war with Mediterranean Europe. In response to a 1537 Ottoman attack on 
Venetian  Corfu  and  the  southern  Italian  coast,  an  alliance  of  the  Pope,  Emperor 
Charles V,  King Ferdinand, and the Venetians in February 1538 formed the “Holy 
League”.70 Ferdinand included help from Ṭahmāsp in his war planning for the Holy 
68 Adel Allouche, The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (906-962/1500-1555), 
(Berlin, 1983), pp. 137-140; Roemer, CHI, "Safavid Period", Chp. 5, pp. 240-242.
69 Roger Crowley, Empire of the sea: The Final Battle for the Mediterranean, 1521-1580, (London, 2008), 
pp. 56-64.;  John F. Guilmartin, Gunpowder & Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean 
Warfare at Sea in the 16th Century, revised edition, (London, 2003), p. 92.
70 Palombini, Bündniswerben, pp. 76-77. 
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League, and he mentions the Persians in several letters of 1537. The specific references 
to the Persians seems to indicate there was some contact at this time; however, there  
now exist no Imperial or Austrian records of any embassies. It is possible Ferdinand 
was drawing conclusions from the previous missions of Pietro de Negro and Simon de 
Lillis. 
In 1538, the Venetian Michele Membré was sent on an embassy to the Shah.71 
He was commissioned by Venice, but he represented the interests of all of the Holy 
League members. Membré travelled in disguise as a Georgian merchant through the 
Crimea and Caucasus to reach Persia. He met with Shah Ṭahmāsp multiple times. In 
1540, while Membré was staying in Ṭahmāsp's camp, Venice concluded a separate 
peace with the Ottoman Sultan. When Ṭahmāsp learned of this,  he was angry; he  
dismissed Membré and sent him back to Venice with a letter complaining about their 
duplicity.  However,  the  letter  was  not  entirely  negative  and  it  leaves  open  the 
possibility  of  future  cooperation.  One  interpretation  of  the  letter's  tone  is  that 
Ṭahmāsp realized that the other powers of the League, including the Habsburgs, were 
still  at  war  with  the  Turks,  and  although  Membré  directly  represented  Venice, 
Ṭahmāsp  knew  word  would  pass  to  the  other  parties.  Ṭahmāsp  still  hoped  for 
cooperation with the other forces, even if Venice withdrew. He may have even sent a 
letter  with Membré to  Charles V,  although this  is  now lost.72 Another  interesting 
feature of Ṭahmāsp's letter is the lack of hostile religious rhetoric, unlike that in his 
letters to the Ottomans, indicating that despite his religious scruples, Ṭahmāsp was 
willing to downplay religious differences with Christian Europe in and emphasize the 
issue of legitimate sovereignty in order to secure western assistance.73 Membré wrote 
a long account of his journey, Relazione di Persia, which includes many details of life 
in sixteenth century Persia, and it was one of the first such books to document the 
realities of Safavid Persia to Europe.
71 Michele Membré, Mission to the Lord Sophy of Persia (1539-1542), trans. A. H. Morton, (London, 
1993), introduction p. x; Palombini, Bündniswerben, pp. 78-79. 
72 Membré, Mission to the Lord Sophy, trans. Morton, introduction, pp. xxi-xxiii.
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The  Ottomans  continued  to  fight  on  one  border  at  a  time  throughout  the 
following decades, despite continued desire of both Habsburg and Persian rulers to 
arrange an alliance that would result in a two-front war. Major fighting took place in  
Hungary from 1541 to 1546, during which the Turks captured much of Hungary and 
forced Ferdinand into a treaty agreeing to pay an annual tribute of 30,000 gold florins 
to  Constantinople.74 Süleyman  then  invaded  Persia  multiple  times,  once  in  1548 
accompanied by Ṭahmāsp's disloyal brother Alqās Mīrzā.75 Ṭahmāsp fought in the way 
he did before, with scorched-earth and poisoned wells, where the Turkish army might 
take territories but were unable to hold them. Peace was finally signed at Amasya in 
1555, which held between Safavids and Ottomans for the next 30 years. The Turks 
made  minor  gains,  but  Persia  retained  most  of  her  lands.  However,  due  to  the 
perceived threat to Tabriz, which had been occupied several times, Ṭahmāsp moved 
the Safavid capital  to Qazvin.76 During all  of  the conflicts,  Shah Ṭahmāsp and the 
Habsburg  brothers  Charles  and  Ferdinand  maintained  occasional  contacts.77 They 
exchanged letters but conducted no major embassies. As before, each side hoped to 
win an alliance for joint action against their common foe, but also as before, local  
concerns dominated decision making, and the Ottomans were allowed to face each 
side in turn. 
Maximilian II's Diplomatic Initiative
Ferdinand's son and Charles V's nephew became Holy Roman Emperor in 1564 as 
Maximilian  II,  and  he  initiated  a  new attempt  at  Persian  diplomacy.78 This  effort 
eventually came to naught; it  failed due to the difficulties of travel, the competing 
interests of European courts, and the external pressures on the Austrian rulers which 
doomed so many of their Persian diplomatic efforts. Hence, Maximilian's diplomacy is 
74 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, pp. 189-190; Winkelbauer, Ständerfreiheit und Fürstenmacht, Vol. 1, p. 
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76 Savory, Iran Under the Safavids, p. 64.
77 Palombini, Bündniswerben, pp. 82-85. 
78 Paula Sutter Fitchner, Emperor Maximilian II, (New Haven, 2001).
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illustrative in its failures. At the same time, examining its nuances reveals an evolving 
attitude to the Safavid state.
During his father's life, Maximilian complained about the 1562 truce Ferdinand 
concluded with the Turks. Maximilian thought that it gave too many concessions, and 
in particular  he disapproved of  the payment of  an annual  tribute  to the Ottoman 
Sultan. Once he came to power, Maximilian delayed payment of the tribute, citing 
excuses such as the  insecurity of the border regions risking the payments falling to 
bandits.79 His  action  of  halting  the  payments  may  have  been  motivated  by  both 
displeasure over the treaty terms, as well as the parlous state of Imperial finances, but 
it was clear that it would soon lead to renewed conflict with the Ottomans. Other 
issues  were  raising  tensions  with  the  Ottomans:  the  Transylvanian  leader  John 
Sigismund  Zápolya,  a  nominal  vassal  to  the  Sultan  who also  had  designs  on  the 
Hungarian crown, began attacking castles in Hungary in 1564. Maximilian replied to 
this assault with an army which pushed Zápolya back. An armistice was reached by 
March 1565, but it drew protests from Constantinople about the treatment of their 
vassal.80 In 1565 Süleyman was preoccupied with the siege of Malta, but skirmishes 
occurred along the Hungarian border, and it was clear that a major military action 
would  soon  take  place  there.81 Therefore,  Maximilian  began  diplomatic  efforts  to 
prepare a force to meet the expected invasion. 
Maximilian wrote in his diaries of his plans to assemble a grand coalition to 
fight the Ottomans. He hoped this coalition would include in addition to his Austrian 
forces, contributions from the Holy Roman Empire; the Papal States, Venice and other 
Italian states;  Spain;  and including Persia  attacking the Ottomans on the opposite 
border.82 
79 Fitchner, Maximilian II, p. 123.
80 Fitchner, Maximilian II, p. 124.
81 On the siege of Malta see: Guilmartin, Gunpowder & Galleys, pp. 191-207; Crowley, Empires at Sea, 
pp. 93-195.
82 HHStA, Tagebuch Maximilian II, Familienakten Kart. 88, Heft 1-3.
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The Turkish court  was  considering Persia  in their  war  planning.  The 1555 
peace treaty between the Ottomans and Safavids, along with the perceived weakness 
of Persia in light of developing succession disputes convinced the Turks to turn their  
attention towards Europe in the 1560's.83 However, the Ottoman court was concerned 
the Persians might invade if the whole army was engaged in Europe, and debated 
whether to leave troops on the Mesopotamian border so as not to be surprised by a 
Persian attack.  These  concerns  were  reported  back to  Maximilian by the Imperial 
Ambassador in Constantinople, Albert von Wyss, who recommended to the Emperor 
and to  the  King of  Portugal  that  they  negotiate  with  Shah Ṭahmāsp to  form the 
offensive alliance that the Turks feared.84
The first official mention of plan for a new Persian alliance came in an opinion 
paper  from the  Papal  Nuncio to  the  Imperial  court,  Cardinal  Zaccaria  Delfino,  in 
August  1565.85 Delfino  recommended  pursuing  a  diplomatic  mission  to  the  Shah 
sponsored jointly by the Emperor, the King of Spain and the Pope. In a series of letters 
between Maximilian and Philip II through that October the two Habsburg monarchs 
agreed to send a delegation with credentials and presents to the Shah in the following 
year.86 Through the winter Maximilian discussed details with his brothers and with 
Delfino,  such as whether the alliance should be offensive or  defensive,  and if  one 
party would be allowed to make peace without the other. The other European powers 
were affraid that involving the Persians may incite the Ottomans and constrain their  
ability to make peace after the Malta campaign, and, therefore, delayed the start of the 
diplomatic mission through negotiations while they clarified the Turkish intentions.87
On  the  8th of  March  1566,  Jacob  Drapper  was  appointed  as  the  Imperial 
83 Palombini, Bündniswerben, p. 85. 
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51
ambassador  for  the  Persian  mission.  Drapper  was  a  merchant  from  Pera  who 
performed other  missions in service  of  Maximilian.88 The instructions for  Drapper 
were composed on advice from Delfino, with a note added personally by the Emperor. 
Maximilian emphasized that since the Pope, the King of Spain and the Emperor agreed 
to a league, the Christian leaders can no longer pull out, and also that the Turks fear a  
European-Persian alliance. Drapper's instructions were to travel to Spain, where the 
King of Spain would arrange travel details with the Portuguese. They would travel by 
sea to the Portuguese outpost of Hormuz. After arriving in Hormuz, the Portuguese 
would  announce  their  arrival  to  the  Persians,  interpreters  would  be  hired,  travel 
passes would be obtained, and then they would travel to the court of the Shah. Once 
there they should remain for a time, then return to report to the Emperor. King Philip 
of Spain was to arrange for gifts, which should be, "costly and of the best quality," for 
presentation to the Shah.89 
The instructions set out the arguments for a Habsburg-Safavid alliance, so that 
Drapper could present these arguments to the Shah. Maximilian argued the case for an 
alliance in more detail than either Charles V or Ferdinand. It emphasised two main 
points: the traditional friendship between the Habsburg and Safavid houses; and the 
hostility of the Turks to both countries.90 In Maximilian's own handwriting, an added 
note  mentions  the  contacts  between  their  parents  (Ferdinand  and Charles  with 
Ismā'īl).91 Even though these contacts were infrequent and achieved little, Maximilian 
could point to them as an existing friendly relationship in order to create a sense of 
affinity with Shah Ṭahmāsp. He also repeatedly connected the Austrian house with 
his  cousins,  the  Spanish  Habsburgs,  who  had  more  extensive  dealings  with  the 
Persians; once again, this was used to create the feeling of an ongoing relationship. 
However, the bulk of the argument was about the common danger from the 
88 For instance, Drapper undertook a mission to Naples while waiting for the Persian mission to get 
under way. Palombini, Bündniswerben, p. 90; Matthee, "Distant Allies", p. 238.
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Turks. It highlights lands lost by Austrians, Spanish and Persians to the Ottomans, 
then proposes to jointly recover them. It mentions that the Turks have been free to act 
on one border or another as they choose, but if the Persians enter into an alliance with 
the western powers the Turks will no longer have such freedom of action. Also, it 
warns that  treaties  with the Turks are  not  to be  trusted. Nothing is  to be had in 
agreements with the Turks but "fraud and deceit", and they set the time which they 
desire to break the peace.92 Maximilian's representatives in Constantinople were aware 
of the treaty Ṭahmāsp concluded with the Turks in 1555, and therefore this final piece 
of the argument was an effort to undercut any hesitance to action on the part of the 
Shah due to loyalty to the 1555 agreement. The argument concludes with the notion 
that  by  acting  together  the  three  powers  will  reduce  their  losses  and  soon  have 
victory.93
If Ṭahmāsp agreed to his offer, Maximilian promised he and the King of Spain 
would not make a separate peace with the Turks. Maximilian offered to pay a war 
subsidy to Persia if they were involved.94 If the Shah did not agree to go to war, then 
Drapper  was  to  ask  him to  undertake  any other  actions  which  might  hinder  the 
Ottoman war effort in the west, such as moving Persian troops internally and sending 
messages to the Turks about border disturbances; anything which might bring "doubt 
and suspicion" to the enemy and so "divide and diminish" his forces by making the 
Turks leave troops to watch the Persian border.95
Maximilian  even  proposed  exchanging  permanent  ambassadors  with  the 
Persian court,  as was beginning to be done between European courts.  Specifically, 
since there would be both an Austrian and a Spanish ambassador on the journey, if an 
alliance was agreed,  one of the ambassadors should return home to report on the 
agreement and the other should stay at the Persian court to coordinate activities. It 
92 HHStA, Instructio Jacobo Drappero, f. 40 r.,"fraudes et imposturas".
93 HHStA, Instructio Jacobo Drappero, f. 42 rv. 
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was left up to the ambassadors to figure out amongst themselves who would stay in  
Persia once they were there. Also, Persian representatives were invited back to the 
Habsburg  courts,  accompanying  the  returning  ambassador.  Unlike  in  previous 
exchanges, details of military action, such as dates for attacks, were left up to the 
ambassador to negotiate with the Shah as appropriate.96 
From his first  moments  of  considering the Persians as  part  of  the alliance, 
through carefully setting out the reasoning for his plans, to suggesting the exchange 
of residential ambassadors, Maximilian treated the Persians more like an equal power 
than had been done before, or indeed, would be done afterwards. Previous contacts 
had been tentative and treated the Persians as foreign, outside the normal functions of 
European diplomacy. But in this effort, they were to be brought within the evolving 
diplomatic system. The ambassador was given more autonomy to negotiate based on 
conditions found in the receiving court. The full argument for action was presented so 
that the Shah may make up his mind. In part, this was done to increase the chance for 
a successful negotiation, but it also was a recognition of equality in the relationship 
and a willingness to treat the Safavids as  a house with equal  status to the major  
European powers.97
Jacob Drapper received these instructions in early March 1566, then he and 
Dietrichstein, the Imperial ambassador in the Spanish court, set about enacting them. 
At the end of the month, Dietrichstein wrote the Emperor that King Philip agreed 
with these plans. But then the difficulties started. By mid-April, Dietrichstein had to 
inform  the  Emperor  there  were  two  problems:  the  Spanish  could  not  find  an 
ambassador of their own to accompany Drapper; and the yearly Portuguese ship to 
Hormuz,  on  which  they  were  to  travel,  had  already  departed.  In  principle,  the 
Portuguese supported the mission, and they had designated an ambassador of their 
own to accompany the mission, but they were unwilling to provide another ship to 
carry  the  ambassadors.  The  Portuguese  jealously  guarded  their  trade  monopoly 
96 HHStA, Instructio Jacobo Drappero, f. 44 rv.
97 Palombini, Bündniswerben, p. 89 - 90.
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through Hormuz and were reluctant to cooperate with the Spanish, even after the  
1580 union of the crowns. Also, the Portuguese and the Ottomans had come to a truce  
after a series of sea battles in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, and the Portuguese feared 
upsetting  the  balance.  Because  of  these  problems,  the  mission  would  have  to  be 
delayed until the following year.98
Meanwhile, the expected invasion came in July 1566. Süleyman personally led 
the Ottoman army one last time to besiege the fortress of Szigetvár.99 Maximilian led 
the gathering Imperial army out of Vienna to Hungary on early August, but this move 
was motivated more to keep the rowdy soldiers from plundering the homes of Vienna 
than out of any plan for action. After sitting indecisive in Hungary for almost two 
months, Maximilian decided to lay siege to the Turkish held fortress of Esztergom. He 
was confident that Szigetvár could hold out, but was mistaken, as the fortress fell to 
the  Ottoman  army  on  8  September.  Although  Süleyman  died  during  the  siege, 
Maximilian's  campaign  fell  apart.  At  Esztergom,  the  multi-national  Imperial  army 
turned on itself: Hungarians, Germans, Italians and others got into fights over short 
supplies and national animosities. Troops mutinied over lack of pay. In mid-October 
the army collapsed entirely; units disbanded and troops returned home. A small attack 
on the Transylvanian fort  Székesfehérvár with the remaining forces also ended in 
defeat,  and  by late  October,  Maximilian  ordered the  remains  of  his  army back to 
border defences while he himself was taken back to Vienna with heart palpitations.100
After this ignominious failure some of Maximilian's advisers counselled peace 
negotiations to bring an end to the war: notably Schwendi, Maximilian's top military 
commander; and Duke Albrect of Bavaria. The Emperor himself fell into depression 
and  indecision.  He  wanted  to  carry  on  with  his  plans,  but  felt  betrayed  by  his 
commanders  and  nobles.101 Dietrichstein  took  the  initiative  to  restore  the  Persian 
98 Palombini, Bündniswerben, p. 90; Matthee, "Distant Allies", pp. 239-240.
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diplomatic effort, writing to the Emperor from the Spanish court in November about 
the usefulness of a Persian alliance. Around this time Maximilian began writing in his 
diary  again  about  contacts  with  the  Shah.  In  late  November,  word  reached  the 
Habsburg  courts  over  the  death  of  Süleyman,  who  had  led  so  many  Ottoman 
challenges to Europe. Philip II, through Dietrichstein, encouraged the Emperor that 
Süleyman's death provided a good opportunity for a Persian alliance. Philip had his 
ambassador  in  Portugal  find  more  information  about  the  Persian-Portuguese 
relationship, and about the situation in Persia generally. With this encouragement, 
Maximilian  had  decided  by  the  end of  December  to  pursue  another  attempt  at  a 
diplomatic mission to Persia.102
In the first days of January 1567 Maximilian and his advisers organized the 
new mission. This time, Michael  Černović was to be the ambassador, since Drapper 
had become ill and could not continue the mission. Černović had previously served on 
Imperial delegations to Constantinople, and was currently working as a translator and 
“Imperial spy” in Venice. In the previous year, Cardinal Delfino had recommended 
Černović accompany Jacob Drapper as a second ambassador on the aborted mission of  
1566.103 Černović wrote a letter to Maximilian dated the 1st of January 1567 where he 
expressed his enthusiasm and opinions for a Persian diplomatic mission in the new 
year. He pointed out that he was familiar with Oriental affairs, and that he has studied 
the reports of prior Venetian ambassadors to the Safavids and  Uzun Ḥasan. Among 
Černović's suggestions was to send an annual annuity to the Shah instead of a single 
large gift, and an unlikely scheme whereby a rebellious Ottoman prince, who had fled 
to Ṭahmāsp's court would, be handed over to the Emperor.104 Černović also asked for a 
letter from the Emperor addressed to 'the Son of the Shah', in case Ṭahmāsp was to die 
before the mission reached his court, as had happened with Charles V's reply to Shah 
Ismā'īl. Maximilian sent official instructions and credentials to Černović in January, 
including  the  letter  to  the  Son  of  the  Shah.  These  brief  instructions  authorised 
Černović  to  do  what  was  necessary  to  secure  an  alliance,  and  they  included  the 
102 Palombini, Bündniswerben, pp. 90-91.
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104 HHStA, Černović to Maximilian II, 1 Jan. 1567, Persica I, Konv. 2, f. 63-65.
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lengthier instructions previously given to Jacob Drapper. However, this time the no 
offer of a subsidy was made, and the promise to never conclude peace without the 
Persians was dropped.105
However, in the early months of 1567, as Černović was making preparations to 
depart, further moves towards peace negotiations were made within the Ottoman and 
Imperial courts. The new Sultan, Selim II, wanted to resolve a peace treaty so that he  
could turn his attention to securing his own throne at home. Many of Maximilian's 
advisers  were  encouraging  peace  negotiations.  The  1566  campaign  shook  the 
confidence of many soldiers to fight under Maximilian's leadership, and exhausted the 
Imperial  treasury.  Many  of  the  Empire's  nobles  had  not  paid  their  contributions 
already promised; soliciting more for a new campaign would be even more difficult.106
Meanwhile,  religious  tensions  in  Europe  were  rising  and  threatening  the 
internal peace of the Empire. Philip II determined in 1566 to take a harder line with  
Protestants  in the Netherlands.  The Netherlands were nominally  part  of  the Holy 
Roman Empire,  but traditionally were run by the Spanish branch of the Habsburg 
family. Spanish crackdowns there agitated the German Imperial nobility, who turned 
to  Maximilian  demanding  protection,  calling  upon  his  reputation  for  religious 
moderation. This conflict put Maximilian in a difficult political situation which would 
demand more of his attention and limit his political  influence for other matters.107 
“Religious matters in the Netherlands will only get worse,” Maximilian wrote in his 
diary in late 1566.108 It  was clear to many at the court that  he should clear other 
conflicts to concentrate on this new situation. 
Because  of  these  difficulties,  Maximilian  was  convinced  by  his  advisers  to 
105 HHStA, Maximilian II to Černović, Jan 1567, Persica I, Konv. 2, f. 69-70.; HHStA, Maximilian II to 
“den Sohn des Schahs”,  Persica I, Konv. 2, f. 105. 
106 Fitchner, Maximilian II, pp. 131-133.
107 Fitchner, Maximilian II, pp. 156-172.
108 HHStA, Tagebuch Maximilian II, f. 6. 
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delay the Persian mission from March until at least September. This would provide an 
opportunity to begin peace talks with the Turks and see what potential there was for 
an agreement. Černović was to go to Portugal and wait while the peace talks began.  
Maximilian still wished to pursue an alliance with the Persians, but he had to do so in 
a  way that  would not  jeopardize  negotiations  with  the  Turks.  He floated an idea 
where the King of Portugal would sponsor the diplomatic mission. But the final end of 
the diplomatic effort came in March 1567, when Dietrichstein informed Maximilian 
that King Philip of Spain was not willing to see the mission turned over to the King of  
Portugal. Philip had designs on the Portuguese throne, an ambition he achieved a few 
years  later,  and  so  he  guarded  against  handing  any  additional  authority  to  the 
Portuguese. Therefore, this final attempt to proceed was scrapped.109 Talks with the 
Ottomans progressed and a treaty restoring the status-quo was signed in February 
1568.110 The diplomatic mission joining Persia to Europe, for which Maximilian had so 
hoped, never even departed European shores. 
Even though Maximilian's diplomatic effort never made it to Persia, there are 
indications that the anticipated combined attack on the Ottomans would never have 
materialized.  Sources  both  European  and  Safavid  suggest  that,  in  his  later  years,  
Ṭahmāsp became passive and seldom left his palace.111 This inactivity would be an 
indication that Ṭahmāsp would not wish to undertake a new war effort against his old 
enemy. However, Andrew Newman among others refutes such reports, indicating that 
Ṭahmāsp was active in leading military actions against the Uzbeks and putting down 
local revolts.112 But this activity is not a sign that Ṭahmāsp would have been disposed 
to go to war against the Ottomans.  In the decade between 1556 to 1566 Ṭahmāsp 
fought  several  wars  against  the  Uzbeks  and  one  against  the  Mughals  to  retake 
Qandahār  (Kandahar).  His  military  attention  was  focused  to  the  east.  With  the 
109 Palombini, Bündniswerben, pp. 92-93; Matthee, "Distant Allies", p. 239.
110 Fitchner, Maximilian II, p. 133; Winkelbauer, Ständerfreiheit und Fürstenmacht, p. 137. 
111 Vincentio d'Alessandri described Ṭahmāsp as sequestered in his palace, ignoring affairs of state. A 
narrative of Italian travels in Persia, in the fifteenth and sixteen centuries, ed. and trans. Charles Grey, 
(London, 1873), pp. 216-225. Also, Qummi, Khulasat al-Tavarikh, and Junabadi, Rawzat al-Safaviyya, 
cited by Andrew Newman, Safavid Iran, pp. 38.
112 Newman, Andrew J., Safavid Iran, pp. 38-39. Roemer, CHI, "Safavid Period", pp. 244-250 describes 
and assesses events of the later years of Ṭahmāsp's reign. 
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Ottomans he actively maintained good relations after the 1555 Treaty of Amasya. He 
returned Prince Bayazid, who had sought refuge at the Safavid court after rebelling 
against his father Süleyman, to agents of his father. Most notably, in 1567, right at the 
time Maximilian hoped Ṭahmāsp would join in the war, Ṭahmāsp sent a delegation 
with  lavish  presents  to  the  newly  crowned  Sultan  Selim  II.  These  gifts  included 
Ṭahmāsp's famous copy of the  Shahmaneh,  a richly illustrated work considered the 
high point of Iranian miniature painting.113 Ṭahmāsp invested considerable effort and 
expense  in  maintaining  the  peace  treaty  with  the  new Sultan.  Therefore,  even  if 
Maximilian's  ambassadors  had  made  it  to  Persia,  it  is  unlikely  they  would  have 
successfully forged an offensive alliance. 
Later Sixteenth Century Conflicts with the Ottomans
Throughout the 16th century, the Ottoman Turks had fought a series of wars with  
both the Safavid Persians on their eastern border and the Christian European nations 
to their west. However, the Ottomans managed to be at an active state of war with  
only one or the other at any particular time. Avoiding a two front conflict was a major 
concern of Ottoman foreign policy.
After  securing  peace  with  Austria  over  Hungary,  the  Sultan  turned  his 
attention in 1570 to the sea and the conquest of Venetian-held Cyprus. In response, 
the Papacy,  Spain,  and Venice  came together  to  form a 'Holy League'.114 Emperor 
Maximilian was invited to join the league, but he declined. He was still wounded, in  
both resources and pride, after the 1566 campaign. He worried that the league would 
fall apart and he would be left to face the Turkish armies on land with no support. 115 
Indeed, his fears were justified. Although the Battle of Lepanto was a substantial naval  
victory for the Europeans in 1571, the Holy League fragmented after and the Turks 
113 Martin B. Dickson and Stuart C. Welch, The Houghton Shahnameh, (Cambridge, MA, 1981), Vol. 1, 
pp. 270-271.
114 Crowley, Empire of the Sea, pp. 212-239. 
115 Fitchner, Maximilian II, pp. 198-190.
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recovered their naval strength quickly.116 Borders in the Mediterranean settled into 
fairly  well-defined  spheres  of  influence,  with  the  ever-present  commerce  raiding 
sanctioned by each side that never reached the level of full warfare. Much the same 
situation held along the land frontier in south-east Europe, where border warlords led 
raids on neighbouring opposing settlements, but never mounted full-scale invasions.117 
Thus the European powers were free to turn their attention to internal arguments – 
the Spanish Armada, the Revolt of the Netherlands, and the Counter-Reformation – 
while the Ottoman Turks could turn their attention towards Persia. 
There existed several causes for tensions between Persia and the Ottomans at 
the time. Shi'a populations in eastern Asia Minor felt more sympathy for the Shi'a 
Safavids  than  for  the  Sunni  Ottomans,  and  the  Safavids  encouraged  these  co-
religionists in acts of rebellion. The borders between the Ottoman and Persian lands 
were ill-defined due to the mountainous terrain and were a haven for thieves and 
raiders, and were a source of disputes. Control of the allegiance of minor states in the 
Caucuses  was  a  major  concern  for  both  sides,  since  these  allies  could  give  an 
important  strategic  advantage  in  the  region.  The  Ottomans  had  entered  into  a 
diplomatic  friendship  with  the  Sunni  Uzbegs  on  Persia's  eastern  border,  and 
encouraged them to attack Safavid territory. Meanwhile, the Russian were expanding 
their borders southward to the Caspian sea, and had entered into trade relations with 
the Persians, which could put a wall of hostile states between the Ottomans and their  
Uzbeg allies. And, as always, the Turks were aware that Europe desired to use Persia 
as a threat to counteract Ottoman freedom to act in the Mediterranean.118 
When Ṭahmāsp died in 1576, various tribes of the Qizilbāsh Turcomans, the 
original source of the Safavid dynasty's support, contended with Iranian and rising 
116 Account of the battle in: Crowley, Empire of the Sea, pp. 264-286; analysis of strategy and effect in 
Guilmartin, Gunpowder & Galleys, pp. 235-264.
117 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean, trans. Sian Reynolds, (London, 1973), p. 1165ff; and Andrew C. 
Hess, “The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History”, Past and Present, 57, (Nov. 
1972) pp. 53-73. 
118 Parry, Ottoman Empire, p. 111; Allouche, Ottoman-Safavid Conflict, pp. 148-151. 
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Georgian factions at court to place their own candidates on the throne. Ṭahmāsp left 
several children, but no clear heir.  Ḥaidar, Ṭahmāsp's son by a Georgian wife, was 
supported by several factions, but a coalition of opponents murdered him before he 
could be crowned.  Instead, they supported Ismā'īl,  son of  Ṭahmāsp by a Mawsillu 
Qizilbāsh wife. He was declared Shah Ismā'īl  II  in August 1576, but his reign was 
short,  bloody and contentious.  Ismā'īl  had many potential  claimants to the throne, 
including his half brothers and cousins, killed or jailed. He also tried to institute Sunni  
Islam, which alienated him from his subjects who had now embraced Shi'ism. Within 
a  year,  Ismā'īl  was  dead  under  uncertain  circumstances;  however,  few  possible 
successors remained. Ismā'īl's brother Muḥammad Khudābanda, who had been passed 
over in the succession because he was partially blind, was crowned in 1578, but his 
power was weak and many factions in the country were rebellious.119 The Ottomans, 
watching the disarray in their eastern neighbour, saw the opportunity to strike and 
attempt to remove the Persian threat.120
This  Ottoman-Persian war  lasted  from 1578-1590,  and  while  the  Ottoman's 
operations were laborious and expensive they achieved continual success against the 
Persians. The Persians used their standard 'scorched-earth' tactics leaving no supplies 
for the Ottoman armies, then employed their light horsemen to raid Ottoman supply 
convoys, leaving the Ottomans often hungry, ill-equipped and harassed. However, the 
Persians were not able to stand up to the Ottoman field armies; the Persian efforts 
could make the Ottoman's advance costly but could not halt it. Disarray in the Persian 
political  sphere  contributed to  their  difficulties,  as  competing tribes  would defend 
their own territories but not support their neighbours, and certain nobles refused to 
send their required levies of troops. Thus, the Ottomans made slow and costly, but 
steady gains. Their first major objective was the subjugation of Georgia – which was a 
tributary and major ally of the Persians, but which was itself divided in a succession  
dispute. The Ottoman general Mustafā Pasha won a series of battles in 1578 allowing 
passage into the area,  but  then they spent the following years from 1579 to 1584 
119 A. J. Newman, Safavid Iran, pp. 41-49; Roemer, CHI, "Safavid Period", pp. 250-253.
120 Parry, Ottoman Empire to 1730. p. 113. 
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consolidating  their  hold  on  Georgia  and  constructing  fortresses  to  defend  it. 
Meanwhile,  another  Ottoman army under  Osmān Pasha  fought  a  series  of  battles 
along the western shore of the Caspian Sea; however, he had insufficient forces to 
conquer  Shirvan  and  found  himself  surrounded  and  isolated  until  reinforcements 
arrived in 1582. With this force he was able to defeat the Persians in a battle on the 
River  Samur,  capture  Shirvan  Daghistan,  and  reassert  Ottoman  control  over  the 
Crimean Tartars who had been refusing to send requested assistance. In 1585-1588 the 
Ottoman objective was Azerbaijan and the city of Tabriz. Osmān Pasha seized the city, 
which had once been the Safavid capital, but then he died in the course of a retreat  
after further fighting. The Ottomans had to hold the captured cities Tabriz, Tiflis, and 
Erivan  from  Persian  counter-offensives,  but  while  their  garrisons  were  severely 
reduced, they held on until new re-enforcements arrived.  The loss of Tabriz was a 
grave insult to the Safavids, since it was the centre of their homeland, but they were 
not  able  to  muster  the  strength  to  recapture  it.  The  final  years  of  the  war  saw 
Ottoman campaigns against Kara-Bagh and the western provinces of Persia: Luristan 
and Hamadhān.121
The Habsburg court watched events of the Ottoman-Persian war with interest. 
In 1585 it  commissioned a  report  on the progress  of  the war.  This  was based on 
information from their agents in Constantinople as well as from other merchants and 
travellers.122 The court also held an Italian book on the history of the wars of the 
Turks, including those with the Persians.123 Although there was no intent to intervene 
in the conflict, Habsburg officials wanted to keep abreast of developments in the war,  
knowing they may soon face the Ottoman armies themselves. 
The  ongoing  Safavid  political  unrest  led  in  1587  to  the  overthrow  of 
Muḥammad Khudābanda in favour of his son 'Abbās. The Ustājlū Qilizbash clan which 
121 The conduct of the war is described in C. M. Kortepeter, Ottoman Imperialism During the 
Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus, (London, 1973), pp. 43-95.; and Parry, Ottoman Empire to 
1730. pp. 114-115. 
122 HHStA, Persisch-türkischen Krieg 1585, Handscriften, Weiß 935, fol. 47r-51r.
123 HHStA, Libro della guerra con Turchi 16 Jht., Handschrifte, Blau 308. 
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championed 'Abbās felt the young prince would be easy for them to control, but they 
were soon proved wrong as he turned out to be a strong and independent-minded 
ruler.124 Shah 'Abbās was faced at the start of his reign with the Ottoman invasion in 
the west, a new Uzbeg invasion of the eastern provinces, and dissension and factional  
violence within his  own country.  He judged that  he had to make peace with the 
Ottomans whatever the cost, so that he could deal with the problems at home first, 
then see off  the Uzbeg invasion.  In 1590,  he concluded a treaty that ceded to the 
Ottomans  the  city  of  Tabriz  and  the  territories  of  Azerbaijan,  Georgia,  Shirvan, 
Luristan and Hamadhān. It was a humiliating treaty, but one that he felt necessary for 
the very survival of the Safavid kingdom. 'Abbās used the security of peace on the 
Turkish border to enact political reform curbing the power of the tribal factions, then 
reorganized the army and, from 1598-1602, retook territory seized by the Uzbegs.125
In the midst of  Persia's  war and political  chaos,  Pope Gregory XIII  sent an 
emissary, Vecchietti, to get up to date information on Persia, its military, and chances 
for an alliance against the Ottoman Turks. Vecchietti reported back in 1587 that the 
country  was  weak,  the  Shah was  manipulated  by  tribal  leaders  and did  not  have 
control over much of the country, that the treasury was empty, and that the military 
had only limited forces and little artillery or fortifications. Those forts they had were 
weak and undermanned, and against Turkish artillery, Vecchietti wrote, the were "no 
different than dust before the wind."126 Ironically, shortly after Vecchietti left Persia, 
Shah  'Abbās  assumed  the  throne  and  began  to  remedy  the  problems  Vecchietti  
described. However, Vecchietti did not observe this change, and his report concluded 
that Persia was in no condition to be of military assistance to the West. Vecchietti's  
negative report did not inspire European leaders to take up arms, although he himself 
remained convinced that the West should intervene to save Persia from total defeat; if 
they did not, then soon the Turks would turn to their west and invade Hungary.127
124 Newman, Safavid Iran, p. 50. and D. Morgan, Medieval Persia 1040-1797, (London, 1988). 
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On this last point, at least, Vecchietti proved prescient, for as the Ottoman-
Persian war drew to a close new tensions developed along the Ottoman-Habsburg 
border. The frontier kleinkrieg (little-war) of raids and counter-raids between Muslim 
ghāzi and Christian marcher lords was intensifying. Hasan Pasha, the  beglerbeg of 
Bosnia, conducted large raids into Croatia in 1591 and 1592, systematically attacking 
the border fortresses.  The Habsburgs responded and met Hasan's 1593 raid with a  
large  force  which  attacked  Hasan  as  he  was  besieging  Sisak.  Hasan's  force  was 
destroyed; a reputed eight to ten thousand Ottoman troops were slain or drowned 
trying  to  flee  across  the  Kulpa  River,  with  Hasan  himself  among  the  dead.  This 
humiliation was  the  event  that  caused  Sultan Murad III  to  agree  with  the  hawks 
among his advisers who had been urging him since 1590 to declare war on Austria.128
Thus, in 1593, the Ottomans declared war on Habsburgs. The Grand Vizer led 
an army of the Janissaries and regular battalions accompanied by a large number of 
Tartars. The Turkish move was welcomed by the Habsburg court, now centred around 
Emperor  Rudolf  II  in  Prague.  They  saw  signs  of  decline  in  the  Ottoman  Empire 
embodied in the fat, gluttonous sultan Murad III, and they expected the war to lead to 
the Ottomans' collapse.129 The Austrians countered the Turkish advance with a larger 
army,  made  up  of  forces  gathered  from  across  the  Habsburg's  far-flung  lands:  
Hungarians,  Italians,  Czechs,  Germans,  and  Belgians,  as  well  as  mercenaries  from 
across  Europe.  In  the  first  year  of  the  war  the  Austrians  captured  fortresses  at 
Esztergom and Visegrad, and hopes were raised that they would soon capture Buda, 
the historic capital of Hungary. But a Turkish counter-offensive took the important 
Imperial fortress of Györ, and showed that the war would be a tougher, drawn-out 
affair. 
128 Parry, et al., Ottoman Empire to 1730. p. 116. and  Kortepeter, Ottoman Imperialism, p. 217. 




In this chapter, we examine the events spanning the end of the sixteenth century and 
the start of the seventeenth. At the turn of the century, Rudolf II was the Habsburg  
Emperor, Shah 'Abbās I ruled in Persia, and war persisted between the Ottoman and 
Austrian forces in Hungary. This time saw several diplomatic initiatives between the  
two countries. These built on previous attempts to form an alliance and progressed 
further than earlier efforts.  They were perhaps the best chance for achieving joint 
military action against their common foe than any time before or after: for a time both  
states were at war with the Ottoman Empire simultaneously; and both rulers were 
enthusiastic about foreign contact and cooperation. Both showed interest in foreign 
cultures, as opposed to some other more insular or religiously dogmatic members of 
their dynasties. Their diplomats made efforts to improve understanding of the foreign 
culture.  Ultimately,  circumstances  and  misunderstandings  prevented  a  military 
alliance from succeeding. As is demonstrated here and argued in detail  in Chapter 
Five, this time was a turning point which served to change the relationship of Persia 
with Austria and the rest of Europe throughout the seventeenth century. In the next  
chapter, we will  see how the relationship continued in spite of the failures of this 
decade, due to the new projects which began at this time. 
Character of the Rulers
Rudolf II  became Holy Roman Emperor in 1576, and soon after moved his court to 
Prague,  which under  his rule  became an artistic  and cultural  centre.  He has  been 
described more by legend and cliché than by careful history: an erratic madman shut 
away in his castle, a patron of the arts bankrupting the country with his art collection, 
or a mystic interested more in alchemy and magic than affairs of state. While each of  
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these views has a certain grain of truth, late twentieth-century authors, such as  R.J.W. 
Evans,  have  argued  Rudolf  manifested  a  unified  world-view  related  to  his  late-
Renaissance environment.1 Rudolf was educated at the court of his Spanish cousins; he 
retained some of their ceremonial formality, but he rejected their militant Counter-
Reformation  Catholicism.  While  a  devoted  Catholic,  he  adhered  to  the  idea  of 
irenicism, seeking a re-unification of Christian faith through reason and compromise. 
This  religious  idea  was  part  of  a  larger  philosophy  in  late-Renaissance  thought 
seeking  a  harmonious  world-order  within  the  diverse  items  of  nature.2 This 
philosophy drove many of Rudolf's activities: from his collection of natural curiosities, 
bringing  together  the  diversity  of  nature;  to  his  support  of  arts  and  scholarship,  
studying  and  representing  the  universal  order;  to  his  politics,  where  he  tried  to 
maintain  peace  between  the  numerous,  ever-more  belligerent  factions  in  Central 
Europe. That he was not always successful in his projects resulted from his personal 
limitations and the growing belligerence and dogmatism of central-European society.  
"Rudolf II's political programme was simple" wrote  Bérenger, "internal peace 
and the resumption of the Turkish War with a view to reconquering Hungary and so 
adding to the glory of the House of Austria and recovering the lustre of the Imperial  
title."3 His irenicist outlook led him to attempt to maintain peace in the Empire by 
balancing confessional factions. As Emperor over all the various princes and peoples 
of the Empire, he wished to be seen as above the fray of sectarian dispute. However, 
after 1600, the 'Spanish Party' of Tridentine Catholics gained the upper hand in the  
court, which led to disastrous effects on foreign policy.4 Opposing the Turks had been 
the  justifying  mission  for  the  Habsburg monarchy,  and  the  court  encouraged  the 
publication of  propaganda excoriating the  traditional  enemy.5 Nonetheless,  on the 
1 R.J.W. Evans, Rudolf II and his world, (Oxford, 1997; originally published 1973), pp. 1-4; Jean 
Bérenger, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1273-1700, trans. C. A. Simpson, (London, 1994), pp. 
242-243.
2 R.J.W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700, (Oxford, 1979), pp. 32-33. Evans, 
Rudolf II, Chapter 3, 'The Religion of Rudolf', pp. 84-115.
3 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, p. 245.
4 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, pp. 244-245; Evans, Rudolf II, pp. 40-42, 68-70.
5 Evans, Rudolf II, pp. 40-42; Paula Sutter Fitchner, Terror and Toleration: The Habsburg Empire 
Confronts Islam, 1526-1850, (London, 2008), pp. 46-58.
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advice of border general Lazarus von Schwendi, Rudolf did not take advantage of the 
1576-1590 Ottoman war with Persia to launch his own strike;  instead, he built  up 
fortifications and allowed Hungarian villages time to recover.6 When he did go to war, 
it became in his mind a struggle to final victory where no compromise was possible. 
His Imperial dignity demanded no less. 
He defended the unique majesty of his office, leading him to conflict with the 
Pope, potential marriage partners and his own courtiers. He demanded to be a part of  
decision making, even when incapacitated with ill health, thus bringing government 
to a  halt.  His  sense of  dignity also led him to become a great patron of  the arts, 
amassing a spectacular collection of Renaissance master-works though his purchasing 
agents across Europe and with many more produced in his workshops. He sought to 
make his collections the most extensive in Europe, in part from his own love of art,  
and also to reflect the greater glory of the Imperial position.7 
His personality was also prone to darkness. Physically, he suffered from ill-
health,  with major  illnesses  in 1581 and many times after  1600.  Mentally,  he  was 
prone to bouts of 'melancholy', when he withdrew from public in fits of depression 
and occasional rage. Whether he was clinically 'mad' is hard to determine, since many 
of  the  reports  of  his  madness  are  from  parties  interested  in  exaggerating  his 
incapacity. He was clearly troubled, and after a major breakdown in 1599 he often 
avoided audiences and public appearances.8 Rudolf had lofty political and intellectual 
goals, and while he succeeded in maintaining peace within the Empire and inspiring 
one last flourish of Renaissance humanist creativity, he lacked the physical and mental 
strength to carry out his policies to the full. 
Shah 'Abbās came to the Persian throne in 1587 as a result of a coup against his 
6 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, pp. 245-246.
7 Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann, The School of Prague: Painting at the Court of Rudolf II, (Chicago, 1988), 
p. 16-25; Evans, Rudolf II, p. 176-183.
8 H. C. Erik Midelfort, Mad Princes of Renaissance Germany, (Charlottesville, VA, 1994), pp. 125-140. 
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father in a precarious time for the Safavid dynasty. Invasions were coming from both 
east and west, and the Qizilbāsh tribes were fighting with each other while ignoring 
the summons of the central government. 'Abbās moved quickly to stamp his authority 
and bring needed reform to society. He could not deal with the Turkish invasion with 
the disorganised and fractious military he then had, so he made a distasteful peace 
with the Ottomans to give himself time to enact reforms. He executed or disinherited 
several Qizilbāsh amīrs, particularly those who had been involved in the murder of his 
brother  Ḥamza.9 'Abbās  reorganised  the  military,  expanding  the  role  of  regular, 
standing troops under his direct control and decreased reliance on the Qizilbāsh feudal 
forces that had originally brought the dynasty to power. As his historian, Eskander 
Beg Monshī, described:10
Because of the rivalries of the Qizilbash tribes had led to all sort of 
enormities, and because their devotion to the Safavid royal house had been 
weakened by dissension, Shah 'Abbas decided to admit into the armed 
forces groups other than the Qizilbash.
 'Abbās created a fighting force out of what was previously a small group of royal 
retainers, the  ghulām, or king's slaves, made up of Muslim converts from Christian 
areas  such  as  Georgia  and  Armenia.  'Abbās  created  a  corps  of  musketeers,  the 
tūfangchī,  recruited from Iranian peasants, who were drilled to oppose the Turkish 
Janissaries.  He also expanded the artillery and created a  separate corps for  it,  the 
tūpchī. These reforms helped provide a regular military force strong enough to oppose 
that of the Turks, concentrate military authority under the central power of the Shah, 
and broaden the coalition of  military power to more segments  of  Safavid society. 
However,  paying for  the new troops required more funds directly  from the royal 
treasury, so 'Abbās had to reform the country's finances as well by taking more lands 
into  direct  royal  control,  often stripping them from rebellious  feudal  lords.  These 
moves  served  hand-in-hand  with  the  military  reforms  to  strengthen  the  central 
authority of the Shah.11
9 Roemer, CHI, "The Safavid Period", Vol. 6, Chp. 5, p. 264, 268; Andrew J. Newman, Safavid Iran: 
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10 Iskander Beg Munshi, History of Shah 'Abbas the Great, trans. Roger M. Savory, (Boulder, 1978), Vol. 
I, p. 527; Uruch Beg Bayāt, Don Juan of Persia, ed. Guy Le Strange,  (New York, 1973), p. 52, 209. 
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As  a  person, Shah  'Abbās  possessed  an  energetic  character  and  a  lively 
intelligence. A Carmelite missionary reported:12 
['Abbās is] of medium height, rather thin than fat, his face round and 
small, tanned by the sun, with hardly any beard: very vivacious and alert, 
so that he is always doing something or other. He is sturdy and healthy, 
accustomed to much exercise and toil: many times he goes about on foot.
Later,  the Carmelite Father Thaddeus reported: "He is  very clear-sighted, and it  is 
sufficient when discussing business to drop a hint for him to understand everything; 
and he penetrates to the smallest of niceties."13 'Abbās could be friendly and jovial, but 
he also had a quick temper. His biographer commented:14 
The character of the Shah contains some contradictions; for instance, his 
fiery temper, his imperiousness, his majesty and regal splendor are 
matched by his mildness, leniency, his ascetic way of life, and his 
informality.
He would quickly dispatch judgement, sometimes administered by his own sword, and 
nobles accused of corruption or oppressing the people were as likely as any to face his 
wrath.  His  harsh  justice  had  a  positive  effect  on commerce;  governors  were  held 
responsible for clearing the roads of bandits allowing caravans to pass more freely.15 
'Abbās enjoyed meeting foreign visitors to the country, and he would engage them in 
discussions of politics, philosophy, religion and warfare. He showed great interest and 
support for the arts, although not to the obsessive level of Rudolf. During his reign 
new  techniques  were  developed  in  pottery  and  rug-making,  both  of  which  had 
economic  benefits  in exports.  Especially  advancing during his  reign was painting, 
which saw a new style led by  Āqā Riżā, Riżā 'Abbāsī, and Shafī Iṣfahānī combining 
European influences with tradition Persian miniature styles.16 Shah 'Abbās also took a 
special interest in architecture. He moved the Safavid capital from Qazvīn to Isfahān.  
For the new capital he commissioned new buildings, filling his city with spectacular 
12 A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia and the Papal Mission of the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, [H. 
Chick, trans. and ed.](London, 1939), p. 158.
13 Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 285.
14 Munshi, History of Shah 'Abbas, trans. Savory, Vol. 1, p. 529.
15 Chronicle of the Carmelites, pp. 158-159; Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the 
Seventeenth Century, (Chicago, 1974; orig. pub. Copenhagen, 1973), pp. 68-73. 
16 Sheila Canby, "Farangi Saz: The Impact of Europe on Safavid Painting", in Silk and Stone: The Art of 
Asia, The Third Hali Annual, (1996). pp. 46-59; Roemer, CHI, "The Safavid Period", pp. 274-275; 
Basil Gray, CHI, "The Arts in the Safavid Period", Vol 6, Chp. 16b, pp. 902-903.
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palaces, mosques and public spaces which developed traditional Islamic architecture 
in a new Safavid style which has impressed visitors with its beauty ever since.17
These two rulers,  Rudolf  and 'Abbās,  would engage with one another  in a 
series of diplomatic exchanges more than any of their predecessors. They had many 
similarities,  such  as  their  interest  in  the  arts  and their  steadfast  determination to 
confront the Ottomans, but 'Abbās possessed the energy, balance and mental stability 
needed  for  accomplished  kingship  which  Rudolf  lacked.  They  held  each  other  in 
respect. The Augustinian and Portuguese envoy De Gouvea reported that Shah 'Abbās 
so "respected the Emperor for waging war on the Ottomans that he kept a portrait of 
him  at  the  entrance  to  his  bedroom."18 The  backdrop  of  this  war  drove  their 
relationship, while even in the midst of war the relationship was expanding into new 
areas of cooperation beyond the military.
The Long Turkish War
The war between the Austrians and the Ottomans that started in 1593 carried on until  
1606. In the Austrian nomenclature it became known as the 'Fifteen Years War' or the  
'Long Turkish War' (Lange Türkenkrieg ). 
Since the last war in the 1560s, both sides had built fortifications along the  
border. Geoffrey Parker described a 'military revolution' which started in the early 
sixteenth  century  in  Italy  which  comprised  three  related  aspects:  greater  use  of 
firepower, the trace italienne style of fortification, and larger army sizes.19 Defences in 
17 Roemer, CHI, "The Safavid Period", p. 270; Robert Hillenbrand, CHI, "Safavid Architecture", Vol. 6, 
Chp. 15b, pp. 774-789.
18 Anthoine di Gouvea, Relation des grandes guerres et victoires obtenues par le roy de Perse Cha Abbas, 
trans. from Portuguese, (Rouen, 1646), p. 424.
19 Geoffrey Parker, The military revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800, 
(Cambridge, 1988), pp. 6-44, summary p. 43.
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Hungary  showed  all  three  of  these  developments.20 These  new  defences  were 
sophisticated forts, with mutually supporting positions built with the latest military 
technology. Therefore the main activity of the war was the siege of these forts. Such 
sieges took most of the campaigning season, leaving little chance for exploitation of 
any successes. Each siege was costly in terms of casualties and expense, but resulted 
in little territory gained. The time-line of the war is a catalogue of these sieges: the 
Turks take Raab in 1594, the Austrians take Gran in 1595, the Austrians reconquer 
Raab but fail to take Buda in 1598, and so on.21
The Imperial army was made up of troops from all over Europe. All of the far-
flung Habsburg empire was represented: Hungarians, Italians, Czechs, Germans, and 
Belgians. But mercenaries came from across the continent and Britain as well. The 
civil wars in France were ending, and Spain was unable to consistently pay it troops 
fighting  in  the  Netherlands,  so  veterans  of  these  conflicts  were  looking  for 
employment. The Turkish war served as a training ground for many leaders of the  
later Thirty Years War, such as the Catholic general Tilly. It also saw the development 
of the system of war entrepreneurs which would play such a role in that later war.22
Only  one  large  field  battle  was  fought.  In  1596  at  Mező-Keresztes,  the 
Ottomans who had just captured Erlau ran into the Imperial army sent to relieve the 
besieged city. The Ottoman army was nearly defeated, for the swampy terrain limited 
the mobility of their light cavalry. But when the Imperial mercenary troops stopped to 
plunder the Turkish camp, a final costly Turkish charge routed the Imperial army. 
This battle was late in the year and winter forced the Turkish army to withdraw, 
resulting in little profit from their victory. The Imperial army, by the ill discipline of 
20 see Géza Pálffy, "The Origins and Development of the Border Defence System Against the Ottoman 
Empire in Hungary", pp. 49-54; József Kelenik, "The Military Revolution in Hungary", pp. 117-160; 
and Klára Hegyi, "The Ottoman Network of Fortresses in Hungary, pp. 163-193; all in Ottomans, 
Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: the military confines in the era of Ottoman conquest, 
eds. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, (Leiden, 2000).
21 V. J. Parry, A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730, ed. M.A. Cook, (Cambridge, 1976), p. 116, 119. 
22 Peter H. Wilson, Europe's Tragedy, A History of the Thirty Years War, (London, 2009), pp. 83-84; 
Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, p. 247. 
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their irregularly paid troops, lost its best chance to inflict a serious defeat against the  
Turkish army.23
Perhaps of  greater strategic importance than events  on the battlefield were 
political  shifts  in  the  provinces  of  Transylvania,  Wallachia,  and  Moldavia.  These 
provinces had been tributaries to the Ottomans, but in 1594 they declared support for 
the Habsburgs. This defection caused great concern for the Ottomans, who both lost 
supporters and faced a large hostile territory on the flank of the main war theatre. The 
three  territories  worked  together  to  defeat  Turkish  attempts  at  invasion,  but 
conflicting  interests  caused  antagonisms  between them and  with  the  Habsburgs.24 
Zsigmond Bártory, the Prince of Transylvania, wished to resist the Turks, press his  
claim to  the  throne  of  Hungary,  and  restore  Hungarian  claims  to  Wallachia  and 
Moldavia.  The  Habsburgs  asserted  a  claim  to  the  Hungarian  lands  based  on  the 
marriage treaty with the King of Hungary before he died at the Battle of Mohács in 
1526; however, their claim was disputed by the nobility of Hungary and Transylvania. 
Michael of Wallachia wished to expand his own territories, and to this end his army 
overran Transylvania  in  1599,  and  Moldavia  in  1600,  bringing Polish  intervention 
against him. Michael was murdered in 1601 on orders from an Imperial commander, 
after which for a time it was unclear who was in charge in the region. Meanwhile, 
Imperial  efforts  to  control  Transylvania  by  confiscating  estates  and  appointing 
German and Italian officials,  and to spread the Counter-Reformation by restricting 
Protestant religions in Hungary and Transylvania, brought resentment by the locals of 
the Habsburgs. In 1604 Transylvania, under the new leadership of István Bocskai, the  
former military leader under Bárthory, abandoned the alliance with the Emperor and 
agreed to support the Ottomans once more.  Bocskai  managed to combine support 
from the disaffected Hungarian nobility who were tired of the war and unhappy with 
the  abusive  actions  of  Imperial  generals,  with  the  support  from the  hajduks,  free 
peasants of the border areas who provided a valuable military asset to whoever held 
their loyalty. Bocskai was crowned Prince of Transylvania and King of Hungary by 
23 Kortepeter, Ottoman Imperialism, pp. 146-150; Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, p. 248. 
24 Parry, Ottoman Empire to 1730. p. 118-119; Thomas Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht, 
(Vienna, 2003),Vol. 1,  p. 144.
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the Turks in 1605. This swung the balance of power back to the Ottomans at a time  
when their strength was failing and was a serious blow to the Habsburgs.25
All sides in the conflict were suffering and ready for a way out of the fighting. 
The Hungarian nobility was tired of warfare on their lands and afraid of Ottoman 
overlordship. They indicated that they would be willing to come back to the Habsburg 
fold in exchange for peace and religious concessions. Ottoman territories were riven 
with revolts and they faced an invasion from 'Abbās on the Persian front as well.  
Ottoman  messengers  made  tentative  peace  overtures  from  1604.  Pressure  on  the 
Imperial court was strong enough such that Rudolf authorised his brother, Archduke 
Matthias,  to  begin  peace  negotiations.  These  led  to  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  on  23 
September 1606 between the Habsburg government and the Hungarian aristocracy. It 
returned Hungary to the Habsburg crown, but granted independence in many areas of 
finance and religion, and confirmed Bocskai as Prince of Transylvania in exchange for 
him renouncing the crown of Hungary. Soon thereafter, in November 1606, came the 
Peace of Zsitva-Torok with the Ottomans. It ended the annual tribute to the Porte 
from the Emperor  and established the two rulers  as  equals,  but  it  established the 
border much as it was at the start  of the war.26 Rudolf was not satisfied with the 
treaties; he thought they gave away too much. However, the nobility was ready for an 
end to the war, and Archduke Matthias led them in opposition to Rudolf. It took a few 
more years of inter-dynastic conflict to firmly establish the peace.27 
First Contact: Warkotsch in Moscow
The first  contact  between Emperor Rudolf  and Shah 'Abbās took place in 1593 in 
25 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, pp. 249-251; Parry, Ottoman Empire to 1730. p. 120; and Winkelbauer, 
Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht, Vol. 1, p. 145-147.
26 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, pp. 251-253.
27 Herbert Haupt, "From Feuding Brothers to a Nation at War with Itself", in Rudolf II and Prague: The 
Court and the City, ed. Eliška Fučikova, et al., Skira, 1997, pp. 238-248; Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, 
pp. 253-256
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Moscow.  In  early  1593,  as  it  became  obvious  war  was  approaching,  Rudolf  sent  
diplomats  throughout  Europe  to  rally  support.  He  hoped  to  create  another  Holy 
League to stand united against the Turks, or at least secure contributions towards the 
enormous cost of the war. One of these diplomats was Nicholas von Warkotsch, who 
was sent to Russia. Warkotsch was a minor noble in the service of the Habsburgs. He 
was sent to Russia first in 1588, then again in 1593 and 1594.28 The Russians had their 
own history of conflict with the Ottoman Turks and so were potential partners. This 
potential was seen by both the Austrians and the Persians, who maintained regular  
contacts  with their  northern neighbour,  and who encouraged Russia  to attack the 
Turks in the years while 'Abbās saw to internal problems.  29 Warkotsch found the 
Russians  unwilling  to  go  to  war  with  the  Turks,  but  they  did  agree  to  send  the 
Austrians valuable furs, the Russian coin in international trade, as a donation to the 
cause. They also introduced Warkotsch to the Persian ambassador in Moscow. 
The Persian ambassador to Moscow, named by Warkotsch as Azi Khosrov, was 
asking  his  Russian  hosts  to  meet  the  Imperial  ambassador  as  soon  as  Warkotsch 
arrived in the city.30 Encouraged by the then-regent Boris Godunov, the Habsburg and 
Persian ambassadors met in Moscow during 1593 and discussed the Turkish issue. 
Warkotsch reported, "I  have also come across the ambassador to Moscow of Shah 
'Abbās... We had useful discussions with each-other about ways of wrecking Turkish 
power."31 Warkotsch explained that the Persian Shah had repeatedly tried to build an 
alliance against the Turks, but it has always been prevented when war draws near. He 
continues, "Now that the Shah has his ambassador here, he once more reminds me of  
his frank offer." The Persian ambassador spoke of joining in an effort with the Holy 
Roman Emperor, the Russian Tsar, and "other potentates" in an alliance against the 
Turks in the war that may come.32 The Russians were not interested in a three-way 
28 Anonymous, Des Römischen Kaisers Gesandten Niklas Von Warkotsch Reisen Nach Moßkwa: In Den 
Jahren 1589, 1593 Und 1594, (Germany, 1840, reprint 2011), p. 1.
29 Rudi Matthee. “Anti-Ottoman Concerns and Caucasian Interests: Diplomatic Relations Between 
Iran and Russia”. In: Safavid Iran and her Neighbors. Ed. by M. Mazzaoui. (Salt Lake City, 2003), pp. 
101–128. 
30 HHStA, Warkotsch to Rudolf, Russland I, 3 (1589-1595), Konv. 4 (1593), fol. 10.
31 HHStA, Warkotsch to Rudolf, Russland I, 3 (1589-1595), Konv. 4 (1593),, fol. 5v. 
32 HHStA, Warkotsch to Rudolf, Russland I, 3 (1589-1595), Konv. 4 (1593), fol. 10.
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alliance, other than taking a few specific fortresses along their frontier, but they did  
facilitate  contact between the Austrian and Persian representatives.33 This  meeting 
provided Europeans with some of the first information about the new shah. 
There  are  no  remaining  records  indicating  additional  meetings  between 
Austrian and Persian ambassadors from 1593 until 1600. Such a thing must have been 
contemplated,  since Rudolf continued to imagine a grand alliance and Europe had 
been hoping for an alliance with Persia to fight the Ottomans throughout the century. 
Additional diplomatic missions were sent from Prague to Russia - Warkotsch returned 
the following year 1594 to inquire about the promised contribution and he brought 
back to Prague a large a Russian embassy with a the gift of furs. In 1597, Abraham von 
Dohna became the Imperial  ambassador  to Moscow and the newly-crowned Boris 
Godunov. Von Dohna advised a later embassy to Persia; however, it is not known if he 
met with any Persians while he was in Moscow.34 Then in 1600, in the midst of the 
war, Anthony Sherley inserted himself into the picture. 
The Sherley Expedition
The Sherley brothers were sons of English minor nobility, and they made careers for 
themselves as adventurers, mercenaries, occasionally pirates, trading on their family 
name and connections to travel the world seeking opportunities. Anthony Sherley and 
his younger brother Robert were in charge of a mercenary band assembled to fight in 
the Ferrara succession crisis of 1597, but they were out of work by the cessation of 
hostilities. While looking for work in Venice, Anthony Sherley heard there may be 
opportunities for trade or combat in Persia. At this time he met a Persian trader in 
Venice  who  told  him  of  the  noble  character  of  Shah  'Abbās.  Sherley  also  met  a 
Christian born in Turkey named Angelo who had travelled around the Middle East, 
33 J. P. Niederkorn. Die europäischen Mächte und der 'lange Türkenkrieg' Rudolfs II, (Vienna, 1993), pp. 
455-457. 
34 J. P. Niederkorn. Die europäischen Mächte und der 'lange Türkenkrieg' Rudolfs II, pp. 457-459. 
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including the Shah's court, and who spoke many languages and who would act as an 
interpreter. With these contacts, Sherley decided to mount an expedition to Persia to 
seek what profit and honour he could find. With a band of 26 others, they travelled 
across Ottoman-controlled Syria and Iraq disguised as merchants.35
Sherley  and  company  were  welcomed  warmly  by  Shah  'Abbās.  Anthony 
Sherley and 'Abbās had many conversations during his stay in Persia,  where they 
discussed religion, geography, history, and warfare, a favourite topic of the Shah.36 As 
a military commander, Sherley was able to advise 'Abbās on the organization of his 
army, although the extent of his influence has been exaggerated by some authors.37 
The shah appointed Anthony Sherley to go to Europe and speak on the shah’s behalf 
to the heads of various states to enlist support of the European powers against the 
Turks. 'Abbās had just concluded a successful campaign against the Uzbeks, and so 
was beginning to ponder returning to war against the Ottomans, and he may have 
been considering sending an embassy to Europe when Sherley showed up offering his 
services.38 Whatever the case, he set out with his band for Europe via Russia, along 
with a Persian ambassador, Ḥusain 'Alī Beg Bayāt, and his own suite of secretaries and 
servants.  Exactly  who  was  in  charge  of  the  expedition  was  a  subject  of  dispute 
between Sherley and  Ḥusain 'Alī  Beg, and would create ongoing problems for the 
mission. Robert Sherley was left behind in Persia as a hostage, although in time he 
became a trusted member of the shah’s court.
By October 1600, the diplomatic party reached Prague. They entered the city to 
great fanfare, much to the delight of Emperor Rudolf, who always loved spectacle and 
the exotic. 300 horsemen led by Rudolf's Chamberlain escorted 12 coaches which were 
sent to carry the travellers from the Star Palace into the city. Ambassadors to the 
35 D. W. Davies, Elizabethans Errant, (Ithaca, 1967), pp. 74-94. 
36 E. Denison Ross, Anthony Sherley, His Persian Adventure, (London, 1933), pp. xix-xxii , This book 
also contains extracts of A. Sherley's own Relation, p. 135-139. Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 160.
37 R. M. Savory, "The Sherley Myth", Iran, Vol. V, 1967, pp. 73-81.
38 Munshi, History of Shah 'Abbas, trans. Savory, Vol. II, pp. 827-826; Uruch Beg Bayāt, Don Juan of 
Persia, pp. 232-233.
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Imperial  court  from  various  countries  around  Europe  joined  with  the  procession. 
Soldiers lined both sides of the street and many citizens of Prague turned out to watch. 
Rudolf observed the procession from a window in the castle.39 
A week after their arrival, the ambassadors had an audience with the Emperor.  
Sherley's mission, and its suggestion of help in the Ottoman war, thrilled Emperor 
Rudolf,  although  other  members  of  his  court  were  puzzled  by  it.  “Why  is  an 
Englishman pushing efforts against the Turks when England was aligned with the 
Turks?” they wondered, and concocted many complicated explanations. Sherley was 
actually  persona  non  grata in  Elizabeth’s  England  at  the  time,  but  this  was  not 
appreciated by the suspicious Imperial courtiers.40 The Venetian ambassador in Prague 
wrote that the other European embassies, "do not much trust this Embassy." He was 
unimpressed  with  Sherley's  alliance  plan,  writing,  "Grand  schemes,  impossible  to 
accomplish."41 The Spanish ambassador worried that the Shah wanted to trade directly 
with Germany, cutting out Hormuz, Portugal, or Venice as middlemen.42 
Meanwhile,  Rudolf's  advisers  debated how to respond to  the embassy.  The 
commission given to Anthony Sherley instructed him to negotiate with the Emperor 
and the Christian Princes concerning war against the Turks, "Against whom ['Abbās] 
would at present begin to wage war, if only he would be assured that all the burden of  
the war shall not fall on his shoulders." 'Abbās exhorted European nations to attack 
the Turks on many fronts, to not make treaties or trade agreements with the Turks, 
and  even  if  they  were  unable  to  join  the  fight  to  "remain  spectators  and  covert 
supporters." Specifically, he wished the cooperating nations not make a separate peace 
without consulting other members of the alliance: "it will not be legitimate for any of 
those participating to abandon general hostilities against the Turks, whether by an 
armistice or some terms of truce or some peace direct, and against the assent of all." 
39 Bayāt, Don Juan of Persia, p . 275; Franz Babinger, Sherleiana, (Berlin, 1932), p. 19.
40 Steensgard, Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 225-226. 
41 Piero Duodo, quoted in Babinger, Sherleiana, p. 19. "Questi non si fidano molto di tale Ambasciata."
42 Davies, Elizabethans Errant, p. 125. 
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He  asks  that  an  ambassador  be  sent  from  the  Emperor  and  other  princes,  and 
expresses a desire that they stay resident in Isfahan. In exchange, 'Abbās promised to 
protect  and allow freedom of  worship  to  Christians  in  his  lands  and to  welcome 
traders from European nations.43 While the language of the commission indicates it 
was composed by Sherley rather than 'Abbās, related documents maintain the essence 
was what the Shah intended, and this is the basis on which the embassy negotiated. 
Despite the advantages offered, the Imperial court was wary about agreeing to the full 
program  as  presented.  After  a  month  of  consideration,  Rudolf  signed  a  carefully 
worded reply. This letter expressed in general his pleasure at receiving the embassy, 
his acceptance of the offer of friendship, and promised to pursue the war with the 
Turks with vigour. However, it assiduously avoided agreeing to the interminably of  
the cooperation and the refusal to make a separate peace. While the reply sounded 
enthusiastic, it avoided limitations on future actions.44
The expedition stayed several months in Prague during which, one member 
reports, "they entertained us sumptuously." They were shown the Emperor's armoury, 
jewel-house, galleries, and wild animal cages.45 Once they departed in February, the 
mission eventually  travelled on to Rome,  where long simmering tensions between 
Sherley  and  Ḥusain  'Alī  Beg  finally  boiled  over  and  the  two  split  company.  The 
Persian went on to visit Spain and Portugal, while Sherley pursued other projects. The 
mission was not the great success that had been hoped, and they were actually denied 
entry  by  several  countries.  But  it  had  succeeded  in  capturing  the  imagination  of 
Emperor Rudolf, if no other rulers. It also caught the public’s imagination, and in the 
following years several members of the expedition published accounts of their travels 
which  were  widely  read  in  several  languages.  In  addition to  the  accounts  by  the 
European travellers,  a book was authored by one of the Persian entourage, Uruch 
(Ūlūg) Beg Bayāt, who converted to Christianity, took the Christian name Don Juan, 
and  stayed  in  Spain.  These  many  accounts  make  this  expedition  one  of  the  best  
43 Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 72-73. 
44 Steensgard, Asian Trade Revolution, p. 226; Gouvea, Relation, pp. 423-424. 
45 Bayāt, Don Juan of Persia, p. 277. Living expenses for the diplomats in Prague covered in HKA, 
Reichsakten, Fz. 169b, r.Nr. 152, fol. 702-707; NAČR, Karton 779 SM, Packet G 4/1a fol. 38-40.
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documented in the period, although disagreements and conflicts between the members 
mean  that  even  with  this  documentation  it  is  not  always  possible  to  determine 
everything that happened. Since the Sherley embassy has been widely examined, here 
I confine my examination of it to the above summary and turn attention to subsequent 
events which are not so well covered. 
The Kakasch/Tectander Embassy to Persia
Emperor  Rudolf  was  excited  by  the  possibilities  suggested  by  Anthony  Sherley’s 
embassy. Rudolf, who was facing the strain of his ongoing war of attrition with the 
Ottoman  Turks,  was  happy  to  enlist  Persian  assistance;  to  this  end  he  sent  a 
diplomatic  party  with  a  reply.  The  embassy,  under  the  leadership  of  Ambassador 
Stephan Kakasch, left Prague on the 27th of August, 1602; they arrived in Moscow in 
November that  year.  In  spring of  1603,  they sailed  down the  Volga  and over  the 
Caspian Sea, arriving into Persia on the 8th of August, 1603. There, most of the party 
became ill and Ambassador Kakasch died on the 25th of October, 1603. His secretary 
Georg Tectander completed the mission, meeting Shah 'Abbās in Tabriz on the 15th 
November  1603.  After  spending  some  time  with  'Abbās  and  the  Persian  army  in 
Armenia,  in  early  1604  Tectander  started  the  journey home in  the  company of  a 
Persian ambassador. They travelled back through Russia and arrived in Prague at the 
end of 1604. 
Rudolf chose Stephan (István) Kakasch de Zalánkemény to head this embassy. 
He was a Hungarian from Slan-Kamen on the Serbian Danube who had experience 
working as a diplomat and court official, and who was available for a difficult and 
dangerous  mission.  Kakasch  for  many  years  had  worked  for  the  princes  of 
Transylvania.  In  the  1590s  he  was  Secretary  to  Transylvania’s  Prince  Zsigmond 
Báthory, and in this role he was used as a diplomat on account of his knowledge of  
many languages. He became one of the trusted confidants of Prince Báthory and the 
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personal secretary of his wife, the Austrian princess Maria Christine, one of whose 
handmaidens Kakasch married. He was sent as a diplomat to the London court of 
Queen Elizabeth and to the court of the Polish king in Krakow. Later, after Zsigmond 
had abdicated in favour of his cousin Andreas, in September 1599 Kakasch was sent on 
an important mission to Emperor Rudolf II. The Báthory dynasty was under threat 
and the Imperial general Basta was supporting their rival. Rudolf sent him back with 
an answer for Andreas Báthory after making him wait in Prague for two months. In 
the meantime, Voivoda Micheal of Walachia had deposed Prince Andreas Báthory and 
taken over Transylvania. Only by an appeal to the Transylvanian Estates was Kakasch 
allowed to return to his home in Klausenburg. With the fall of the house of Báthory, 
Kakasch lost his patron and was unemployed. In the beginning of year 1601 he was  
forced to sell his house and property in Transylvania and emigrate. He appealed for a  
position  to  Emperor  Rudolf,  who  happened  at  the  time  to  be  looking  for  an 
ambassador to Shah 'Abbās in Persia, and so Kakasch was given the commission.46
Stephan Kakasch brought with him on the journey two assistants. One was 
named  Georg  Agelast,  about  whom  little  else  is  known.  The  other  was  Georg 
Tectander, who acted as Kakasch’s secretary and who was to play a much larger role 
in the embassy and who left the primary accounts of the journey. 
When he departed on the diplomatic mission, Georg Tectander was a 21 year 
old scholar from the Sudetenland part of Bohemia. He came from a family of Lutheran 
scholars and pastors. His Grandfather, who is mentioned in the Forward to his travel  
account, was born Martin Zimmerman in 1506, but later changed his family name to  
Tectander. He was a student of Luther and Melanchthon, and was ordained by Luther 
in 1539.  From 1547 he was a pastor and superintendent of the Consistory in Meissen, 
then in 1558 became the Pastor Primarius in Zittau.  He published several scholarly 
46 Dorothea Müller-Ott, 'Introduction', Eine abenteuerliche Reise durch Russland nach Persien, 1602-
1604, by Georg Tectander, (Tullin, 1978), pp. 6-8; also Iskra Schwarcz. ' "Iter persicum" Tectanders 
und sein Russlandbild'. In: Russland, Polen, und Oestereich in der Fruehen Neuzeit. Festschrift fur 
Walter Leitsch zum 75 Geburtstag. (Vienna, 2003) , pp. 198-199.
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works, including a catechism and a respected herbalist manual.47 Tectander’s father 
Martin studied at the University of Leipzig and in 1580 became the pastor of Gabel 
(Jablonné), in Bohemia. There he fathered two sons, Heinrich and, in 1581, Georg. 48 
Through his family connections, Georg Tectander was educated at the Gymnasium in 
Zittau and then the University of Leipzig.49 He was recommended for the position of 
Secretary to the diplomatic mission in a letter to the President of the Hofkammerer 
from a Doctor Kramer who had taught Tectander at university.50 Tectander was thus a 
well educated young man, from a respected although non-noble family, embarking on 
his first job out of university. 
Tectander published his account of the journey, and his books are the main 
source of information about events of this embassy. There are some related documents 
in the Austrian archives, especially letters Kakasch wrote from Moscow, but these do 
not cover the conclusion of the mission and the meeting with Shah 'Abbās. For this we 
must rely on Tectander's accounts. He published three editions of his work. The first 
was published in Leipzig in 1608.51 In Tectander's introduction to this first edition, he 
dedicates the work to his friend and patron, the Saxon ambassador to the Imperial  
court,  Johann  Georg  Gödelman.  After  hearing  Tectander's  stories  of  his  journey, 
Gödelman convinced Tectander to write his account for publication. This first edition 
is a simple narration of the events of the journey, with little detail or explanation. A 
year later, Tectander produced a longer account, which was published in Altenburg in 
1609.52 The second edition has expanded text, providing details and observations on 
the  lands  and  cultures  he  visited.  It  also  contains  illustrations,  the  Latin  text  of  
Tectander's  oration  to  Shah  'Abbās,  the  instructions  to  Tectander  from  Kakasch 
47 Cornelius Stempel, Reformation und Konfessionalisierung im oberlausitzischen Zittau. Vergleichende 
Aspekte, (Munich, 2006), pp. 73-75.
48 Schwarcz, “Iter persicum”, p. 199. 
49 R. Wolkan, 'Vorwart', Georg Tectanders von Gabel Reise nach Persien. Neudruck der Ausgabe vom 
Jahre 1610. (Reichenburg, 1889), no page numbers. 
50 Georg Tectander, Iter Persicum, Kurtze doch außführliche und warhafftige beschribung der 
Persianische Reiß:... (Altenburg in Meissen, 1610), p. 2. 
51 Georg Tectander, Kurtze und warhafftige beschreibung der Reis von Prag aus... bis an den Königlichen 
Hoff in Persien:... (Leipzig, 1608). Republished as Eine Abenteuerliche Reise Durch Russland nach 
Persien, 1602-1604, ed. Dorothea Müller-Ott, (Tullen, 1978). 
52 Georg Tectander, Iter Persicum, Kurtze doch außführliche und warhafftige beschribung der 
Persianische Reiß:... (Altenburg in Meissen, 1609).
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shortly before the ambassadors death, and several endorsements including some in 
verse. Although it was intended to be a deluxe version of the book the production was 
cheaply done. The paper is thin, and although the print is easily legible, in places it is  
not  well  inked,  and  the  dies  show  holes  and  excess  ink  spots.  The  illustrations,  
prominently advertised on the title page, are not especially tied to the text; they are 
mostly of eastern European cities which were passed through in the first few pages. 
They appear to have been adapted from plates the publisher already had on hand.  
Despite these shortcomings, the expanded text is of great value. Tectander describes 
details of life in Tabriz, northern Iran, and Armenia, where he spent time with the 
Shah's army. He describes the architecture, religious practices, and reactions of the 
people to the Shah's re-conquest. This is the earliest published description of Persian 
culture  written  in  the  German  language,  and  while  there  are  other  European 
testimonies of Shah 'Abbās' court, this one is distinguished by witnessing the army in 
the field and describing north-western Iran. A third printing was published in 1610, 
again in Altenburg, which reproduced the 1609 version with its expanded text.53 Most 
of the references below are to this 1610 edition. 
The Journey
The diplomatic party set out from Prague on the 27th of  August, 1602.54 Since Ottoman 
lands lay along the direct routes between the Austrian lands and Persia, and because 
of the war these could not be crossed, the diplomats had to travel through Russia then  
down to the Caucasus to Persia. Along the way they stopped in Moscow and several 
other regional capitals to discuss the war situation. Tectander gave their route passing 
through the following towns: Schweinitz and Bretzlaw in Silesia, Wartenburg, Welon 
(Wieluń),  Chyestacoa  (Częstochowa),  and  Crackow  (Kraków)  in  Poland,  Warsaw, 
Grodna  and  Vilna  (Vilnius)  in  Lithuania,  Orsa  (Orsha,  Belarus)  and  Smolensk  in 
53 Georg Tectander, Iter Persicum, Kurtze doch außführliche und warhafftige beschribung der 
Persianische Reiß:... (Altenburg in Meissen, 1610). Republished as Georg Tectanders von Gabel Reise 
nach Persien. Neudruck der Ausgabe vom Jahre 1610. ed. R. Wolkan, (Reichenburg, 1889).
54 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, p. 2.
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Russia, before reaching Moscow.55
As they travelled through Wartenburg, they stayed on the 2nd September with 
Abraham von Dohna, an old acquaintance of Kakasch who had served as an Imperial 
diplomat to Moscow. Von Dohna had consulted with Rudolf in the planning for this 
mission, and he might have been selected to lead the mission himself except that he 
was  very  ill.  Von  Dohna discussed  with  Kakasch  plans  for  the  mission  and gave 
Kakasch a letter for the Grand Duke of Moscow.56
They continued on their way, passing through cities in Poland, Lithuania, and 
into Russia. Along the way they met with local rulers, who were known to Kakasch 
from his days as a diplomat in Poland. Their way east was slowed by poor roads, bad 
weather,  and  a  Plague  outbreak.57 Tectander  described  several  instances  when 
entering into new territories, despite having pass-letters from the Emperor, they were 
forced to wait for several days to receive permission from the local ruler to continue 
their travel. They then had to negotiate their way past bands of Cossacks who claimed 
not to recognise the Emperor.58 
On  the  9th November  they  reached  Moscow;  “Praise  God”  exclaimed 
Tectander.59 They were given food and a place to stay provided by the Grand Prince,  
Boris Godunov.60 A week later, on the 17th of November, Kakasch had an audience 
with the Grand Prince.61 Kakasch reported on his meetings in a series of letters written 
55 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 3-10.
56 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, p. 4; Schwarcz, “Iter persicum”, p. 200.
57 Schwarcz, “Iter persicum”, p. 200.
58 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 4-15.
59 Tectander, Kurtze und warhafftige beschreibung, 1608, pp. 15-16. 
60 'Grand Prince of Moscow' is an equivalent to 'Tsar of all Russias' at this time, Grand Prince being 
the older title. Tectander and other seventeenth century Germans tend to use the term Grand 
Prince (Großfürst) so I use it here. 
61 In the 1609 and 1610 editions of Tectander's book the date is given as 27 November, but in the 1608 
edition it is given as the 17th. The first edition agrees with the date given by Kakasch in his letters 
to Prague. Iskra Schwarcz examines the contradiction and concludes it is a printing error in the 
1609 and 1610 editions. Schwarcz, “Iter persicum”, pp. 200-201.
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in Moscow to the Hofkammerpräsident Wolf Unverzagt in Prague. While Tectander 
described the splendour and gold of the Moscow court and the beautiful clothes of the 
Grand Prince and his son, Kakasch reported on the more substantial issues of the 
meeting. He made a list of requests: that the Grand Prince provide pass letters through 
his and neighbouring lands and a guide to lead them, that he write to the Sultan of 
Astrakhan and request a ship be provided for crossing the Caspian Sea, that someone 
might help Kakasch learn a bit of the Persian language, that one of the servants be 
allowed to return to Prague with a letter detailing their progress, and that the Grand 
Prince give them clearance to continue their travel and help with travel expenses.62 
Godunov provided them with most of  what he asked and more. He paid all  their 
expenses travelling in Russian ruled lands thorough Astrakhan. He also provided two 
additional servants. Importantly, he gave seven bundles of sable furs and other items 
as gifts for the Shah.63 He also wrote his own letter to Shah 'Abbās, to be delivered by 
the diplomatic party. Godunov recognised Russia's growing rivalry with the Ottoman 
Turks. He had no desire to enter into an open war, especially since his own political  
situation at home was tenuous. However, he generously aided Rudolf's war efforts; if  
he could encourage an effort by two of the Ottoman's greatest rivals to jointly fight  
the Turks,  it  would  keep the Turks occupied  away from the Crimea and Russia's 
southward  expansion.  Generous support  of  the  diplomatic  mission was  much less 
expensive than facing a war of his own.  
After staying a month in Moscow the group departed on the 7 th of December. 
They travelled by sled through Vladimir and on to Cassan (Kazan) on the Volga River,  
arriving Christmas Eve. In Kazan they waited out the winter until the Volga thawed.64 
On the 11th of May, 1603, they boarded a fleet of seventy Russian ships which were 
sailing down the Volga to Astrakhan. These sailed down the river through the lands of  
the Crimean Tartars, who were allied with the Ottomans and technically were at war 
with Austria; the Tartar Khan had withdrawn personally from the fighting by 1603 
but Tartar forces still  participated. The Khan had just renewed peace treaties with 
62 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 32-38.  Kakasch to Prague, HHStA, Persia I, Konv. 3, fol. 3-4, 7-9.
63 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 37-38. "7 Zimmer Sobeln" where 1 Zimmer = 40 pelts. 
64 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 61-63. 
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Godunov and it was through the Russian's protection that the travellers were able to 
pass safely.65 They arrived in Astrakhan at the end of May, and then spent two months 
making preparations and purchasing supplies to sail across the Caspian Sea to Persia.66
In July, they set sail on a ship of a Persian merchant trading across the Caspian 
Sea.  On  board,  in  addition  to  the  diplomatic  party  were  people  of  various  other  
nationalities,  including  a  Pole  named  Christoff  Pawlowsky,  as  well  as  Russians, 
Tartars, and Turks. Tectander reported speaking with them in a variety of languages, 
but, on instruction from Kakasch, not mentioning their diplomatic mission. While at 
sea they ran into a severe  storm.  After  much difficulty they landed on the 8 th of 
August 1603 at Langeran (Langorūd), in the Province of Gīlān on the Persian shore of  
the Caspian Sea.67
The Embassy in Persia
Although now in Persia,  the group’s troubles were just starting. Now they had to 
make  contact  with  the  Shah  for  permission  to  travel  within  the  country.  The 
diplomatic group stayed on the Gīlān coast, "in poverty and misery", for ten weeks. 
Tectander described Gīlān as "pretty and jovial", but the climate was "very warm and, 
because it was near the sea, unhealthy". The party had little food and only bad water 
to drink. While the local Persians did grow grapes, Tectander was dismayed that they 
did not make wine from them, and thus the travellers were left drinking the local 
water. Everyone in the group became sick from the conditions, and Tectander's Polish 
friend from the ship, Pawlowsky, soon died.68 Eventually, this sickness would claim 
the lives of all the party, save Tectander. 
65 Karl Max Kortepeter. Ottoman Imperialism During the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus. New 
York University Studies in Near Eastern Civilization. (London, 1973). pp. 176-180.
66 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, p. 65.
67 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 73-74; Tectander, Kurtze und warhafftige beschreibung, 1608, pp. 
46-47. 
68 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 74-75.
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The town of Langorūd was not their intended destination, but merely where 
their  ship  was  forced  aground  in  the  storm.  Once  they  landed,  Kakasch  sent  a 
messenger off to the capital Isfahan announcing their presence and seeking clearance 
and instructions. However, "as fate would have it," Tectander said, 'Abbās was not in 
the capital. At that time he was with the army marching to retake Tabriz. Fortunately,  
the Papal representative to Persia, Francisco di Costa, was in Isfahan and heard of the 
party's plight. Di Costa wrote to Shah 'Abbās, whereupon 'Abbās sent Robert Sherley, 
who was now working in the Shah's service, to collect the travellers.69 Meanwhile, 
their  situation  was  turning  desperate.  Already  weakened  from  the  travail  of  the 
stormy sea passage, they soon succumbed to sickness, which was aggravated by the 
lack of supplies and the hot, humid climate which did not agree with the constitution 
of central Europeans. As they were stricken ill, it became difficult to move to another, 
perhaps healthier location. When they did move, Tectander reported they carried the 
sick Kakasch with great difficulty to a town only two miles away. Once they became 
ill they were stuck, and for most, their fates were sealed. 
Once Robert  Sherley arrived,  he brought Kakasch,  Tectander and the other 
assistants towards Tabriz. However, after only two miles they stopped in the town of 
Lanzan (Lahījān), on account of Kakasch’s weakness. Kakasch lay there for three days 
before dying on the 25th of October. They buried him, “under a tree at our lodging,” 
Tectander reported.70 
Before his death, Kakasch summoned his assistants Tectander and Agelast, told 
them what was in the Emperor’s letter of instruction, and asked them to faithfully 
carry out the mission. Tectander reproduced Kakash's last instructions in his 1609 and 
1610 editions. The ambassador first asked them to bury him with Christian songs and 
prayers. Next, he gave them the letters from the Emperor and Grand Prince Godunov, 
and asked them to continue carrying the letters to the Shah. He also described the 
69 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, p. 76.
70 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 77; Tectander, Kurtze und warhafftige beschreibung, 1608, pp. 49-
50. 
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sable pelts and other gifts. Then he asked, when they return home that they go to the  
town of Botzen in Tyrol, where they will find his wife. They should inform her of his 
death and have her divide his possessions,  including providing for his black valet.  
They should bring these instructions to the Imperial Paymaster and the Hoffkammer 
President who should see that they are rewarded. He gave them a letter for the Papal 
Ambassador Di Costa and told them where they may find in his baggage some money 
to live on. Finally, he enjoined them to be loyal to God and His Imperial Majesty and 
told them he will pray for God to protect them and bring them success. 71 Tectander 
presented  these  instructions  in  his  book  as  Kakasch's  official  will,  dictated  to  his 
secretary who wrote it down. The original document does not survive, other than in 
Tectander's  text.  Once  returning  home Tectander  was  involved  in  a  legal  dispute 
concerning the legitimacy of Kakasch's final instructions, so it was in his interests to 
portray them as official as possible.72 However, several passages read like the words of 
a dying man making his peace with the world, so it is likely these were his actual 
words. 
Kakasch requested the local official of the town of Lahījān, named as Mahomet 
Schephi, to open the ambassador's diplomatic chest upon his death. Inside were the 
sable pelts, his clothing, and a small amount of money. The official recorded all the 
contents and sent the list to the Shah. He provided a donkey to transport the sables to  
the Shah. Tectander took Kakasch's clothes, since he did not have dress of a quality 
suitable for addressing the Shah as an official  Imperial representative. 73 They then 
departed with Robert Sherley the next day, continuing on towards Tabriz. After 5 days 
travel, the remaining members, the two Russians and the Pole sent by Boris Godunov, 
and  George  Agelast,  the  other  German  servant  of  Kakasch,  became  too  sick  to 
continue. They were left behind and died a few days later. Robert Shirley was also 
called to other duties, leaving Tectander, "all alone in great sorrow and worry."74 A 
young Persian boy with a donkey was sent to guide Tectander to Tabriz. Tectander 
71 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, p. 78-82.
72 NAČR, Karton 779 SM, Packet G 4/1a, fol. 44-51.
73 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, p. 82-83.
74 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, p. 85.
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hired a Persian translator named Murath who spoke Russian, since Tectander could 
speak some Russian himself. He had to provide the translator clothes and other needs 
and pay him weekly, but at least he could communicate.
Tectander arrived at Tabriz on the 15th of November, a week after the city fell 
to 'Abbās’ army after several weeks of siege.75 The recapture of Tabriz was one of 
'Abbās’ primary goals ever since signing the 1590 treaty. Tectander was tired and 
weak with fever when he arrived, but because he was told the Shah was not staying 
long in the city he dressed and hurried to the palace. Tectander found Shah 'Abbās in 
the palace of Tabriz surrounded by “other of his lords and officials  of the land”.76 
Tectander described 'Abbās as dressed less well than the others, which matches other 
descriptions of his plain dress habits.77 In fact, Tectander at first did not recognise the 
Shah,  until  an old Persian gentleman took Tectander  by the hand and led him to 
'Abbās. Tectander kissed the Shah's hand and fell to the ground, then 'Abbās bid him 
to stand. Tectander did not have his interpreter with him, and he worried how he 
would make his presentation. However, in the court was a Swiss man, apparently a 
refugee from religious conflict in Switzerland, who had taken up a position in the 
Shah's court, and he was able to translate from Latin to Persian. Tectander then told  
how his lord had been sent by the Emperor, about how they had become ill and all the 
others had died, and that he was charged with delivering the letters. These had to be 
fetched from the house where Tectander was staying, then 'Abbās was presented with 
the  letters  from  Emperor  Rudolf  and  the  Grand  Prince  of  Moscow  along  with 
Kakasch's oration. These were translated into Persian by the Swiss man78
Tectander  related  the  following  anecdote  from  his  court  appearance.  After 
'Abbās inspected the letters, a Turkish prisoner was brought out and made to kneel on 
the ground before 'Abbās. A servant brought out two ornamental swords, handed the 
75 Capture of Tabriz described in Munshi, History of Shah 'Abbas, trans. Savory, Vol. II, pp. 829-833.
76 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 86-87.
77 For example, Father John Thaddeus in Chronicle of the Carmelites, Vol. I, p. 285. 
78 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 88-89.
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first to 'Abbās, who cut the head off the Turk. Next, 'Abbās called for Tectander to 
come forward and kneel.  The servant handed 'Abbās the second sword. Tectander 
feared his own life was to be forfeit, and he wondered if there was something in the 
Emperor’s letter that was offensive to the Shah, or if he himself had inadvertently 
given insult. But 'Abbās laughed and presented him the second sword with a short 
speech  about  how  the  Christians  should  fight  their  common  Turkish  enemy. 79 
Tectander’s  story  fits  with  other  stories,  from  western  visitors  and  from  Persian 
sources, which indicate 'Abbās had a wicked sense of humour, and he frequently used 
dramatic and often violent gestures to emphasise his authority.80
On the third day after Tectander's arrival in Tabriz, 'Abbās led his army out 
towards Armenia. Tectander went along in the entourage, riding a "beautiful Arabian 
horse"  given  to  him  by  'Abbās.81 The  army  moved  through  Marant  (Marand), 
Nachszschirvam (Nakhchivan), and Sulpha (Julfa), all  of which fell to 'Abbās' army 
without a fight. Tectander describes the people along the path of the army welcoming 
Shah 'Abbās and liberation from the Turks with singing and dancing in the streets.82 
The Persian army then proceeded to siege Irivan (Yerevan), where Turks held out in 
the  fortress.83 Along  the  journey  and  at  Yerevan,  Tectander  spent  more  time 
conversing with Shah 'Abbās, often dining at his table. Tectander called 'Abbās, "a 
friendly and jovial Lord."84 He mentioned one incident when he was sitting on a carpet 
on the ground near the Shah. Tectander was dressed in his best clothes, as appropriate 
for a meeting with the Shah, while 'Abbās was dressed in a simple shirt. A prisoner 
was brought over, fell to the ground and kissed Tectander's foot, thinking he was the 
Shah. This evoked laughter from 'Abbās and the court.85 Tectander did not reveal the 
79 Tectander, Kurtze und warhafftige beschreibung, 1608, pp. 57-58; Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 
90-91.
80 Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 69-72; Eskander Beg Munshi, History of Shah 'Abbas, trans. 
Savory, Vol. 1, p. 529. 
81 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, p. 92.
82 Tectander, Kurtze und warhafftige beschreibung, 1608, p. 60; Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 94-
98; Vardapet Arakel of Tabriz describes Shah 'Abbās' passage from an Armenian perspective, The 
History of Vardapet Arakel of Tabirz, trans. George A. Bournoutian, (Costa Mesa, CA, 2005-2006). 
vol. 1, pp. 24-25. 
83 Eskander Beg Munshi, History of Shah 'Abbas, trans. Savory, Vol. II, pp. 833-836, 843-846.
84 Tectander, Kurtze und warhafftige beschreibung, 1608, p. 64. "ein freundlicher und lustiger Herr". 
85 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 118-119.
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topics of conversation he had with 'Abbās, however, it is known that the Shah liked to  
engage  western  visitors  in  debate  on  religion  and  philosophy  and  inquire  about 
European geography and politics. 
Near the end of 1603, 'Abbās determined to send a reply to Emperor Rudolf, 
updating him on the  progress  of  the campaign.  He gave  Tectander  permission to 
return home and sent with him a Persian envoy, named by Tectander as Mechtichuli 
Beeg (Mehdī Quli Beg). At the departure audience, 'Abbās said he heard that the Turks 
were making peace offers to the Emperor and asked Tectander to urge Rudolf to make 
no peace with the Turks. The Persian army, he said, was taking lands and fortresses 
from the Turks, and this would hurt their ability to make war in Hungary.86 'Abbās 
presented Tectander  with gifts  of  900 Reichs Talern in gold coins,  a  Persian-style 
sword,  the  horse  mentioned  above,  and  "kingly  Persian  clothes  which  he  himself 
('Abbās) wore on his body."87 Tectander was being honoured; the clothes were part of 
a Persian tradition of ḵeḷ'at, opulent clothes given from Shah's wardrobe as a sign of 
respect. The money, given in part to cover his travel expenses, and the sword were to 
become part of a legal dispute once Tectander returned to Prague. Some members of  
the Imperial Court insisted since he was not the official ambassador he must hand 
over the gifts he received; Tectander appealed to the Emperor in order to keep them, 
arguing that he had been duly deputised by Kakasch and he had carried out the duties 
of an ambassador.88 There is not a record of how the dispute was concluded; however, 
the evidence is that Rudolf was favourably inclined toward Tectander. In a later letter 
to the Shah, Rudolf commends the Shah for his treatment of Tectander: "We are told 
by a  servant  that  our  delegate  died  on the journey,  and that  he [Tectander]  was 
received humanely ... which for us was pleasant and a delight."89 So it is likely that 
Rudolf ruled in Tectander's favour and allowed him to keep the gifts bestowed by 
'Abbās. 
86 HHStA, Heinrich von Logau to Barvitius, Persica I, Konv. 3, 16 v.
87 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, p. 117. Willem Floor, "Ḵeḷ'at", Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. XVI, Fasc. 2, 
pp. 226-229, online edition pub. (May 2013). 
88  HHStA, Tectander to Rudolf II, Persica I, Konv. 3, fol. 18-23; NAČR, Karton 779 SM, Packet G 4/1a, 
fol. 44-51.
89 Rudolf II to Shah 'Abbās, Oct. 1605, in J. Hammer, Geschicte des Osmanischen Reiches, vol. IV, p. 675. 
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The  journey  back  to  Prague  was  no  less  arduous  than  before.  To  avoid  a 
Turkish held fortress and the snow-covered mountains of the Caucauses, Tectander 
and  Mehdī  Quli-beg  took  a  ship  across  the  Caspian  Sea  from  Azerbaijan  toward 
Astrakhan. But the ship wrecked on a small island in the sea, and the envoys were 
forced to walk across the sea-ice to land. In spring they made the way up the Volga, 
then to Moscow. While in Moscow they rendezvoused with Heinrich von Logau, the 
Imperial ambassador to Russia who was just arriving in Moscow. Together they had 
an audience with the Grand Prince. Then they journeyed on to Narva, took a Swedish 
ship to Stettin, and returned to Prague at the end of 1604.90 Tectander finished his 
mission by reporting to Emperor Rudolf on 8 January 1605.91
Significance
In  terms  of  diplomatic  outcomes,  the  Kakasch/Tectander  mission  had  very  little 
significance.  Actions  in  neither  Persia  nor  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  were  altered 
through this diplomacy. By the time Tectander delivered Rudolf's letter, Shah 'Abbās 
had already embarked on his war against the Ottomans. The embassy did little to 
change the course of the Persian advance, nor did Tectander negotiate any significant 
strategy. Once Tectander returned to Prague his report was certainly considered by 
the court; however, his conveyance of 'Abbās' requests for greater Christian efforts 
came to nothing, since by 1605 the war situation was turning bad for the Imperial 
forces and other concerns predominated. 
'Abbās had long planned to attack the Ottomans, and in 1603 an opportune 
time had come. Already in 1602, 'Abbās promised the Augustinian friar Antonio De 
Gouvea that he would attack the Ottomans before De Gouvea left Iran.92 'Abbās had 
dealt with the internal stability of his kingdom, then faced the Uzbeg threat on his 
eastern border; now he could turn his full attention to the Ottomans. Disaffection with 
90 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 123-144.
91  HHStA, Tectander to Rudolf II, Persica I, fol. 18.
92 John M. Flannery, The Mission of Portuguese Augustinians to Persia and beyond (1602-1747), (Leiden, 
2013), p. 59. 
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the war in Hungary and the economic difficulties it brought led to revolts in Asia  
Minor against the Ottoman government. This weakness in the Ottoman Empire gave 
'Abbās an advantage in attacking soon.93 The specific opportunity to attack occurred 
in September 1603, when a Kurdish chief rebelled against the Ottoman governor of 
Tabriz. The governor went out with most of his troops to put down the rebellious 
vassal, leaving the city virtually undefended. The Kurdish chief sent a letter to 'Abbās  
informing him of the situation, and 'Abbās seized the chance to assemble his troops 
and march on the lightly defended city.94 Thus, 'Abbās made his decision to attack 
before receiving Rudolf's letter. Indeed, it was 'Abbās' departure with the army that 
led to Kakasch and the rest waiting on the shore of the Caspian Sea for so long. 
One result of the embassy was that the arrival of an official emissary with a  
reply from the Emperor encouraged 'Abbās to think that he could rely on Christian 
cooperation more than turned out to be the case. When Ḥusain 'Alī Beg returned in 
1602  he  conveyed Rudolf's  promise  to  prosecute  the  war  in  Hungary  against  the 
Ottomans  until  he  achieved  victory.95 Tectander's  arrival  fulfilled  the  Emperor's 
promise  to  send  an  ambassador,  and  his  offer  of  friendship  from  Rudolf  further 
encouraged 'Abbās that he could count on Christian cooperation. 'Abbās had heard 
rumours that the Turks were offering peace negotiations to Rudolf, but Tectander's  
arrival eased his fear that he would be left fighting alone.96 This encouragement could 
help to explain the vociferousness of his feeling of betrayal at the Treaty of Zsitva-
torok.  As  will  be  shown  later  in  this  chapter,  Rudolf's  wishes  and  Tectander's 
diplomacy  counted  for  little  in  the  peace  treaty  between  the  Austrians  and  the 
Ottomans. 
Arguably  of  greater  significance  than  the  diplomatic  outcomes  were  the 
93 V. J. Perry, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 120, 103-131.
94 Munshi, History of Shah 'Abbas, trans, Savory, Vol. II, pp.827-828; Colin Imber, "The Battle of 
Sufiyan, 1605: A Symptom of Ottoman Military Decline?" in Iran and the World in the Safavid Age, 
ed. Willem Floor ad Edmund Herzig, (London, 2012), p. 92. 
95 Gouvea, Relation, pp. 423-424. 
96 HHStA, Heinrich von Logau to Barvitius, Persica I,  16 v.
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cultural contacts between central Europe and Persia. In a direct way, the travellers 
interacted with people in other lands, and the universally human tragedy of Kakasch 
succumbing to a fatal disease would certainly have exposed at least a few of the local  
Persians to the humanity of the Christian west. Such sympathy can be seen in the 
actions of the Mayor of Lahījān where Kakasch died. But it was Tectander's books that 
left the most lasting legacy, giving a German audience a glimpse of Safavid Persia and 
other eastern countries. 
Travel Writing
While literature has always contained travellers' tales, during the Renaissance, first-
hand accounts of travel to foreign lands became an important genre. By the sixteenth 
century  there  was  at  least  some  effort  to  separate  fact  from  fiction.  Editors  like 
Hakluyt excluded the fantasies of John Mandeville, while Francis Bacon encouraged 
travellers to write to provide the foundations of scientific and philosophical studies.97 
Tectander's books contributed to this growing tradition. While there were many forms 
of travel writing, Renaissance literature scholar William Sherman says, "By the end of 
the  sixteenth  century,  however,  the  most  characteristic  form  was  the  'report'  or 
'relation', which combined a chronological narrative of movements and events with 
geographic and ethnographic observations."98 This was exactly the form of Tectander's 
books, especially the revised editions. Since Tectander was well-educated and from a 
scholarly  family,  it  is  probable  that  he  was  familiar  with  this  literary  trend  and 
perhaps he revised his initial, more narrative account to better fit the 'relation' form. 
Sherman goes on to say, "The narrative voice in these texts could be either strongly  
first-person  (as  with  Coryate)  or  strongly  third-person  (as  with  Harriot)."99 
Interestingly, Tectander combines both of these in his writing. 
97 Peter Hulme and Tim Youngs, "Introduction", in The Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing. eds. 
Hulme and Youngs, (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 2-4. Cambridge Companions Online 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL052178140X. 
98 William H. Sherman, "Stirrings and Searchings (1500-1710)", in The Cambridge Companion to Travel  
Writing. eds. Hulme and Youngs, Cambridge, 2002, p. 30.
99 Sherman, "Stirrings and Searchings", p. 30.
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The narrative structure of Tectander's writings projects an arc of his personal 
growth. The first half of the book is written almost exclusively in third-person, with 
Tectander  as  an almost  invisible  narrator.  Kakasch is  the  actor;  Tectander  merely 
reports. Occasionally he uses the subject 'we', as in, "Thereafter the second day we 
came to Breslau," but in theses cases Tectander is just one of the group, not an agent 
in his own right.100 More often he attributes group activity to Kakasch, as in, "By the 
following  11th  September  the  Imperial  Ambassador  had  ridden  through  Masovia, 
Lithuania, and White Russia," or simply reports the actions of, "mein Herr...".101 This 
writing  reflects  Tectander's  role  as  secretary,  not  decision-maker.  The  crisis  came 
when they land in Gīlān and everyone else dies. Tectander is alone, thus he is forced  
to become an agent. His language shifts to first-person. The subject is now Tectander, 
as in, "I announced to him in Latin..."102 He begins to describe his inner thoughts, such 
as  his  uncertainty and then fear  at  his  first  audience  with 'Abbās,  something not 
present in the earlier section. As he travels back with his Persian companion he again 
writes his sentences with 'we', but this is not the passive 'we' of the earlier section.  
Now he is active in making decisions and the rest of the entourage is following his 
lead. He has grown from passive adolescence at the start  of the journey to active 
agency at its end. 
This arc of personal growth is most clear in the first edition of his book. The 
later editions are more heavily edited and much more description is added amongst 
the  basic  narrative.  However,  his  own development  can be  sensed  in  his  cultural  
descriptions of the later editions. In Persia he is acutely aware that he is alone; he is 
the outsider observing a functioning culture going about its business. He describes 
what he sees without imposing value-judgement. He reports on mosques and religious 
services, funeral rites, and other religious issues, as well as dining habits and foods. He 
transcribed  the  adhān call  to  prayer  as  best  he  could  and he wrote  about  people 
washing their face and hands before praying. At times he admits he was not able to 
100 Tectander, Kurtze und warhafftige beschreibung, 1608, p. 3,  "Hernacther den andren tag seynd wir 
gen Breßlaw".
101 Tectander, Kurtze und warhafftige beschreibung, 1608, p. 6, "Folgends den 11 Septembris ist der 
Keyserliche Legatus per Masoviam, Lithvaniam & Albam Russiam gereiset".
102 Tectander, Kurtze und warhafftige beschreibung, 1608, p. 55, "Ich ihme auff Latein vermeldet...".
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see certain things, and either that he is reporting what he was told or that he just does  
not  know.103 This  contrasts  with  his  description  of  the  Tartar  nomads  around 
Astrakhan. There he was clearly judgemental. He wrote that they did not grow crops 
to make bread, they did not use coins, and that they sold their family members for 
sheep and horses. He called them a "barbaric people" and concluded, "In summary, it is  
a  very  wicked  and  untrustworthy  race."104 At  the  time of  his  encounter  with  the 
Tartars,  Tectander  was  still  a  servant  in  a  group  of  westerners.  He  was  free  to 
compare their ways with his own culture because he was still surrounded by his own 
cultural group. Only after he went through the crisis of losing his cultural group was 
he forced to recognise his position as an outsider. As he grew in agency he also gained 
the possibility of objectivity.
Tectander's  travel  account became overshadowed by much more exhaustive 
treatments by others later in the century. However, when it was published it was a 
valuable glimpse for the German-speaking world into the culture of the east. The fact 
that it went through three printings indicates that it was met by a receptive audience. 
Even  today,  although  it  is  not  as  well  known as  the  later  works  by  Olearius  or 
Chardin, it remains valuable for its look at Shah 'Abbās on campaign. 
Persian Ambassadors in Prague
By 1603, Shah 'Abbās had determined the time was right to start his war with the 
Ottoman Empire. The ongoing war in Hungary had led to financial strains, internal 
revolts and a decline in loyalty of Ottoman troops; to 'Abbās these troubles signalled 
that the Ottoman adversary had been weakened to the point where his revived Persian 
army could reclaim the territory lost in the previous war.105 He was very interested in 
obtaining  Christian  cooperation  in  confronting  the  Ottomans  with  a  multi-front 
103 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 100-112 for his observations on Persian life, as well as other 
comments throughout his text. 
104 Tectander, Iter Persicum, 1610, pp. 67-72.
105 Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 230-236; Parry, History of the Ottoman Empire. pp. 120-122. 
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threat, and to this end he launched a major diplomatic initiative to the countries of  
Europe. Over the course of 1603, at least seven Persian ambassadors were dispatched 
to  Europe,  an  unprecedented  effort  in  the  European-Persian  relationship.  Among 
these embassies were:  Allah Verdi Beg, who was accredited to the Spanish court but 
went by sea no further than the Portuguese colony in Goa, who returned him with  
their own representative after discussing trade matters but not the war; Bastam Qulī  
Beg, who was sent to the Pope accompanied by the papal representative Miranda, but 
he died on route to Europe; Ḥasan Beg, who was sent to France, but he was denied 
admission by the French king who was allied with the Ottomans, and he eventually 
ended up in Prague; and  Zainal Khān Shāmlū, and later,  Mehdī Qulī Beg, who were 
sent to Emperor Rudolf’s court in Prague.106
The Persians Visit Prague
Zainal  Khān Shāmlū departed  Persia  sometime in  mid-1603  and did  not  arrive  in 
Prague until July 1604, thus his travel overlapped that of Kakasch and Tectander. He 
embarked while Kakasch’s party was travelling through Russia,  and did not arrive 
until after Tectander had already met with 'Abbās. Neither party was aware of the 
other until they arrived at their destination, and so the letters each bore could not 
address issues brought by the other. This was one more example of the limitations on  
East-West diplomacy imposed by the distance and difficulty of travel at the time. 
Zainal Khān arrived with his entourage in Prague on the 19 th of July, 1604 to 
much fanfare.  He and his  party of  30  servants  were  given an escort  of  over  one 
thousand men, mounted and on foot.107 Reports liken the arrival and procession across 
town  to  a  parade.  Certainly,  the  Habsburg  monarchs  were  noted  for  the  use  of 
elaborate  processions  to  express  their  power.  The  exotic,  foreign  nature  of  the 
embassy would have elevated Zainal Khān above other more mundane ambassadors 
106 Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 237-242.
107 Franz Christoph Kevenhiller, Annales Ferdinandei, vol. VI, (Leipzig, 1721), p. 2821. 
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as an opportunity for a spectacle.108
The Persians met Emperor Rudolf a week later on the 26th of July, when they 
were received in the palace. A small clash of cultures occurred when the Persians 
entered and sought to show their respect to the Emperor. The ambassador tried to kiss 
Rudolf’s  foot,  in the Persian fashion of showing subservience to the ruler.  At first 
Rudolf  was  shocked,  and  withdrew  his  foot,  offering  his  hand  instead  for  the 
ambassador to kiss. Then the Persian servants were admitted and they came forward 
on all fours, and Rudolf allowed them to kiss his foot. The Papal Nuncio remarked,  
“This form of respect raised a smile from His Majesty, who hadn’t been seen to smile 
in public for twenty years.”109 The exchange obviously made an impression because 
several observers narrate the event.110 Zainal Khān had a short, but pleasant audience 
with the Emperor. The Persians presented Rudolf gifts of carpets and silk. It appears 
nothing  of  substance  was  discussed  at  this  first  meeting,  for  the  reports  describe 
“exchange  of  pleasantries”  and  “magnificent  entertainment”,  without  mentioning 
discussion of political topics. However, after the meeting with the Emperor concluded, 
the ambassador had a more substantial meeting with Ferreri, the Papal Nuncio. The 
two discussed several topics in this meeting. They covered Papal relations with Persia,  
where Ferreri expressed a desire to see more Catholic orders established in Persia. 
They also discussed the lack of an Imperial representative in Persia, in contrast with 
the  Vatican  and  Spain  which  had  sent  semi-permanent  representatives.  Ferreri 
informed Zainal Khān that an Imperial ambassador, Kakasch, was under way. Finally, 
the Persian ambassador complained that the Spanish King promised to go to war with 
the Turks, but he had not done so yet.111
The  Persians  were  housed  in  a  residence  owned  by  the  innkeeper,  Georg 
108 Die Prager Nuniatur des Giovanni Stefano Ferreri, Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland. Ed. by A. O. 
Meyer. Vol. IV. 3. (Berlin, 1913), no. 259, p. 181.
109 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 264d, p. 185.
110 Victor von Klarwill, ed., Fugger News-Letters: First Series, trans. Pauline de Chary, (London, 1924), p. 
270.
111 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 264d, p. 186.
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Mayer. Mayer provided housing in Prague for a number of foreign ambassadors. He 
kept detailed records of expenses, but then spent the next ten years trying to obtain 
his promised compensation from the court.112
Zainal Khān wanted to deliver his message to the Emperor, obtain a reply and 
quickly  depart  for  home;  however,  things  in  the  Imperial  court  did  not  move  so 
quickly. Shah 'Abbās had requested a promise that the Christians would keep fighting 
the Turks, and that they would consult 'Abbās before making peace. This would be in 
line with the minimal expectation for a military alliance, and would not allow the  
Turks to shift all their forces away from Hungary to face Persia. But Rudolf and the  
court were hesitant to make this promise. The war was putting a strain on Imperial 
resources. Already there were tentative offers of peace coming from the Ottomans, 
and some in the court were encouraging these offers to be accepted.113 Rudolf was 
indecisive, as ever, and the court was divided. Already by the 9 th of August, Zainal 
Khān was requesting that he be given leave to return home.114 But the Emperor kept 
postponing  his  departure.  Instead,  Rudolf  arranged  many  activities  for  the 
ambassador, such as troop reviews and banquets.115
Eventually, word came from Moscow that another Persian diplomat was on his way to 
Prague; this was Mehdī Qulī Beg travelling with Tectander.116 Zainal Khān’s departure 
could be postponed until they heard the news from the new envoy. 
Mehdī Qulī Beg arrived in Prague on the 20th of December, 1604. Hasan Beg, 
another Persian ambassador who had been sent to France but was denied entry, also 
arrived in Prague earlier in that month. They were all housed in the same quarters 
112 HKA, Reichsakten, Fz.194, r.Nr. 177; Fz. 194, f. 116; Fz. 169b, r.Nr. 152, f. 698-714.
113 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 267e, pp. 191-193.
114 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 272d, p. 197.
115 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 275b, h, pp. 204, 208. 
116 HHStA, Heinrich von Logau to Barvitius, Persica I, 16-17; Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 
304c, p. 231.
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with Zainal Khān, their entourages completely filling the guest-house.117 Thus, for a 
while the Prague court hosted three Persian ambassadors, which pleased Rudolf, who 
was always eager to demonstrate the superiority of the Imperial court. Mehdī Qulī Beg 
had an audience with Rudolf on the 8th of January, 1605 where he presented a letter 
from 'Abbās detailing his progress in the war, the capturing of Tabriz and 57 other 
places. He gave Rudolf gifts including several elaborate Persian shields, covered in silk 
with  Persian  inscriptions,  which  helped  emphasise  the  military  nature  of  the 
embassy.118 He explained to Rudolf that after the conquest of Armenia, 'Abbās had 
treated the Christians there well and bestowed rich gifts on the Armenian church. In 
the days after the official audience Mehdī Qulī Beg met with the heads of the court 
diplomatic and intelligence services.119 Ferreri hosted all three ambassadors to dinner, 
and  he  reported  Mehdī  Qulī  Beg  was  particularly  friendly  towards  the  Catholic 
religion,  while  the other  two were more restrained.120 Ferrerri  also spoke  with an 
Armenian  member  of  Mehdī  Qulī  Beg's  party  about  the  conditions  and  'Abbās' 
treatment of the Armenian Church. Ferrerri hoped the Pope would send a Catholic 
archbishop to take charge of the Armenian Church.121
During the winter months the ambassadors could be easily delayed because the 
weather was not  appropriate for travel,  but come spring they were begging to be 
given leave to return home. Rumours circulated they would depart without formal  
leave. Rudolf kept postponing their departure while he and the court pondered how to 
reply.122 Rudolf also hoped to send an emissary of his own with the returning Persians, 
but  arrangements  for  this  mission were delayed.  Meanwhile,  in  1605,  the military 
situation was turning quite bad for the Imperial forces. Stephan Bocskay was now in 
charge in Transylvania and switched allegiance to the Ottomans. In addition to its 
own strategic  value,  this  move  also  caused  unrest  in  many Hungarian areas.  The 
117 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 337, p. 258; no. 344e, pp. 264-266.
118 These shields are now in the collection of the Livrustkammaren, The Royal Armoury in Stockholm, 
after they were taken in the Thirty Years War. Inventory numbers: 10607, 10608, 7032, 7084.
119 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 344e, pp. 264-266; no. 356, p. 274; Steensgaard, Asian Trade 
Revolution , p. 239.
120 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 382c, p. 316.
121 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 382e, p. 317.
122 Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution , p. 240.
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Turks  took  advantage  to  conduct  an offensive  which  recaptured  the  fortresses  of 
Visegrad  and  Esztergom,  thus  erasing  the  main  Imperial  strategic  gains  from  the 
war.123 Ferreri speculated that Rudolf was waiting for a victory he could report to the 
Shah before sending the Persian ambassadors home.124 
Many voices in the court and the nobility were calling for a peace settlement. 
Members  of  the  Habsburg  family,  led  by  Rudolf’s  brother  Mathias,  supported  the 
peace  faction  and threatened to  remove Rudolf  as  Emperor  if  he  did  not  support 
negotiations  with  the  Turks.  But  there  were  also  equally  strong  proponents  of  
continuing  the  war,  notably  the  papal  nuncio  Ferreri,  and  perhaps  the  personal 
feelings of Rudolf himself. Rudolf contacted Anthony Sherley in Italy to ask for advice 
in  responding  to  the  Persian  diplomacy.  Sherley  provided  analysis  of  events, 
forwarded information he obtained from the English ambassador in Constantinople 
regarding famines and riots occurring in Turkey, and generally encouraged Rudolf to 
keep fighting. After an exchange of letters, in July of 1605 Rudolf brought Sherley to 
the court in Prague.125 Throughout the summer of  1605,  while these debates  were 
carried out, the Persian ambassadors were kept waiting in Prague. 
Finally, on the 31st of October, 1605, the Persians had their farewell audience. 
Ferreri also attended the audience and bid them farewell. Rudolf gave the ambassadors 
gifts worth 12,000 florins, although Ferreri does not mention what those were. Rudolf 
also gave them a letter for Shah 'Abbās professing his intentions to continue fighting 
the  Turks  and  to  send  an  embassy  the  following  year.  He  also  expressed  these 
assurances to the ambassadors personally. Ferreri describes, "The Persian ambassadors 
were released full  of hope for the war."126 However,  despite his assurances, on the 
same day Rudolf gave instructions to start peace negotiations with the Turks. 127
123 Kortepeter, Ottoman Imperialism, pp. 188-204. 
124 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 382e, p. 317.
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The Persians faced a long and difficult  trip home.  Two of the ambassadors 
travelled to the Baltic then over the sea to Russia; the other travelled overland through 
Poland and rendezvoused with Carmelite missionaries, before meeting the others in 
Moscow. The trip was made all the more difficult by the political unrest in Russia  
following the death of Boris Godunov in April 1605. They were detained in Kazan and 
Tsaritsin along with a part of the Carmelite mission, and did not reach the Caspian 
Sea to sail  for home until  August 1607. Zainal  Khān was refused passage through 
Russia and returned home by a different route. He visited the Netherlands and arrived 
home  via  a  ship  from  Portugal  shortly  before  May  1609.128 By  the  time  the 
ambassadors  returned  home,  news  had  already  made  the  messages  they  carried 
obsolete.  Rudolf  was  forced  to  sign  the  Peace  of  Zivta-Torok  in  November  1606, 
breaking his promises to Shah 'Abbās. 
 After their return, the two ambassadors sent to Rudolf's court went on to high 
positions  in  the  service  of  Shah  'Abbās.  Mehdī  Qulī  Beg  was  reported  by  the 
Carmelites in 1609 to have, "come into great favour and been made Head Gatekeeper 
and lieutenant of 'Alī Quli Khān..."129 Zainal Khān had an even more illustrious career. 
He was an ambassador to the Moghul court of Jahangir, he successfully led a defence 
of Baghdad against a Turkish attempt at recapture, and for that he was promoted to 
Commander-in-Chief of the army (ishīk-āqāsī-bāshī). However, he was executed along 
with many other high officials of 'Abbās' court when 'Abbās' grandson Safi became 
Shah in 1629.130
Activity of the Prague Court
The difficult  diplomatic  situation in which the Imperial  court  found itself  in 1605 
occasioned  evaluation  of  the  goals  and  potentials  of  their  diplomatic  contacts, 
128 Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 107-112; Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 241-242.
129 Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 169.
130 Newman, Safavid Iran, pp. 74, 200-201; Munshi, History of Shah 'Abbas, trans. Savory, Vol. II, p. 
1194, 1172, 1283, 1309.
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including, since it was pushed to the fore by the presence of the ambassadors, the 
Persian diplomacy. The main decision facing the court was whether to continue the 
Turkish  War  or  seek  peace  terms.  Many  military,  diplomatic  and  domestic 
considerations pushed towards seeking an end to the war.  Against  this  had to be 
weighed the potential for gains to be brought about by a new military alliance with 
Persia. 
Unfortunately, the records from Rudolf’s court are incomplete. After his reign 
the court moved to Vienna, and most of the records from his period were moved as  
well. Many were lost in this process. Other records remained in Prague, a city which 
suffered during the Thirty Years War, once again resulting in more records lost. The 
result is that records from Rudolf’s  court are uneven; some documents exist while 
others are missing in an almost random fashion. Details of court debates are therefore 
difficult to piece together and must rely on tiny bits of evidence. 
In addition to the Imperial court records, another type of official records are  
reports  sent  from  other  diplomats  in  Prague  to  their  homes.  Perhaps  the  most 
important  of  these  is  the  letters  of  the  representative  from  the  Vatican.  The 
correspondence of Giovanni Stefano Ferreri, the Nuncio from 1603-1606 is especially 
extensive and detailed. It covers all aspects of events in the court, and helps reveal the 
activities  there  in  the  absence  of  many  of  the  court  documents.  Ferreri  reports 
frequently about the Persian ambassadors, both on their activities in Prague and issues 
raised by them for the court. Ferreri spent much time with the Persians, taking it upon 
himself to become their unofficial host, and frequently inviting them to dinner.131 He 
had  his  own  particular interests  he  raised  with  them.  He  wished  to  see  the 
establishment of a Carmelite mission in Isfahan, and to further this goal he introduced 
Zainal Khān to Carmelite missionaries in hopes that they could travel back to Persia  
together.132 He was also concerned about the spread of Calvinists into Persia, and he 
urged Shah 'Abbās through his diplomats to allow only Christian churches approved 
131 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 275h, p. 208.
132 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 268a, p. 193.
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by  Rome  into  his  lands,  and  asked  Rudolf  to  stop  Calvinist  missionaries  from 
travelling.133 Ferreri was keen to see the war against the Turks continued, and thus he 
was delighted at the prospects of an alliance with Persia. He worried that the Sultan 
makes peace offers, "...to separate the Kaiser and the Shah, for both united are too  
much for him."134 Ferreri was a powerful influence at the heart of the court, and he had 
personal interest in the Persian embassy, so his reports are some of the best records of  
the Persian visit. 
The  Habsburg  court  had  many  divisions  and  opposed  interest  groups,  for 
instance: Protestants versus Catholics, moderate Catholics versus staunch Tridentine 
Catholics,  regional  lords  versus  centralised  monarchy,  different  regions  and 
nationalities versus each other. The interplay of these different loyalties often created 
unlikely  alliances  as  groups  looked  to  maximise  their  current  self-interests.  The 
question of continued war or negotiated peace with the Turks was no exception. The 
Protestant Hungarian lords supported the Catholic Archduke Matthias over his more 
moderate brother on the peace negotiations because they felt they could leverage their 
support to get concessions from Matthias. The art of ruling the multi-ethnic, multi-
religious Holy Roman Empire came down to balancing these different interest groups. 
After 1600, as Rudolf became more reclusive, he was increasingly outmanoeuvred in 
these negotiations. 
One great division that coloured all  other issues in the court was the feud 
between Emperor Rudolf and his brother Archduke Matthias. Matthias was ambitious 
and always looking for ways to increase his personal power; Rudolf was proud of his 
office,  introverted  and  increasingly  paranoid  about  threats  to  his  power.  Their 
contrasting characters set them out for conflict. As Herbert Haupt writes, "During the 
Turkish Wars, Rudolf's long-standing mistrust of his brother Matthias evolved into 
133 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 276, p. 210.
134 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 267e, p. 193. "er will Ks. und Schah trennen, da ihm beide 
vereint zu viel sind."
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open  enmity  and  hatred."135 Matthias  looked  for  ways  to  undermine  his  brother's 
power. In 1600, when Rudolf's mental state was at its most erratic, Matthias called 
together the other  Archdukes in the town of  Schottwien to discuss the Emperor's 
sanity and prepare possible moves to replace him.136 Despite Rudolf's mistrust, he put 
Matthias in charge of the military for the Turkish war, a role for which he proved to 
be  ill-suited.  After  his  inept  leadership  led  to  the  military  stalemate  and  his 
sanctioning of Counter-Reformation forces contributed to the crisis in Transylvania 
and Hungary, Matthias took advantage of the situation to support efforts towards a 
peace settlement against the wishes of his brother.137 The dispute between the brothers 
would be a fulcrum around which the discussion of peace talks would rotate. 
Supporters  of  the  peace  initiative  included  a  variety  of  court  officials  and 
military leaders, as well as many people from other social classes. Wolf Unverzagt, the 
President  of  the Aulic  Council,  was called by Ferreri  a leader  of  the peace party.  
Ferreri  accused  him  of  delaying  shipments  of  weapons  to  the  army  in  order  to 
undermine the military situation.138 However, Ferreri may have beeen mistaken, since 
Unverzagt  was  usually  a  close  confidant  of  Rudolf  and  an opponent  of  the  more 
militant Bishop Khlesl on many religious matters.139 Unverzagt's support of the peace 
initiative may have been a principled stance on what he thought was the best advice 
he could give his Imperial patron in the situation, rather than more devious political 
manoeuvring. Khlesl, on the other hand, was the Bishop of Vienna, a supporter of the  
Counter-Reformation  who intrigued  to  increase  Catholic  control  over  politics  and 
education,  and  the  architect  of  Archduke  Matthias'  policies.140 Khlesl  pushed  his 
protégée Matthias into the peace process in order to increase their joint power, even 
though that meant defending the same Protestant nobles he usually fought against.  
The  court  Steward,  Fürstenberg  was  also  pressing  for  the  peace  process.  Ferreri 
complained that Fürstenberg and Unverzagt wrote to the Curia accusing the Pope of 
135 Haupt, "Feuding Brothers", p. 238.
136 Midelfort, Mad Princes, pp. 131-132 ff.; Evans, Rudolf II, p. 60. 
137 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, pp. 248-249.
138 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 267e, p. 192.
139 Evans, Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 61-62. 
140 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, p. 237.
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undermining their peace work with his financial support for the war.141 General Tilly, 
who found fame in the Thirty Years War but who was at this time commander of the 
Imperial artillery, was also an advocate of seeking peace. He wrote repeatedly to the 
Emperor complaining of the condition of the army and the lack of discipline of the  
soldiers. These conditions, he argued, required the Emperor to make peace quickly.142 
Other military leaders expressed similar worries, as did Serra, the Nuncio in Vienna, 
He wrote, "One expects the coming of peace, because the Emperor with the Hungarian 
nobility, and the Sultan with the Persian war, are both in need of a rest."143
In addition to some of the high nobility, other members of Austrian society 
expressed their displeasure with the war and its demands. In the late sixteenth century 
taxes had already been raised to pay for the construction of the frontier defences.  
With the outbreak of war, in 1595 the government decreed a 'levy of the tenth man', 
which  required  one  man  out  of  every  ten  volunteer  for  military  service  and  the 
remaining nine in the village pay for his support. After the defeat at Mező-Keresztes 
in 1596, to this was added 'the levy of the fifth man'. At that point, the demands on the 
peasantry were too much for them to bear and they organised themselves, selecting 
both political and military leaders. While the political representatives brought their 
grievances to Rudolf and Matthias, other bands pillaged a few castles. The rebels were 
soon violently put down and Catholic authorities used the opportunity to implement 
Counter-Reformation policies, but the message was received and Matthias rescinded 
the 'fifth man' levy.144  
On the other side of the issue were various advisers who saw an opportunity to 
defeat the Turks decisively. Ferreri was clearly one of these; the tone of his letters  
make  clear  he  hopes  the  Emperor  will  continue  the  war  and  that  he  finds 
141 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 304a, p. 229.
142 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 264b, pp. 184-185; 267e, p. 192. 
143 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 598b, p. 548.
144 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, p. 205-206; Evans, Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 45, 97; Winkelbauer, 
Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht, Vol. 1, p. 482, illus. p. 51.
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contemptuous  those  advocating peace  negotiations.145 However,  Ferreri  despite  his 
access had limited influence over Rudolf, since the nuncio represented the Vatican, 
which Rudolf jealously perceived as a rival to Imperial power.146 More influential was 
the court secretary Andreas Hanewaldt, who was a trusted adviser and who argued 
that  those proposing peace negotiation be treated as  traitors.147 The Pope and the 
Spanish King both opposed peace talks.148 Both contributed funds to its prosecution, 
although the Spanish King never committed troops despite frequent suggestions. Pope 
Clement VIII was an enthusiastic supporter of the war, and he tried repeatedly - albeit  
unsuccessfully - to persuade other nations to join a Holy League alliance. His death in 
March  1605,  followed  by  the  quick  death  of  his  successor  Leo  XI,  threw Church 
support into disarray just at the critical decision time. General Basta seems to have 
defied the trend of military leaders pushing for peace talks. The peace-leaning Serra 
described him as "disgruntled" by the negotiation and "not so peaceful".149 However, 
his  views  were  tempered,  for  he  also  advised  the  Emperor  that  the  province  of  
Transylvania was bringing less than 100,000 Taler but cost over 360,000. He was more 
pragmatic, dedicated as a soldier to continue fighting but recognizing the difficulties. 
At  the centre of these swirling arguments sat Rudolf.  His personal feelings 
inclined him to continue the fight; however, it was his crown that was under threat.  
As  the  arguments  intensified,  Rudolf  appears  to  have  suffered  another  bout  of 
depression in the spring of 1605. He kept petitioners  waiting for hours while he hid 
away in the castle. He told his confessor Pistorius, "I know for certain that I belong to  
the devil."150 He also accused Matthias and his advisor Khlesl of bewitching him.151 
The Persian entry into the the war stiffened Rudolf's opposition to the peace 
effort. The Papal nuncio noticed a change in the court's mood in response to the news 
145 for instance: Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 601e, pp. 553-554.
146 Evans, Rudolf II, pp. 87-88.
147 Herbert Haupt, "Feuding Brothers", p. 239.
148 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 267e, p. 192.
149 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 598c, p. 548.
150 Midelfort, Mad Princes, p. 137.
151 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 399c, p. 322; 413b, p. 364.
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of 'Abbās' attack on Tabriz. In a letter to Matthias, Rudolf explained his opposition to 
the peace talks. In addition to stating his mistrust of the Turkish negotiations and the 
help expected from other European rulers, Rudolf highlighted the Persian war effort 
and their  desire to combine with Christian powers against their  enemy as a chief 
reason for his opposition.152
Rudolf  contacted Anthony Sherley for  advice  on responding to the Persian 
ambassadors. Since parting from his Persian embassy, Sherley had been an agent for 
the Spanish and Scottish kings in Venice.  He had been arrested in Venice  over  a  
dispute with a Persian silk merchant, and he was ordered to leave the city in 1603,  
although  he  convinced  officials  to  extend  the  time  he  stayed.153 In  1604,  Rudolf 
corresponded  with  Sherley  through  a  number  of  letters.  In  these  letters,  Sherley 
passed  to  Rudolf  information  from the  English  ambassador  in  Constantinople.  He 
described difficulties faced by the Ottoman government due to the war, such as their 
shortage of funds, revolts in the countryside and riots and famines in Constantinople. 
He passed on information about the mobilization of troops and even when the armies 
departed for the front.154 This correspondence frightened the Venetians, who were in 
fear of jeopardizing their important Turkish trade, and in December 1604, Sherley was 
finally expelled from the city.155 He continued to write from Ferrara. Then in June 
1605, Rudolf brought Sherley to Prague as a personal adviser. His arrival was much 
noticed: the English ambassador Sir St. Lesieur worte, "Sir Anthony Shurley came to 
Prague the 2. of June by poste from Messina...it is said, the Emperor sent for him." and 
Ferreri stated that Sherley was there to advise the Emperor on a reply to the Persian 
ambassador.156 It is clear that Sherley believed the Emperor should continue the war 
effort. He writes that he hopes to see the Turkish mosques despoiled and the Turks 
152 HHStA, Rudolf to Matthias, Türkei I, 88, Juli-August 1604, fol. 134f;  Jan Paul Niederkorn. 
“Zweifrontenkrieg gegen die Osmanen”, In: Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische 
Geschichtsforschung, 104 (1996), p. 320.
153 Davies, Elizabethans Errant, pp. 148-160. 
154 Original letters in HHStA, Handschriften Weiß 290, Band XI. 
155 Babinger, Sherleiana, p. 34; Davies, Elizabethans Errant, pp. 163-164. 
156 Babinger, Sherleiana, p. 35, citing Public Record Office (London): News Letters, Germany, etc., no. 
41; Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 431b, p. 378.
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completely defeated.157 After consulting with the Emperor, Sherley was given a new 
commission - to oppose Turkish interests in Morocco.158
Cultural Exchange
While the diplomatic goal of the Persian’s embassy was not in the end successful,  
their  stay in Prague did provide an interesting example of cultural  contact.  Zainal 
Khān spent over a year in Prague, while Hasan Beg and Mehdī Qulī Beg were in the  
city for many months; thus they had ample time to the observe the city and its culture 
as well as meet and make an impression on the people living there. 
The citizens of Prague were fascinated by the exotic foreigners. Many people 
turned out to see the entrance to the city of Zainal Khān in 1604, as well as Sherley,  
Ḥusain 'Alī Beg and their entourage in 1600. Most of the ambassadors’ dealings were 
with select members of the court; however, the populace at large was aware of their  
presence from such public events. Sales of travel books, such as that by Tectander,  
show that there was an interest in foreign lands, at least among the educated parts of  
the population. 
Members  of  the  court  society  had  direct  contact  with  the  Persians.  The 
ambassadors were invited to and hosted dinners with members of the court, including 
the Emperor on at least one occasion.159 One of their most frequent visitors was the 
papal  nuncio  Ferreri.  He  had  numerous  meetings  and  diners  with  them,  and  he 
introduced  them to other  figures  in  the  Catholic  Church.  There  was  considerable  
Church interest in setting up Catholic missions in Persia, so the Church personnel 
involved with that effort were eager of the opportunity to make Persian contacts and 
157 Anthony Sherley to Rudolf, Ferrara, 26 January 1605, HHStA Handschriften Weiß 290, Band XI. fol. 
161-162. 
158 Babinger, Sherleiana, p. 37-51; Davies, Elizabethans Errant, pp. 193-198. 
159 von Klarwill, ed., Fugger News-Letters, pp. 270-271 ; Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 267e., p. 
193.
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learn about the country. Ferreri hoped the missionaries could travel back to Persia in 
the company of the Persian ambassador when he returned.160 Another visitor was the 
scientist  and  court-physician  Jessenius.  He  wrote  a  book  on  Zoroastrianism,  and 
already established an interest in Persian history, which he, no doubt, was eager to  
discuss with the Persian ambassadors.161 
The source for recording some of the social events of their stay, including the 
banquet with the Emperor, was the Fugger News-Letters. The Fugger family headed a 
trading and banking enterprise with vast interests throughout Europe and around the 
world. To inform their business decisions they collected reports from their agents in 
various  important  cities  about  the  events  occurring  there.  These  reports  covered 
whatever the agents deemed to be of interest: “political, financial, or even of a local 
nature.”162 These reports, together with reports of the long-running broadsheet  Neue 
Zeitungen, were collected in the business headquarters at Augsburg, which regularly 
supplied  Count  Fugger  and  other  clients  with  updates  of  current  events.163 The 
collection survives intact, and as such, provides a window into events of early-modern 
Europe. The Persian embassies to Prague were one such event covered in the Fugger 
News-Letters. They describe the arrival and audiences of both Zainal Khān and of the 
Sherley mission. These reports are written in a more journalistic style than the court 
or nuncio reports. They mention the ambassadors intentions to conclude an alliance 
with the Emperor,  and certainly the war with the Turks receives due attention in 
other reports as it certainly affects the Fuggers' business decisions. However, more of 
the reports on the Persians are devoted to their dress, their manner, and their public  
activities. For instance, one report details the banquet when the Emperor attended. 
The Emperor offered a toast and passed the Persian ambassador Zainal Khān a large 
goblet  of  wine,  but  the  ambassador  refused  this  on  account  of  his  religious 
restrictions. Rudolf was gracious, complemented the ambassador on his religious 
160 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 273, p. 201; 275h, p. 208.
161 Evans, Rudolf II, p. 137.
162 von Klarwill, ed., Fugger News-Letters, Forward by H. Gordon Selfridge, p. ix.
163 von Klarwill, ed., Fugger News-Letters, Forward by H. Gordon Selfridge, pp. xxvi-xxxi. 
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Fig. 1. Portrait of Zainal Khān Shāmlū,
Engraving by Aegiduis Sadeler, 
© Fitzwilliam Museum.
 Fig. 2. Portrait of  Mehdī Qulī Beg,
Engraving by Aegiduis Sadeler, 
© British Museum.
scruples and took back the cup.164 Reports such as these, while brief, give some of the 
flavour of the encounters with the ambassadors that are lacking in the official reports. 
Artwork  was  an  important  part  of  Rudolf's  court  and,  appropriately,  the 
Persian  ambassadors  were  depicted  in  illustrations  of  their  visit.  Aegidius  Sadeler 
made copperplate engravings of portraits of both Zainal Khān (fig. 1) and Mehdī Qulī 
Beg (fig. 2).165 Another illustration showing the Persians is a view of the Great Hall in 
the Prague Castle, showing the crowds of people there, and the Persian ambassadors 
are visible in the crowd.166 
164 von Klarwill, ed., Fugger News-Letters, pp. 270-271.
165 Prag um 1600: Ausstellungskatalog. Kunst und Kultur am Hofe Rudolfs II, (Essen, 1988), no. 36, 37, pp. 
112, 121; Zainal Khān Shāmlū, Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, No. P.8705-R; Mehdī Qulī Beg, 
British Musem, London, No. AN00445809.
166 Fučíková, Rudolf II and Prague, p. 464, #I.367.
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The  portrait  engravings  were  produced  by  Aegidius  Sadeler,  the  court 
engraver. He was born around 1570 in Antwerp to an artistic family - his father was  
an  art  dealer  and  his  two  uncles  were  engravers.  His  early  career  took  him  to 
Frankfurt, Munich and Rome where he worked with several artists who subsequently 
worked for Rudolf's court: Joris Hoefnagel, Hans von Aachen and Joseph Heintz the 
Elder. Once these artists moved to the Imperial court, they recommended Sadeler to 
the Emperor; in 1597 he was appointed to the court himself, where he became the 
most illustrious engraver of his time.167 Sadeler's portrait of Zainal Khān matches a 
painting for Emperor Rudolf by Esaye Le Gillon; however, the attribution on the print 
indicates that the image was made from a life drawing by Sadeler. It is probable that 
Zainal Khān did one sitting for both Le Gillon and Sadeler at the same time. 168 The 
portrait shows Zaimal Khān wearing an Persian-style clothing, including an elaborate 
silk robe, and a turban. The engraving bears inscriptions in both Latin and Persian 
stating the ambassador's name and titles and that he was the representative of Shah 
'Abbās to Emperor Rudolf II. The portrait of Mehdī Qulī Beg was made from a life-
drawing by Sadeler, and a hand-drawn sketch of his for this engraving still exists. It  
likewise shows him in his native dress and holding an eagle on his hand as a symbol  
of power. It also bears inscriptions in Latin and Persian of his name and function. 
The portraits reveal several things about the ambassadors' reception in Prague. 
The first point is the very existence of the portraits, not just as a single painting, but  
as a copperplate print. Copperplates were made for wider distribution of the image, so 
obviously there was interest in circulating their image more widely.  Interest could 
come from both above and below. Above, from the Emperor who encouraged the 
167 Sadeler's early career covered in Dorothy Limouze, "Aegidius Sadeler, Imperial Printmaker", 
Philadelphia Museum of Art Bulletin, Vol. 85, No. 362, (Spring 1989), pp. 3-7; Fučíková, "Rudolf  II as 
Patron and Collector", Rudolf II and Prague, pp. 20-21. 
168 Prag um 1600: Ausstellungskatalog. Kunst und Kultur am Hofe Rudolfs II, ed. Kulturstiftung Ruhr, 
(Essen, 1988), no. 37, p. 121; Sadeler's prepatory sketch in Fučíková, Rudolf II and Prague, p. 437, 
#I.229. 
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Fig. 3. Portrait of Soliman, Pasha of Ofen, 
Turkish Commander, from Wikicomons.
Fig. 4. Allegorien auf die Türkenkriege: 
Kriegserklärung vor Konstantinopel, by Hans von 
Aachen, from Wikicommons.
distribution  of  the  portraits  to  publicise  the  importance  of  his  court  as  host  to 
international visitors. He did this by the granting of a privilegium, a form of copyright 
that was granted to certain artists.169 Since the Emperor retained the original painting, 
allowing  prints  to  be  made  and  granting  privilegium  to  enable  their  production 
indicates a desire for them to be seen by a wider audience. The demand from below 
clearly  existed  since  copies  of  the  prints  were  sold.  The  portraits  show  the 
ambassadors in their  Persian style of  dress,  which emphasises  their  exotic  nature.  
However, they are also depicted as pleasant, friendly, and noble men - the type of men 
one can trust to make deals with. This image is a contrast to portraits of Turks, who 
are also portrayed in Asian dress, but who are pictured as scowling and with darkened 
eyes and often holding weapons (figs.  3 and 4).170 Another point of  interest is the 
Persian text on the bottom of the prints. No one in Prague could read Persian; Negroni 
had to be brought from Vienna specifically for his knowledge of the language in order 
169 Dorothy Limouze, "Engraving at the Court of Prague", in Rudolf II and Prague: The Court and the 
City, ed. Eliška Fučíková, et al. (Skira, 1997), p. 174.
170 Prag um 1600, no. 44, pp. 124-125; Hans von Aachen, "Allegory on the declaration of war before 
Constantinople", painting in Heeresgeschictliches Museum, Vienna, reprinted in Winkelbauer, 
Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht, Vol. 1, p. 143.
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Fig. 5. Great (Vladislaw) Hall in Prague Castle, by Aegidius Sadeler, © British Museum.
to read the letters sent from 'Abbās. Yet Sadeler went to considerable effort to include 
the  Persian  inscription  on  the  copperplate  engravings.  Once  again,  this  feature 
emphasizes the exotic nature of the subject, and also reveals an interest in the foreign 
by the audience. Sadeler had to work directly with the Persians to get the text, which 
he would have copied from their  calligraphy since he did not  know the language 
himself. These points emphasize the interest which the Persians aroused in the people 
of Prague. 
Sadeler's picture of the Great (Vladislaw) Hall in the Prague Castle shows this 
busy space at the heart of the Imperial government (fig. 5). Amongst the crowds of  
courtiers, petitioners and servants depicted in the hall is the Persian delegation. This 
image indicates that the Persians would have been regularly seen by many people, at 
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least those with access to the palace. This image was made 1607, two years after the 
ambassadors had departed. And yet, Sadeler remembered them well enough to depict 
them as tiny details in the image. The print was dedicated to Chief Justice Christoph 
Lobkovic, who had a particular interest in Eastern affairs.171 Thus, the inclusion of the 
Persians may have been made by Sadeler as an effort to please this patron. Also, it 
shows that their presence stuck in the minds of the people of Prague.172
The interest in contact with foreign culture ran both ways; the Persians also 
demonstrated  an  interest  in  learning  about  western  culture.  Shah  'Abbās  issued 
instructions to the ambassadors sent in 1603 to follow the local customs. He wished to 
give no chance to  offend potential  allies,  as  well  as  desiring to  learn more  about 
western ways. 173 Ferreri was particularly impressed that Zainal Khān was satisfied to 
eat fish on Fridays,  in accordance to Catholic doctrine.  He compared Zainal  Khān 
favourably  with  Ḥusain  'Alī  Beg,  the  diplomat  with  the  Sherley  expedition,  who 
insisted  on  having  meat.174 The  Persians  were  interested  to  observe  Euorpean 
technology and report techniques that could be of use back home.  Uruch Beg, who 
wrote about the 1600 embassy as Don Juan of Persia, remarks on observing water- and 
windmills  used  for  mining  and  milling  in  Saxony,  comparing  them  with  Persian 
techniques.175
The Persians took advantage of their time in Prague to buy items not available 
in Persia. Specifically mentioned by Ferreri is that they bought clocks.176 Persia had 
long  manufactured  water-clocks,  but  mechanical  clocks  were  a  relatively  new 
introduction  and  there  were  few  people  in  the  country  who  understood  their 
workings.  In  the  late  fifteenth  century  Muḥammad  Hạ̄feẓ  Iṣfahānī  obtained  a 
171 Evans, Rudolf II, ill. 14. 
172 For details about the composition of the image see Limouze, "Aegidius Sadeler, Imperial 
Printmaker", pp. 9-11.
173 Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution, p. 240.
174 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 267e, p. 193.
175 Parviz Mohebbi, Techniques Et Ressources En Iran Du 7e Au 19e Siecle, (Tehran, 1996), p. 146; Bayāt, 
Don Juan of Persia, p . 271.
176 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 267e, p. 193.
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mechanical clock from a European traveller and wrote a book about its workings. But 
after  him  there  were  no  other  native  clock-makers  for  three  centuries;  a  few 
Europeans were recruited by the Shahs to repair their clocks. Clocks were considered 
rare and valuable items, and were used as diplomatic gifts on account of their great 
value.177 The  'other  items'  bought  may  have  included  paintings,  since  there  was 
developing in Persia at  this time a taste for western art,  and several  paintings by 
artists from Rudolf’s court ended up in Persia. 
The ambassadors also took the time to observe local activities. The Emperor 
arranged for Zainal Khān to view a review of troops heading to the Turkish front. The 
ambassador reported being satisfied with the order of the troops, but not with their 
number. 178 Ferreri arranged for the Persians to witness a Catholic mass in the Jesuit 
church, tastefully hidden behind a screen so as not to offend the congregation with 
the presence of non-believers.179 This act, in particular, demonstrated the ambassadors 
genuine interest  in learning about  the culture  they visited.  This mass was not  an 
official  state  function nor  directly  related to  their  primary mission,  like  the troop 
review.  Instead,  this  was  an  opportunity  to  observe  cultural  practices.  They  had 
refused other activities on religious grounds, such as refusing to drink wine at the 
Emperor's toast. These religious refusals had not caused great offence, so certainly the 
ambassadors could have gotten out of attending mass on religious grounds if they had 
so desired. That they attended shows their interest, both personally and in following 
the Shah’s orders to observe local customs. 
Rudolf's Reply and its Aftermath
On the 31th of October, 1605, Rudolf gave the Persians permission to depart for home 
and a reply letter to Shah 'Abbās. In the letter Rudolf expressed his intention to 
177 Willem Floor, "Clocks", Encyclopædia Iranica, Vol. V, Fasc. 7, pp. 713-718, online edition updated 
October 21, 2011; Mohammad Reza (Farhad) Nourbakhsh, "Iran's Early Encounter with Three 
Medieval European Inventions (875–1153 AH/1470–1740 CE)", Iranian Studies, 41:4, (2008), 551-553. 
178 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 275h, p. 208.
179 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 382c, p. 316; Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution, p. 240.
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continue the war against the Ottomans and to send an ambassador to Persia the 
following year.180 Neither of these promises were kept. 
An expedition was in preparation during 1605 to send Wratislaw von Dohna as 
an ambassador to Persia. He was a cadet member of the extensive Dohna family who 
had holdings across central Europe, and he was related to Abraham von Dohna, who 
had been the Imperial Ambassador to Russia and who was mentioned by Tectander 
when his expedition visited von Dohna's estate. Wratislaw von Dohna began making 
preparations for the journey. He apologized to the Emperor for an eight month delay 
in  the  preparations.181 The  reason for  this  delay  he did  not  explain,  however,  his 
brothers later write about financial difficulties which may be related. One explanation 
for  the  wait  the  Persians  were  made  to  endure  before  receiving  their  departure 
permission was that Rudolf wanted to send an ambassador of his own with them on 
their return journey. This eight month delay would fit the time-frame of the Persian's 
wait. However, as has been shown, this would have been just one of several reasons 
why the Persians were kept waiting for an answer. Eventually, they were dismissed 
with the expectation that Wratislaw von Dohna would follow soon after. Then, before 
he  could  embark,  Wratislaw  died.182 The  planning  for  the  embassy  was  lost  and 
another was never started. 
As for  the promise to continue the war,  on the same day that the Persian 
ambassadors  were  handed  the  letter  Emperor  Rudolf  authorised  official  peace 
negotiations  with  the  Turks.183 His  brother  Matthias  was  delegated  to  lead  the 
negotiations.  These  talks  led  to  the  Peace  of  Zvita-Torok,  completed  before  the 
Persians reached home. 
180 Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution, p. 240. A copy of the letter is in the Vatican archives, Fondo 
Borghese II: 152, ff. 61-62. 
181 Wratislaw von Dohna to Rudolf II, HHStA, Persica I, Konv. 3, f. 23/2-23/4.
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Unofficial peace talks had been held between the two armies for quite some 
time already.  Since 1604,  the Ottomans were looking for  a way to get  out  of  the 
dragging conflict in Hungary so they could turn their full attention towards 'Abbās'  
invasion.  Archduke  Matthias  encouraged  these  contacts  and  regularly  sent  a 
representative to discuss terms with the Turkish commanders. While Rudolf knew of 
these  negotiations,  he  had  not  given  them  official  approval  and  he  frequently 
criticized  the  terms  discussed.184 But  in  October  1605,  he  relented  and  gave  the 
contacts official authorisation. In Ferreri's opinion, "The Emperor on no account wants 
to conclude a peace with the Turks."185 Instead, Ferreri thinks Rudolf only approved 
the peace talks as a concession to the court peace party, to gain time for the situation 
to improve.186 While Rudolf's personal feelings might be to carry on with the war until  
an  ultimate  conclusion,  he  was  pressured  by  his  advisers  and  the  deteriorating 
situation. Ferreri reported that Rudolf was depressed over the Hungarian rebellion and 
that he would speak to no one about the authority granted to Matthias to conduct 
negotiations.187 
The negotiations progressed, and by June 1606 an agreement was reached with 
the  Hungarian nobility.  Royal  Hungary  (that  portion  not  under  Ottoman control) 
returned to Habsburg sovereignty; however, its finances would remain separate, civil 
and military offices  within Hungary would go exclusively to Hungarians,  and the 
Hungarian Diet would elect a palatine as head of government. Also, the nobility, the 
royal towns and soldiers in the military frontier were given freedom to choose their 
religious denomination, although this right did not extend to the peasantry who had 
to follow their local lord. In addition, István Bocskai, who had lead the uprising, was 
confirmed as Prince of Transylvania, which provided him double legitimacy since this 
was also recognized by the Ottomans.188 
184 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 257a, p. 180, no. 264b, p.184, no. 267e, p. 191, and others. 
185 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 601e, p. 554.
186 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 602, p. 555.
187 Meyer, Die Prager Nuniatur Ferreri, no. 601e, p. 554.
188 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, pp. 251-253; Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht, Vol. 1, p. 
147.
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Then,  with  the  Hungarians  acting  as  mediators,  Matthias  negotiated  a 
settlement with the Turks - the November 1606 Peace of Zsitva-Torok. The treaty 
established  the  border  much  as  it  was  at  the  start  of  the  war,  with  only  minor 
adjustments.  It  contained  many  symbolic  conditions  which  indicate  a  decline  of 
Turkish power. Official recognition of the Habsburg rank as Emperor was made by 
the Ottomans for the first time, where the treaty stated that, "both should address the  
other as Emperor, not just as King."189 The annual tribute to the Sultan was replaced 
by a single "gift of honour"; no other payments would be expected. Also, both sides 
were obligated to attempt to keep the peace, reining in raids by their border vassals.  
The treaty was established for 20 years, but was subsequently renewed several more 
times.190
Although Matthias had delivered a settlement, it bothered Rudolf that he had 
not conclusively defeated the Turkish enemy and therefore had fallen short of his own 
imperial standards. He regarded the treaties as a personal betrayal and treason against 
the Imperial crown. Rudolf reluctantly ratified the treaties on 9 December, but looked 
for an opportunity to abrogate them. He hoped the German Reichstag scheduled for  
1608  would  provide  him the  funds  needed  to  raise  a  new army  and  resume  the 
Turkish war. Then, the death of Bocskai on the 29th of December, 1606 gave him the 
chance to annul the Treaty of Vienna.191 The Turks were wary of standing down their 
military  and  the  Hungarian  nobles  were  threatening  resumption  of  rebellion. 
Archduke Matthias saw an opportunity to seize power and placed himself at the head 
of the Hungarian nobles. At a meeting in Pressburg (Bratislava) during February 1608, 
an alliance of the noble orders of Hungary, Upper and Lower Austria formed under 
Matthias' leadership to preserve the privileges granted in the Treaty of Vienna and 
maintain the peace with the Turks. When in April 1608 Rudolf refused to sign the  
final peace treaty with the Turks unless they vacated three border forts - a condition  
189 Article 2, cited in Karl-Heinz Ziegler, "The Peace Treaties of the Ottoman Empire with European 
Christian Powers", in Peace Treaties and International Law in European History, ed. Randall C.H. 
Lesaffer, (Cambridge, 2004), p. 345.
190 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, p. 253; Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht, Vol. 1, p. 147;  
Karl-Heinz Ziegler, "The Peace Treaties of the Ottoman Empire", pp. 345-346.
191 Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht, Vol. 1, p. 147.
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the Sultan would certainly reject - Matthias, with prompting from his adviser Khlesl  
and beholden to his noble supporters, decided to attack. Matthias and the Hungarian 
nobility felt that Rudolf had shown his inadequacy to rule by endangering the peace. 
Rudolf thought the treaty gave away too much to the Turks and that the plotters were 
traitors.192
Facing  this  revolt,  Rudolf  looked  for  supporters.  The  Reichstag,  torn  by 
conflicts  over  confessional  disputes,  recessed  in  the  middle  of  April  without 
considering his request for money to resume the Turkish war. The Bohemian nobility 
was willing to support Rudolf in exchange for guarantees of religious liberties. Rudolf  
agreed to their 25 point demands in what became the Letter of Majesty in 1609. By late 
May, Matthias' army of 20,000 faced Rudolf's army of only 4500 just 25 miles from 
Prague. But the show of support from the Bohemian nobility was enough and brought 
Matthias to negotiations. The brothers agreed that Matthias would become King of 
Hungary as well as controlling the ancestral provinces of Upper and Lower Austria.  
Matthias would also become Rudolf's heir for the Kingdom of Bohemia. Rudolf would 
keep the crown of Bohemia and the title of Emperor. But he was also obligated to sign 
the peace treaties ending the Turkish war.193 
Meanwhile,  Shah  'Abbās  was  becoming  disillusioned  with  the  promises  of 
European military action. The other nations of Europe were not forthcoming with 
action against the Turks and the Empire made peace despite their promises. 
'Abbās  had  already  heard  about  the  peace  treaty  through  his  spies  in 
Constantinople  before  his  ambassadors  returned.  When  the  missionaries  who 
travelled across Russia with the ambassadors gave 'Abbās a letter from the Emperor, 
'Abbās replied, "the Emperor had lost his kingdom, one of his people having taken it  
192 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, pp. 253-255; Haupt, "Feuding Brothers", pp. 238-241. 
193 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, pp. 255-256; Haupt, "Feuding Brothers", pp. 242-247; Winkelbauer, 
Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht, Vol. 1, p. 147
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from him..., and he no longer had any power (left), and so had made peace with the 
Turks contrary to promises several times made."194 To the Portuguese Augustinian De 
Gouvea,  'Abbās  called  the  treaty  of  Zsitva-Torok,  "this  infamous  peace."195 'Abbās 
reacted as if  the peace treaty was a personal  betrayal.  Rudolf  had specifically  not 
agreed to irrevocable cooperation nor to consult the Shah before making peace when 
such was proposed by Ḥusain 'Alī  Beg and Anthony Sherley in 1600. He was not 
violating  the  norms  of  international  diplomacy.196 However,  Rudolf  did  repeatedly 
communicate his intention to continue fighting and led 'Abbās to believe he would no 
matter what happened. The receipt of Tectander as an envoy would have furthered 
such  perception.  The  arrival  of  letters  with  his  returning  diplomats  implying  a 
continuation of the fight after the peace treaty was already signed seemed too much of 
an insult to 'Abbās. All the while, the Pope and the King of Spain kept talking of an 
international league to war with the Turks in the Mediterranean, although no such 
league ever materialized. 'Abbās did not give up entirely on the idea of a military 
alliance - such a development would be too valuable to his own endeavours to ignore, 
but he no longer placed much faith in European promises of military action.
When Zainal Khān returned to Persia, after his long stay in Prague and then 
his trip through the Netherlands and Spain, he wrote ill of the European leaders. In his 
report, he wrote in pessimistic language about an alliance of the European nations 
with Persia. He warned 'Abbās that the professions of friendship were false and that 
they wanted the Turks and Persians to destroy one another along with the Muslim 
religion. This accusation was unfair to Rudolf, who seemed genuinely interested in the 
Persians but who was trapped by circumstances from carrying out his plans, but it  
could be true of the Spanish king who was much more religiously bigoted. When 
'Abbās saw this letter he is reported to have said, "You shall see what a fire I shall light 
alight in Christendom within two years."197 The Carmelites missionaries described this 
point as the time he turned his mind towards taking Hormuz from the Portuguese. 
194 Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 123.
195 Gouvea, Relation, p. 424. 
196 Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution, p. 241.
197 Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 169.
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Although it took 'Abbās thirteen years to accomplish the capture with English help, he 
started taking territories along the coast from which Hormuz was supplied. 
'Abbās' war effort against the Turks went well and he recaptured much of the 
lost Persian territory. 'Abbās won a major victory over the Ottoman army at the Battle 
of Sufiyan in 1605.198 He had less need for European military assistance. He derided 
the Christian kingdoms for their passivity. The Carmelites wrote, "now that he has 
won so many battles over the Turks he does not care (a jot) for the Christian Princes  
and publicly mocks them."199 As an example of such, when the missionaries asked to 
build a church, 'Abbās replied, "were the Christian Princes to make war and capture a 
single goat from the Turks, he would give them both site and church."200 Instead of 
military cooperation, he turned his attention more to trade and economic issues. The 
war effort was very expensive. Since 'Abbās reorganised the army, the new musket-
armed infantry forces were under the direct control and pay of the Shah. While this  
gave 'Abbās greater authority and less reliance on the fractious Qizilbash tribes, it also 
meant 'Abbās needed new sources of income to pay this expense.201 One source of 
revenue  traditional  under  the  shah’s  control  was  the  export  of  silk.  Thus,  'Abbās 
looked for ways to increase silk exports to Europe. Anthony Sherley helped devise a 
plan  where  caravans  carrying  silk  and  other  Asian  exports  would  be  routed  to 
Hormuz  for  shipment  over-sea  to  Europe,  instead  of  travelling  over-land  through 
Ottoman controlled territories to ports on the Mediterranean. This plan would bring 
more income to the Shah, and divert tariff money from Ottoman coffers.202
In 1609  Robert  Sherley toured  Europe as  an official  representative  of  Shah 
'Abbās. Among his missions were to promote the Persian silk trade, to continue to 
encourage  joint  military  action  against  he  Turks,  and  also  to  find  out  what  had 
198 Imber,"The Battle of Sufiyan", pp. 93-98; Monshi, History of Shah 'Abbas, trans. Savory, Vol. II, 886-
893.
199 Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 164.
200 Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 177.
201 Floor, Safavid Government Institutions , pp. 133-137, 160-176.
202 Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 264-270. 
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happened to his  brother  Anthony.  Robert  Sherley was well  received in Prague by 
Rudolf,  who knighted Robert.203 Sir  Robert  delivered a  letter  to  the Emperor  from 
'Abbās. The letter greets Rudolf with professions of great friendship, but it contains  
little  substance  and  thinly  conceals  'Abbās’  disappointment  in  Rudolf’s  broken 
promises.204 Rudolf sent back a reply in 1610. But by this time Rudolf had little real 
power  and  his  health  was  failing.  All  he  could  do  was  return  the  professions  of 
friendship  and  offer  hopes  that  in  the  future  Europe  would  join  Persia  in  action 
against  their  common foe.205 Rudolf’s  time was passing,  and with him so was the 
chance  for  an  alliance  against  the  Turks.  In  his  wake  relative  peace  would  be  
maintained along the Turkish border  under  the framework of  the Peace of  Zvita-
Torok, but under the more militantly Catholic Emperor Ferdinand II the Empire itself 
would be torn by the violence of the Thirty Years War. 
203 Lockhart, CHI, “European Contacts with Persia”, vol. 6, p. 390.
204 HHStA, 'Abbās I to Rudolf II, 1 Persien, Konv. 3, fol. 24, 25.




In this chapter, we examine how the relationship between Austrian Habsburgs and 
Safavid Persians evolved in the seventeenth century. In the previous chapter, it was 
seen that the efforts towards a military alliance, which had dominated the relationship 
through the sixteenth century, failed at the start of the seventeenth century and left  
the Persian Shah disheartened about military cooperation with Europe. After the first 
decade  of  the  seventeenth  century,  with  the  failure  of  the  anti-Ottoman  alliance 
attempt,  relations  between  Austria  and  Persian  turned  to  different  matters. 
Throughout the seventeenth century, issues of trade and religion became as or more 
important  as  military  matters.  As  the  century  progressed  the  Habsburgs  brought 
Persia into the early modern diplomatic system which had been developing in Europe 
during the previous century.  The changes in the relationship show that a turning 
point was passed at the start of the century, as will  be argued in Chapter Five. In 
chapter Six, it will  be shown how the diplomatic relations and  trade projects that 
were begun in the seventeenth century flourished in later centuries during the post-
Safavid age. 
With an expanded agenda of different issues covered by their diplomacy, the 
various issues often overlapped and coincided. Therefore, it is more appropriate to 
treat  these  topics  thematically,  rather  than  strictly  chronologically  as  in  previous 
chapters. Below is a summary of the main events that occurred in in each country 
which formed the background to their diplomatic contacts. 
Summary of Events
The Safavids continued warring with the Ottomans sporadically for the first third of 
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the  century.  There  were  periods  of  armistice,  but  at  least  low-level  confrontation 
along the border was almost constant. Shah 'Abbās I captured Baghdad in 1623, and 
the city  was held by the Safavids  for  15  years.  By  1639,  the  two sides  reached a 
comprehensive peace with the Treaty of Zuhab, after which peace was maintained 
between them for the rest of the period.1 'Abbās I also put pressure on the Portuguese 
outpost of Hormuz, and in 1622 his forces ejected the Portuguese from the island with 
the help of the English.2 After the removal of the Portuguese, the English and later the 
Dutch  trading  companies  became  major  commercial  forces  in  Persia,  trading 
manufactured goods from Europe and India as well as spices from Asia for Persian 
silk.3 It is traditionally thought Safavid power gradually declined over the latter half of  
the seventeenth century, until their defeat by Afghans in 1722. Certainly there was a 
reduction of military strength in the Safavid army, although once peace was made 
with their primary opponent, the Ottomans, there was less need for a large army. 
Some scholars, particularly Andrew Newman, have argued that based on measures of 
cultural output and domestic tranquillity, there was no decline until just before the 
1722 fall.4 While Rudi Matthee eschews the tradtional conception of decline, he points 
out various fiscal and political weaknesses in Safavid society which undermined the 
dynasty's  ability to respond to a crisis,  such that when the end came the collapse 
seemed sudden and complete.5
The Habsburg Emperors of the seventeenth century, Ferdinand II (reign 1619-
1637), Ferdinand III (1637-1657), and Leopold I (1657-1705), were more dogmatically 
Catholic than their relatively tolerant predecessors. Worries that Ferdinand II would 
erode Protestant privileges led to the Bohemian Revolt and the start of the Thirty 
Years War in 1618. The conflict, which devastated much of central Europe, started 
1 Ernest Tucker, "From Rhetoric of War to Realities of Peace: The Evolution of Ottoman-Iranian 
Diplomacy through the Safavid Era",in Iran and the World in the Safavid Age, eds. Willem Floor and 
Edmund Herzig, (London, 1012), pp. 81-89.
2 Niels Steensgard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, (Chicago, 1974), pp. 340-
343, and preceding. 
3 Steensgard, The Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 367-411. 
4 Andrew J. Newman, Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire, (London, 2006), pp. 2-9. 
5 Rudi Matthee, Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan, (London, 2012), pp. xxii-xxx, 
passim.
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over  religious liberties,  but  became a struggle  between the Habsburg dynasties  of  
Austria and Spain against the Bourbon dynasty of France. The Treaty of Westphalia 
ending the war decreased the authority of the Emperors in the German territories, but  
as there was no other legitimate alternative, they continued to maintain considerable 
influence.6 Legally, a distinction was drawn between Imperial diplomacy, authorised 
by the Reichstag, and diplomacy carried out by the Emperor on his own initiative; 
however, in practice, much international diplomacy was conducted from the Viennese 
court alone. This time also saw the growth of standing committees to oversee foreign 
affairs as part of a shift towards bureaucratization of the Imperial government.7 The 
Habsburg  rivalry  with  France  continued  and  Austria's  involvement  in  the  feud 
increased as France sought to extend its influence into Germany. Following the death 
of  Rudolf  II,  Vienna  became  the  permanent  capital  of  the  Empire  and  the  city 
expanded.8 While Austria was engaged with war in Europe, peace was maintained on 
the Ottoman border. The Peace of  Zsitva-Torok was renewed several times through 
the mid-century. Later in the century, the Ottomans again threatened, and in 1683 laid 
siege to Vienna. This invasion was defeated by a coalition of forces led by the Polish 
king. Afterwards, the Austrian army continued with a string of victories that began to 
push the Turks out of Hungary.9
Diplomatic Courtesy
One  category  of  correspondence  was  diplomatic  courtesy.  This  category  covers 
contacts made for the purpose of maintaining the relationship between the counties, 
not  for  any  particular  issue.  This  includes  things  like  congratulatory  messages, 
6 On the power of the Emperor after the war see: Peter H. Wilson, Europe's Tragedy, A History of the 
Thirty Years War, (London, 2009), pp. 751-758, 773-778; R.J.W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg 
Monarchy: 1550-1700, (Oxford, 1979), pp. 275-308. On the war generally see: Wilson, Europe's 
Tragedy; Ronald G. Asch, The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-48, 
(Basingstoke, 1997).
7 Klaus Müller, Das kaiserliche Gesandschaftswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden, 
1648-1740, (Bonn, 1976), pp. 10-24. 
8 see John P. Spielman, The City and the Crown: Vienna and the Imperial Court 1600-1740, (West 
Layfayette, 1993).
9 John Stoye, The Siege of Vienna, (Edinburgh, 2000, first published 1964); Thomas M. Barker, Double 
Eagle and Crescent, (Albany, NY, 1967); Andrew Wheatcroft, The Enemy at the Gate, (London, 2008).
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expressions of friendship, and exchange of diplomats.  Europe in the sixteenth century 
had  seen  a  defined  culture  develop  around  diplomatic  activities.  Resident 
ambassadors, empowered to represent the interests of their sovereign on any issue 
which may arise,  replaced envoys who were sent  to act  on one specific  instance. 
Among their many duties, resident ambassadors carried out many of the courtesies 
such as attending coronations and weddings previously assigned to special 'embassies 
of ceremony'.10 In the seventeenth century, the Habsburgs gradually extended these 
diplomatic conventions to their dealings with Persia. 
Following  the  death  of  Shah  'Abbās  I  in  January  1629,  his  grandson  was 
crowned as his successor, taking the name Ṣafī I.11 A year later, on the 22nd of March 
1630, the Emperor Ferdinand II wrote a letter of congratulations to the new Shah. 
Ferdinand wished that Ṣafī and his country "enjoy many years of contentment and 
happiness," and he hoped that the two nations may continue to be friends.12 Nothing 
of substance was discussed in this letter, merely well-wishes and platitudes. However, 
it must be compared to the situation a century prior, when Emperor Charles V was 
still  addressing letters to Shah Ismā'īl  five years after the Shah's death. 13 The 1630 
letter  demonstrates  that  in  the  intervening  century,  western  knowledge  of  and 
communications  with  the  Safavid  court  dramatically  improved.  Within  a  year, 
Emperor  Ferdinand learned  of  the  coronation of  a  new Shah and was  committed 
enough to the relationship between their countries to send a letter for no other reason  
than to maintain that relationship. 
After Shah 'Abbās II succeeded his father Ṣafī as Shah in 1642, there proceeded 
another exchange of congratulatory friendship letters. This is shown by a letter from 
the new Shah to Emperor Ferdinand III which clearly replied to a currently non-extant 
letter  from  Ferdinand.  The  Shah  thanked  Ferdinand  for  his  letter  and  said  he 
10 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, (London, 1955), p. 250. 
11 Roemer, CHI, "The Safavid Period", vol. 6, p. 279.
12 HHStA, "Ferdinand II to Ṣafī, 22 March 1630", Persica I, Konv. 4, fol. 7. 
13 Barbara von Palombini, Bündniswerben abendländischer Mächte um Persien 1453- 1600, (Wiesbaden, 
1968), p. 65; Lockhart, CHI, “European Contacts”, Vol. 6, p. 382. 
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welcomed their friendship. He wished the Emperor luck and happiness, and "..may 
you  sit  with  Allah  in  Paradise."  He  mentioned  one Pādrī Pāvlō,  presumably  a 
missionary priest of the type the Habsburgs often employed as diplomats, who had 
apparently been introduced in the earlier letter. 'Abbās said as long as the friendship 
between  the  rulers  endures,  the  Padre  will  be  allowed  to  remain  in  the  Safavid 
kingdom and will  have a residence at the expense of the Shah. The Padre will  be 
accepted as the Emperor's ambassador and will be granted audience with the Shah.14 
While this letter was written in the name of the newly crowned Shah 'Abbās II, it 
must  be  remembered  that  'Abbās  II  was  only  ten  years  old  at  the  time  of  his 
coronation (and this letter was written within a year of that date).15 Therefore, it was 
actually the court bureaucracy, in particular, the powerful Grand Vizer,  Sārū Taqī, 
who was responding with this profession of friendship. The relationship between the 
courts was not only a friendship between two rulers, it was considered an important 
aspect of foreign policy, an international relationship worth maintaining. 
Examples  like  those  above  indicate  the  changing  circumstances  of  the 
seventeenth  century.  There  were  several  reasons  for  the  increase  in  diplomatic 
courtesy  contacts.  Improvements  in  transportation,  diplomatic  practice,  and  the 
geopolitical  situation  eased  communication  and  allowed  letters  to  be  exchanged 
without mounting a major expedition. Thus, letters with no other purpose than the 
maintenance  of  the  relationship  were  practical.  Letters  could  be  presented  by  the 
resident representative already on site. Increased knowledge of events in the other 
country  allowed  officials  to  respond  in  a  timely  way  to  major  events.  These 
improvements were furthered by long periods of peace with the Ottoman Empire. The 
time-consuming and dangerous journeys of the previous century in order to avoid 
Ottoman territory could largely be replaced with the shorter route across Turkey or 
the Levant. Constantinople became a meeting point for representatives from East and 
West.  Both  the  Austrians  and  the  Persians  had  resident  representatives  in 
14 "Abbās II to Ferdinand II", in L. Fekete, Einführung in die Persische Paläographie: 101 Persische 
Dokumente, (Budapest, 1977), #94, pp. 521 - 524.                                                                                       
15 Roemer, CHI, "Safavid Period", p. 288. 
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Constantinople, and they were in contact with each other.16 Letters were able to be 
passed between them. 
The diplomatic courtesy correspondence also indicates the normalising of the 
relationship  between  Habsburg  and  Safavid  courts.  In  the  previous  century,  the 
relationship  was  focused  on  the  single  issue  of  the  Ottoman  threat.  Therefore, 
contacts  were  only  made  when one  side  or  the  other  was  contemplating military 
action. However, as new issues were added to the relationship, it became seen by both  
sides as important to maintain a regular state of contact and friendship between the  
courts, such that when such issues arose they could be dealt with more easily. 
Austria maintained an official representative to the Safavid court resident in 
Persia through most of the seventeenth century. This was usually a church official 
who had other religious duties, however, they were recognised as authorised to speak 
for the Austrian government. The seventeenth century Habsburg Emperors identified 
strongly with Catholicism, indeed, Leopold I had been educated for a career in the 
Church  until  his  older  brother  died  leaving  Leopold  the  heir-presumptive.  The 
Habsburgs  sponsored  missionary  activities  by  the  religious  orders,  especially  the 
Jesuits,  which  combined preaching the  Catholic  religion  and promoting Habsburg 
policy, the two of which were merged in the mind of the Emperors.17 Persia did not 
maintain regular representatives in Europe, but this was part of a general reduction of  
diplomatic activity on their part throughout the century, and not a reflection of lack of 
concern about European affairs.18 They did, as shown in the second example above, 
respond quickly and magnanimously to Austrian contacts. So both sides can be said to 
be  committed  to  furthering  their  countries  friendship  and  maintaining  their 
relationship through diplomatic courtesies. 
16 Thomas Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht: Länder und Untertanen des Hauses Habsburg 
im konfessionellen Zeitalter, (Vienna, 2003), Vol . 1, pp. 426-427. 
17 Examples of such activities in Evans, Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 419-432. 
18 Matthee, R. "Iran's Ottoman Diplomacy During the Reign of Shāh Sulaymān I (1077-1105/1666-94)", 




A growing arena of contact between Persia and Europe in the seventeenth century 
was  trade.  Trade  was  an important  aspect  of  Safavid  diplomacy:  merchants  often 
accompanied  Safavid  diplomatic  missions  and  the  purpose  of  many  diplomatic 
missions was to establish trade relations. This was all part of the bargaining and gift-
giving which  was  the  foundation  of  Iranian politics.  Several  European states  also 
promoted  trade  as  part  of  their  foreign  policy.  However,  the  European  style  of 
mercantilism  with  contracts  and  corporations  sometimes  clashed  with  the  middle 
Eastern  style  of  continual  negotiations  and  private  dealings,  leading  to 
misunderstandings  and  conflict.19 In  the  first  half  of  the  century,  the  Austrian 
Habsburg  administration,  unlike  some  other  European  governments,  did  little  to 
promote  international  trade  itself.  It  did,  however,  authorise  trade  missions  by 
Austrian and  German merchants.  Eventually,  once  they realised  the  money  other 
rulers  were making they created an office  to encourage commerce.20 These efforts 
were not as successful as Dutch and English companies, but they did expand contacts 
between Habsburg lands and Persia  and they set  the stage for  expanded trade in 
future centuries. 
Safavid Trade Policy
Trade became an important aspect of Safavid political and international policy in the  
seventeenth century. As Matthee describes in his monograph The Politics of Trade in  
Safavid Iran,  Safavid society was in the process of evolving from a tribal-nomadic 
society to an urban-bureaucratic order.21 Although the early Safavid shahs had taken 
limited  steps  to  encourage  commerce  in  their  empire,  it  was  Shah  'Abbās  I  who 
intertwined political legitimacy with revenue.22 In order to wrest control of the state 
19 Matthee, Rudolph P., The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600-1730, (Cambridge, 
1999), p. 69, 232-234.
20 Paula Sutter Fichtner, "Trade", in Historical Dictionary of Austria, 2nd edition, (Lanham, Mayland, 
2009), p. 303.
21 Matthee, The Politics of Trade, pp. 62-63.
22 Matthee, The Politics of Trade, p. 66.
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away from tribal Qizilbash leaders and build the power of the central government,  
'Abbās raised his own military units and court servants, loyal only to the Shah, not 
provided by feudal leaders.23 These reforms required cash with which to pay the new 
professional troops, as well as to maintain a growing centralized bureaucracy. Thus, 
commerce and trade became an important aspect  of  maintaining the central  state. 
Political  power  remained  tied  primarily  to  the  military  and then to  the  land,  but  
revenue  was  important  to  maintain  the  elements  of  power.  Likewise,  merchants 
required state protection, and benefited from the policing and caravanserais provided 
by the central  government.24 A symbiotic  relationship  developed between the two 
elements of society: political-military and merchant, although they remained separate 
institutions. Mercantile success did not typically lead to positions of political power, 
but it did give the merchant classes access to and influence upon the political elite.25 
Persia was a land with few resources desired by the external world with which 
to trade for the desired income. It derived some income from tolls on goods crossing 
the continent, since the country lay at the crossroads of many Asian trade routes. 
Shah  'Abbās  I  also  tried  to  encourage  the  growth  of  craft  industries,  bringing  in 
potters  from  China  to  develop  a  local  porcelain  industry  and  promoting  the 
manufacture of carpets in royal workshops for export to Europe.26 But by far the most 
important  export  product  was silk.  Silk had been linked with Persia since ancient 
times,  through  the  Silk  Road  which  crossed  its  lands  from  China  as  well  as  by 
indigenous production as described by Herodotus. From the time of the Mongolian 
invasion,  the  provinces  of  Gilan  and  Manzandaran  became  centres  for  silk 
production.27 The importance of these silk producing provinces was demonstrated in 
the 1590s when 'Abbās quelled rebellious Qizilbash forces in these regions and turned 
23 Willem Floor, Safavid Government Institutions,  (Costa Mesa, 2001), p. 137; Roemer, CHI, "Safavid 
Period", pp. 263-266. 
24 Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution, p. 68; Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia, (London, 1939), p. 
174; Rüdiger Klein, “Caravan Trade in Safavid Iran”, in Etudes Safavids, ed. Jean Calmard, (Paris, 
1993), pp 305-318.
25 Matthee, The Politics of Trade, pp. 73-74.
26 Andrew J. Newman, Safavid Iran, (London, 2006), pp. 62-63, 67; Roemer, CHI, "Safavid Period", p. 
274. 
27 Matthee, The Politics of Trade, p. 15. Linda K. Steinmann, "Shah 'Abbas and the Royal Silk Trade 
1599-1629", Bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, (1987), pp. 69-70. 
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them into crown domains under loyal  ghulam vizers.28 European interest in Persian 
silk  grew  in  the  later  sixteenth  century  as  European  manufacturing  and  wealth 
increased;  however,  the  real  growth  occurred  as  Levant  companies  looked  for 
products to replace the spices which began to be imported direct from east Asia by the  
Dutch and English East India companies.29 This shift fortuitously occurred just as Shah 
'Abbās was seeking increased sources of revenue, and the Persians were happy to fill 
the demand. However, in the long run, Persians overestimated their silk's worth on 
the world market. In the second half of the seventeenth century, new sources for silk 
were opened in India and China which offered higher quality and lower prices. The 
later  Safavid  administrations  were  slow  to  react  to  changing  circumstances, 
continuing to demand high prices and restrictive contracts, and so lost much of their 
income.30 While the European companies wanted to pay for silk with in-kind trade of 
goods such as spices and manufactured wares, the Persians were interested primarily 
in cash payment. As Iran had no source of gold or silver, they needed to receive these  
metals, and tried repeatedly to restrict export of bullion. This set up repeated conflicts 
with the European traders who, especially in the latter part of the century, wanted to  
sell their goods and take cash from the country in order to invest elsewhere.31
Perhaps the most audacious attempt by the Persian rulers to control the export  
of silk and its revenues was in 1619, when Shah 'Abbās I created a royal monopoly on 
silk exports.  His decree was that producers must sell  to crown agents and foreign 
exporters must buy from the crown. In practice, however, the Armenian merchants 
could  buy  raw silk  direct  from the  farmers  by  paying  a  tax  on  the  goods.32 The 
monopoly allowed 'Abbās to set the price for silk and obtain more revenue. It offered 
foreign buyers high but stable prices and came at the time when new outlets opened 
on the Persian Gulf.  But it  angered farmers and the Armenian merchants.  'Abbās'  
28 Iskandar Beg Munshi, History of Shah 'Abbas the Great, (Boulder, 1978), Vol 2, pp. 634-7, 693-8; 
Matthee, The Politics of Trade, p. 77.
29 Matthee, The Politics of Trade, pp.  24-25.
30 Matthee, The Politics of Trade, p. 202.
31 Matthee, The Politics of Trade, p. 151, 160.
32 Steinmann, "Shah 'Abbas and the Royal Silk Trade", pp. 68-74; Matthee, The Politics of  Trade, pp. 
100-105; Steensgard, Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 377-381.  
131
grandson and successor, Shah Ṣafī, abolished the monopoly soon after his accession in 
1629. Persian chronicles describe it as an example of the new Shah's benevolence and 
link it with other measures taken at the start of his reign. However, modern scholars 
demonstrate  how the  influence  of  the  Armenians  with  certain  court  officials  was 
important in changing the policy.33 Despite ending the royal monopoly, the court still 
heavily influenced trade. It was still the largest purchaser of raw silk, and used the  
power to set tolls and taxes to coerce foreign buyers to deal with them rather than 
independent agents. For instance, the Dutch company had a contract which exempted 
their goods from tolls, but a succession of Safavid administrations ruled that the deal 
only applied to silk they purchased from the Shah; if they purchased elsewhere, then 
the goods they brought in as exchange would be subject to punitively high taxes. 34 
After 'Abbās I,  later Safavid Shahs were less  involved in the details  of  commerce. 
However a series of Grand Vizers and court officials took up the task of representing 
Persian trade interests.35 Over time these officials became more subject to corruption. 
Through  placing  short-term  and  personal  gain  over  long-term  growth,  they 
contributed to a decline in Safavid funds in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth  
centuries when state instability meant increased revenue would have been useful.36
Silk was exported from Persia along several routes, whose relative importance 
varied with time. These were: overland to the Levant, from ports on the Persian Gulf,  
up the Volga through Russia, and over the Black Sea.37 Each route had advantages and 
disadvantages.  For  example,  the  Levant  ports  were  reached  through  Ottoman 
territory, which was subject to being closed during wartime, and which paid tolls to 
the enemy.  In  the sixteenth  century most  silk  exports  passed  through the  Levant 
carried  by  Venetian  and  other  Mediterranean  shippers  to  Europe,  while  the 
Portuguese engaged in trans-oceanic trade from Hormuz on the Persian Gulf. In the 
33 Matthee, The Politics of Trade, pp. 119-121; Steensgard, Asian Trade Revolution, p. 386.
34 Matthee, The Politics of Trade, p. 132, 149, 157, 234-235; Steensgard, Asian Trade Revolution, p. 391-
393.
35 Matthee, The Politics of Trade, p. 129.
36 Matthee, The Politics of Trade, pp. 240-241.
37 Edmund M. Herzig, "The Volume of Iranian Raw Silk Exports in the Safavid Period", Iranian Studies, 
Vol. 25, No. 1/2, (1992), p. 62; Matthee, The Politics of Trade, pp. 47-55. 
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first half of the seventeenth century, supremacy in trade transferred to the English 
and Dutch companies, who exported silk from Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf after 
the English helped Shah 'Abbās I eject the Portuguese from Hormuz in 1622.38 Later in 
the century,  the Levant  ports  regained their  importance once a  lasting peace was 
established between the Safavid and Ottoman empires, and the route through Russia 
became  more  practical  after  Russia  emerged  from  its  "Time  of  Troubles"  and 
established firmer control over the lower Volga region. Throughout the period and on 
all the routes Armenian family firms were constant agents and middlemen. Austrian 
and German efforts were only ever a small portion of the total trade. But Austrian 
traders formed a part of the larger Levant trade and pioneered the Black Sea route,  
while a German effort prefigured the Russian route, although too early for it to be 
commercially practical. 
Olearius and the Holstein Trade Mission
In the 1630s, as the Thirty Years War ravaged much of the German Empire, the Duke 
of Holstein Frederick III  sponsored a trade mission to Persia through Russia in an 
attempt to capture some of the European silk trade away from the maritime powers. 
With  approval  from  the  Emperor Ferdinand  II, the  mission  set  out  in  late  1633, 
travelled to Moscow where they were delayed in negotiations with the Tsar,  then 
sailed down the Volga River and over the Caspian Sea to Persia. There they met Shah 
Ṣafī I in Isfahan in 1637, and returned again through Moscow and arrived back in 
Germany in 1639.39 The difficulty of the journey and the expensive transit fees showed 
that  the  venture  could  not  be  commercially  successful.  However,  inclusion  in  the 
mission of the scholar Olearius made the expedition a cultural and scientific success,  
as his detailed observations and writings brought to Europe a wealth of information 
about Persian lands and peoples. 
38 Samuel Purchas, Purchas his Pilgrimes, (Glasgow, 1905), pp. 348-353; Steensgaard, Asian Trade 
Revolution, pp. 331-343. 
39 Gerhard H. Weiss, In Search of Silk: Adam Olaerius' Mission to Russia and Persia. The James Ford Bell 
Lectures, No. 20, (Minneapolis, 1983). timeline and map pp. 20-21.
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Numerous  nations  were  interested  in  developing  overland  Persian  trade 
through Russia, because of the distance and expense of sea-travel around Africa or the 
tariffs  imposed  by  the  Ottomans  for  transport  to  the Mediterranean.  England,  the 
Netherlands, France, Denmark and Sweden had all tried, but failed, to establish trade 
across Russia.40 But Holstein held several advantages which led Duke Frederick III to 
believe  he  might  be  successful  where  the  other,  larger  powers  had  failed.  Otto 
Brüggemann, a Hamburg merchant, had proposed the venture to Duke Frederick and 
sold the idea to raise Holstein into a powerful trading centre for silk based on these 
advantages. The Duchy's location on the Jutland peninsula gave it ready access to the 
Baltic  and North Seas,  as  well  as  rivers  by which to  distribute  silk  products  into 
Europe.  Duke  Frederick had  familial  connections  with  the Kings  of  Denmark and 
Sweden, whose cooperation would be needed for the venture. Meanwhile, he managed 
to maintain his country's  neutrality during the Thirty Years War and remained in 
favour  with  the  Emperor  Ferdinand  II,  as  Holstein  was  one  of  the  largest  meat 
suppliers  to  the  Empire  after  others  had  been  devastated  by  war.  Frederick  also 
cultivated good relations with the Russian Tsar, who had denied transit permission to 
other nations. Brüggemann was sent to Moscow with a gift of 12 cannon in 1632, just 
as  Russia  was  preparing for  war  with  Poland.  The  Tsar  was  also  invited  to  send 
recruiting agents to Holstein to enlist soldiers. Holstein held another advantage in 
Moscow over the greater powers in that it was a small state, and so was unlikely to  
encroach on Russia's territory or independence. So it was thought the Tsar might be 
willing to grant rights to Holstein that he was unwilling to give to others. 41 The Shah 
was also expected to receive the mission favourably since Brüggemann's brother-in-
law was the Shah's clock-maker and a respected figure in the Persian court.42 All these 
advantages appeared to give trade based from Holstein a chance where others had 
failed. 
40 Samuel H. Baron, transl. and ed. The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth Century Russia. (Stanford, 
1967), p. 5
41 Baron, Travels of Olearius, pp. 7-8. 
42 Schuster-Walser, Sibylla, Das Safawidische Persien im Spiegel europäischer Reiseberichte (1502-1722), 
(Baden-Baden, 1970), p. 53
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Territories of the Holy Roman Empire were expected to receive permission of 
the Emperor to enter into foreign treaties, until after 1648 when this requirement was 
modified in the Peace of  Westphalia.43 A representative  of  Duke Frederick had an 
audience with Emperor Ferdinand II in mid-1633 to gain the Emperor's approval for 
the expedition. As per the Emperor's request, he put the request from the audience in 
writing in the form of two letters dated July and August 1633. 44 He promoted the 
expedition as a way to damage the income of the Turks, as well as bring new income 
to  the  Empire  and the  House  of  Austria.45 Although relations  with  the  Ottomans 
remained peaceful  for  much of  the 17th century following the treaty of  1606,  the 
Turks were still perceived as a threat. Plans to cut the income they made from taxes 
on trade through their Mediterranean ports, as earlier explored by Robert Sherley,  
were  understood  as  popular  with  the  Emperor.  The  representative  outlined  route 
plans for the trade - over the Baltic Sea and through Moscow - and how imported 
goods will be distributed to other cities in the Empire. He promised to "convey the 
Emperor's good wishes" to the rulers of Persia and Moscow, although what he hoped 
to achieve by this promise was to receive letters giving Imperial endorsement to the 
operation. He also suggested sending a gift  of  "several  hundred thousand" Reichs-
dollars to the King of Persia so that the King will continue his war with the Turks. 46 
This gift would help win the King of Persia's favour for the trading company and 
further the Emperor's  foreign policy goals at  the same time. In a follow-on letter, 
Duke Frederick agreed  to  obey conditions  requested by  the  Emperor:  the  mission 
would promote the Emperor's interests abroad, and the Emperor would have the right 
to charge tolls on foreign goods. In exchange, the Duke's company alone had the right 
to sell all goods brought into Germany from Persia.47 Emperor Ferdinand also provided 
the requested letters to the Shah of Persia and the Grand-duke of Moscow.48 In his 
43 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, p. 284; Wilson, Europe's Tragedy, p. 777.
44 HHStA, "Johan Adolff Veithaus to Emperor Ferdinand II", July 1633, Persica I, Konv. 4, f. 14-16; and 
25 Aug 1633, f. 17-19. 
45 HHStA, "Veithaus to Ferdinand II", July 1633, f. 14. 
46 HHStA, "Veithaus to Ferdinand II", Persica I, Konv. 4,  July 1633, f. 15. 
47 HHStA, "Veithaus to Ferdinand II", Persica I, Konv. 4, 25 Aug 1633, f. 17-19. 
48 HHStA, "Emperor Ferdinand II to Magno Duci Moscovia", 29 August 1633, Persica I, Konv. 4, f. 19-
20; "Emperor Ferdinand II to Regi Persaren", 29 August 1633, f. 21-22.
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letter to the Shah, Ferdinand introduced Duke Frederick and his emissaries, asked that 
they be received in friendship, and explained the advantages of trade through Moscow 
in that it would harm their common adversary.49
Duke Frederick III of Holstein-Gottorp was a talented diplomat who was able 
to  maintain  peaceful  relationships  with  Denmark,  Sweden  and  the  Emperor 
throughout the Thirty Years War. As a noble of the Holy Roman Empire he was a 
vassal of the Emperor; however, he held the territory of Schleswig from Denmark. He 
also had family relations to the Danish crown and  connections to Sweden, including a 
marriage alliance of his daughter to the Swedish King. Although he was entangled 
with  several  opposing  factions,  he  was  able  to  walk  the  tightrope  of  neutrality 
through the Thirty Years War through his diplomatic skill. He thought of himself as a  
modern,  enlightened  ruler  who  was  dedicated  to  maintaining  the  security  of  his 
people and improving their fortunes. He was also devoted to the arts of peace: culture,  
letters and learning, and he was himself a genuine scholar.50 As such, he charged his 
embassy with not only negotiating trade with the rulers of the countries they visited, 
but also with gathering information on their lands and peoples.51 For this purpose he 
enlisted the scholar, Adam Olearius.
Olearius was born in 1603 in the German principality of Anhalt. His father was 
a tailor named Adam Oelschläger, but when he entered the University of Leipzig he 
adopted a Latin name - Olearius, as was custom among scholars of the time. He was 
known as a gifted student, and after obtaining his degree in 1627 he was made a part 
of the university's Faculty of Philosophy. He had broad scholarly interests; he was 
well versed in the classics and languages, but he also was interested in the natural  
science and mathematics. He had some early publication of his research in physics and 
astronomy. However, when the Thirty Years War engulfed Saxony, he was forced to 
49 HHStA, "Emperor Ferdinand II to Regi Persaren", 29 August 1633, Persica I, Konv. 4, f. 21-22.
50 Rumohr, Henning von, Schlösser und Herrenhäuser im Herzogtum Schleswig, (Frankfurt, 1968), pp. 
147-148.
51 Baron, Travels of Olearius, p. 11. 
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abandon  his  scholarly  work.  In  1633  he  was  invited  into  service  of  the  Duke  of 
Holstein, perhaps through the intercession of Danish friends at the Holstein court. His 
linguistic  skills,  detailed powers  of  observation and writing abilities  made him an 
excellent choice for the scientific mission in the embassy.52
The  embassy  departed  their  assembly  point  of  Hamburg  on  the  6th of 
November 1633, and on the 9th of November took to the Baltic Sea from the port of 
Travemünde.  In addition to the ambassadors and counsellors the mission contained 
cooks, servants, watchmakers, musicians, boat builders, soldiers and other  attendants 
- numbering almost 300 people at times.53 They sailed across the Baltic Sea to Riga and 
Reval,  where they waited for  several  months,  to coordinate their  activities with a 
Swedish mission and to await an opportune time to arrive in Moscow. When they 
finally arrived in Moscow on the 14th of August 1634, they were graciously received by 
the Tsar, but he demanded far more payment for trade to cross his territory than they 
were authorised to agree. The leaders of the mission went back to Holstein to consult  
with the Duke, while the rest of the mission stayed in Reval.54 The second journey 
began with the ambassadors surviving a shipwreck in the Baltic Sea. But they joined 
the rest of the mission and eventually returned to Moscow on the 28 th of March 1636. 
After  concluding  business  in  Moscow  they  travelled  to  Nizhni  Novgorod  then 
travelled down the Volga in ships built on the river by the company's ship-builders.  
Travelling down the Volga they passed through territory only loosely controlled by 
Moscow, and they faced raids by Cossacks and Tartars. From Astrakhan they sailed 
across the Caspian Sea, but they landed in Derbent when a storm destroyed several of  
their smaller ships and their flagship arrived damaged on the shore. Arriving in Persia 
in December 1636, they stayed for several months in Shamakhi (Şamaxı, Azerbaijan), 
waiting for permission to travel on to Isfahan. While in Shamakhi, Olearius studied  
Persian culture, and learned the Persian language from a young mullah who wanted to 
52 Baron, Travels of Olearius, pp. 11-12;  Weiss, In Search of Silk, pp. 9-10. 
53 Adam Olearius, Vermehrte, newe Beschreibung der muscowitischen und persischen Reyse, 1656, 
reprinted as Moskowitische und Persische Reise, ed. Eberhard Meißner, (Berlin, 1959), Book 2, Chp. 1, 
pp. 37-39. Hereafter cited as Olearius, Reise; Weiss, In Search of Silk, p. 8.
54 Weiss, In Search of Silk, pp. 9-10, gives an outline of the journey. 
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learn German.55 This knowledge was useful when they received permission to travel 
on to Isfahan, where they arrived on the 3rd of August 1637.  They were received 
enthusiastically by Shah Ṣafī, and treated to numerous entertainments such as feasts 
and  hunting  expeditions.  However  they  also  faced  troubles  from  other  foreign 
embassies, such as the Dutch who saw them as trade rivals, and Indians who were 
insulted by a member of  their  retinue and besieged the house where the German 
embassy was staying.56 They reached some general agreements about trade with the 
Shah, but produced no specific deal, in part because of interference by other European 
trade agents. When they began the return journey in December 1637, it was becoming 
clear that the planned trade would not be economically viable. The difficulties and 
expenses faced by the team were just too great. Some of the embassy returned home 
to Gottrop on the 15th of April 1639, while the rest paused in Reval and returned at the 
end  of  July.  On  return,  Otto  Brüggemann,  who  had  originally  conceived  of  the 
expedition, was put on trial by the Duke of Holstein and executed for mismanagement 
and other offences during the trip.57
Although  the  Holstein  party  was  received  graciously  by  the  Shah,  little 
headway was made on their trade objectives. Brüggemann reported on his return to 
Duke  Frederick  that  the  Persians  offered  nothing  but  "promises,  politeness,  and 
hopes".58 In part, the attitude of the Persians and the failure of the agreement were 
precipitated by Brüggemann's proposals. Brüggemann asked for a monopoly on the 
export of Iranian silk in exchange for an anti-Ottoman alliance. He also required the 
Shah to expel all  Dutchmen from Persia.59 The Shah and his advisers would never 
agree to such a deal.  It  was not  in the Shah's interest  to become tied to a single 
monopolistic  exporter.  A  competitive  market  increased  income  for  suppliers  and 
provided multiple  routes  of  export.  Just  a  few years  prior  the Dutch had tried to 
corner the Persian silk market by purchasing all produced, but for simple economic 
55 Olearius, Reise, p. Book 4, Chp. 16, 259; Book 5, Chp. 10, 434; Weiss, In Search of Silk, p. 29.
56 Weiss, In Search of Silk, pp. 30-31.
57 Olearius, Reise, p. Book 6, Chp. 11, 508, 509; Weiss, In Search of Silk, pp. 35-36.
58 Matthee, Politics of Trade, pp. 141-142. 
59 Matthee, Politics of Trade, p. 141; Ferrier, "British-Persian Relations", p. 225. 
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reasons this effort had failed.60 It was also a danger to Persian sovereignty to be tied to 
one single foreign power. The Shah would not seriously consider expelling a group of 
foreign merchants  who brought  income to  the crown,  unless  there  was sustained 
provocation and the promise of greater profits  to come.61 The personal conduct of 
Brüggemann  was  also  not  suited  to  that  of  a  diplomat  and  trade  negotiator.  He 
frequently  engaged  in  open  debauchery  and  insulted  his  hosts;  he  tarnished  the 
reputation of Holstein and in his position committed some other serious malfeasance. 
Once he saw that trade negotiations were not productive, he devised a plan, in which 
he  tried  to  involve  Russia  to  seize  the  silk-producing  regions  from  Persia. 62 This 
behaviour led to  Brüggemann's trial and execution upon his return to Holstein, and it 
certainly contributed to the failure of the trade mission. 
After the end of the mission, Olearius spent the next eight years preparing his 
voluminous notes  for  publication.  In 1643 he  was  appointed  court  mathematician, 
librarian and counsellor to the Duke, a position which supported him while writing 
about his travels.63 His first account was printed in 1647 as Oft begehrte Bescheibung 
der Newen Orientalischen Reise (Frequently Requested Description of the Recent Journey  
to  the  Orient).  A  second,  substantially  enlarged  edition  was  published  in  1656  as 
Vermehrte, newe Beschreibung der muscowitischen und persischen Reyse (Extended, New  
Description of the Journey to Moscow and Persia). This second edition was to become 
the standard, and was frequently reprinted and translated throughout the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. Olearius' account was not merely a narrative of the journey; 
it  was  much more  detailed  and systematic  than Tectander's  account,  described  in 
Chapter Three. In addition to the story of their travels, he included observations of the 
lands  and  peoples  they  visited.  He  gave  detailed  descriptions  of  the  cities  the 
expedition  passed  through:  Ardibil,  Qazvin,  Qom,  Kašan,  Isfahan  and  Rašt. He 
described political and religious institutions, as well as the lives and habits of ordinary 
people,  such as their  clothing, food, housing and customs. While his objectivity is 
60 Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 375-376.
61 Such as with the Portuguese on Hormuz in 1622. Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 286-343. 
62 Weiss, In Search of Silk, p. 34; Baron, Travels of Olearius, p. 10. 
63 Baron, Travels of Olearius, pp. 12-13.
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sometimes  questionable  -  for  instance,  he  refers  to  the  Persians'  "false  prophet 
Muhammed" - his encyclopaedic observations are invaluable.
Olearius  made  especial  contributions  to  understanding  the  geography  of 
Persia. He began describing the land as such:64 
The soil, where the land is flat and does not have mountains, is arid, course and 
mixed through with red stones. There is nothing but thistles and shrubs, which 
where there is no wood they gather and use for cooking-fires. But in the valleys 
that run out of the mountains, where most of their villages lie, it is green and  
fruitful; they know that it is the mountains that are the source of streams. 
 He then goes on to describe the animals and plants, then customs of the people who 
live there. He states in the preface that he intends to “correct the ancient geographers” 
and more recent authors who copy from them; “errante uno, errant omnes” – if one 
errs, all err.65 On his accompanying map he is the first to depict the Caspian Sea in its 
correct orientation, with its long axis running north-south. Ptolemy had depicted it in 
his Cosmographica with the long axis running east-west, and it had been depicted so 
ever since. Olearius corrected this and defended against criticism of his depiction by 
reference to his observations and data.66
Shah  Ṣafī  arranged  for  a  reciprocal  mission  to  visit  Holstein,  and  this 
rendezvoused with the returning Germans at the Russian border. Along the way the 
Persian ambassador was offended by cultural differences of the lands they travelled 
through. For example,  he was bothered by a group of women in Narva who were 
hoping to see his wife, and he called them all whores for allowing themselves to be  
seen so openly. Olearius remarked that, “He wanted to judge our customs by his own,” 
but also observed that many of the Europeans were similarly puzzled by the customs 
in  Persia.67 However,  both  missions  made  it  to  Gottrop,  where  the  Persians  were 
64 Olearius, Reise, Book 5, Chp. 2, p. 394.
65 quoted in Weiss, In Search of Silk, p. 13.
66 Elio Brancaforte, "Mapping the Regnum Sophorum: Adam Olearius's Representation of the Safavid 
Empire (1647)", in Iran and the World in the Safavid Age, ed. Willem Floor and Edmund Herzig, p. 
304. Cyrus Alai, General Maps of Persia, (Leiden, 2005), pp. 135-139, plates 97-99.
67 Weiss, In Search of Silk, p. 36.
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received with as  much splendour as  the  little  Duchy could manage.  The  Persians 
presented  Duke  Frederick  with  an  elaborate  letter  from  Shah  Ṣafī  hoping  for 
continued friendship, and the gift of several bolts of silk.68 This gift, which draped a 
few rooms of Gottrop Castle, was the only shipment of silk to come from the trade 
endeavour. Six Persians wished to stay in Germany, in part to escape the cruelty of 
the ambassador, and they converted to Christianity and were given sanctuary by the 
Duke. These men included the embassy's secretary, Hakwirdi, and his son. Hakwirdi 
became a good friend of Olearius, and helped him confirm details about the Persian 
chapters  in  his  book.  The  two  collaborated  on  translating  Saadi's  Golestan into 
German,  and this  work had  considerable  influence on German poets  for  the  next 
century. The son went on to become a famous gunsmith in service to the Elector of 
Saxony, adopting the name Hans Georg Farss.69
Thus, the trade mission from Holstein to Persia was a failure on its own terms. 
However, because of the work of Olearius and other cultural contacts, the lost trade is 
insignificant next to the understanding and appreciation of Persian culture brought to 
central Europe. 
Vienna and the Oriental Trading Company
Since the middle ages Vienna was a centre for trade, sitting as it does on one of the 
major  European  waterways  -  the  Danube.  Viennese  trade  was  primarily  with 
Hungarian and Balkan territories along the lower Danube, transferring goods further 
up the river into Germany. Most European trade with Asia was conducted by Venice 
and  other  sea  powers,  Asian  goods  travelling  through  the  Levant  over  the 
Mediterranean, or over the ocean around Africa in the case of Portugal. Vienna was 
only involved as a local centre of distribution of the lucrative Asian trade. The 16th 
68 Faridun Vahman, "Three Safavid Documents in the Record Office of Denmark", in  Iran and Iranian 
Studies: Essays in Honor of Iraj Afshar, ed. Kambiz Eslami, (Princeton, NJ, 1998), pp. 178-180, trans. of 
letter in Appx. A, p. 181; Weiss, In Search of Silk, p. 36.
69 Olearius, Reise, Editor's Afterword, p. 511; Weiss, In Search of Silk, p. 37.
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century expansion of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent wars further restricted 
Vienna's mercantile activities.70
The 1606 Treaty of Zsitva-Torok between the Habsburgs and Ottomans, and 
especially its 1615 renewal established conditions for trade between Austria, Turkey 
and the east. The treaty guaranteed freedom of trade between the two Empires. It also 
set a low rate of tolls on this trade. For merchants from Austria, the Holy Roman 
Empire or the Spanish Netherlands travelling under the Emperor's flag, border tolls 
were established at 3%. A tax rate of 2% was set on trading agents residing in the  
Sultan's  lands,  and  these  agents  were  guaranteed  travel  unhindered  on  land  and 
water.71 These rates compare favourably to those paid by merchants of other nations; 
rates varied with time, place and participants, however they could be a much as 10% to 
12%.72
For the first half-century this new trade was conducted by intermediaries. The 
court requested the opinions of traders from Vienna and around the Empire in 1615 
about the possibilities of implementing the trade opened by the treaty's provisions. 
The merchants emphasized the necessity of re-establishing trade between Vienna and 
Ottoman territories.  However,  they did not  see  it  necessary to set  up direct  trade 
relations and recommended that this trade be conducted by intermediaries. They also 
strongly opposed Turkish traders setting up a market in Austria.73 Instead of directly 
trading  with  the  Ottomans,  Viennese  merchants  used  Hungarian,  Serbian  and 
Armenian traders as agents to import goods. These goods included Asian items such 
as tobacco, carpets, sponges, pepper and ginger as well as beef cattle raised on the 
lower  Danube.74 Although  this  trade  was  conducted  with  agents  in  Ottoman 
70 Spielman, The City and the Crown, pp. 5-17; Fichtner, "Trade", in Historical Dictionary of Austria, p. 
303.
71 Herbert Hassinger, "Die erste Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie 1667--1683". 
Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschafts- Geschichte, Vol. 35, (1942). p. 6. 
72 Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, p. 65.
73 Lajos Gecsényi, "A Memorandum Presented by the Merchants Living in Vienna Regarding East-
West Trade (1615)". Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaria, Vol. 61, (2008), p. 53. 
74 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 7.
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territories, many of these items originated in Persia and were simply trans-shipped 
through Ottoman lands. There were a variety of reasons for this indirect approach,  
including religious and cultural biases against Turks with whom they had so recently 
been at war, as well as practical problems of not having established relationships with 
Asian merchants. 
Several trends served to increase trade through Vienna over the first half of the 
seventeenth century. The Thirty Years War blocked the Hanseatic and Dutch town 
from trading safely into southern Germany. More of this market could be covered by 
trade through Vienna up the Danube.75 While during the war the volume of Viennese 
trade with the east was reduced, primarily because of inflation and the expulsion of 
Protestant craftsmen in the counter-reformation, after the war's conclusion it picked 
up  with  increased  markets.  Under  pressure  from  merchants,  the  court  began 
reforming medieval  anti-luxury  and clothing laws  which  restricted  what  different 
social classes could own and wear. While these did not disappear entirely, the number  
of separate categories was reduced and the restrictions were eased, allowing more 
people to purchase silk and other luxury goods.76 After the war Vienna emerged as the 
chief city of the Empire, and thus the courtiers who flocked to the city made it the  
largest  market  for  luxury  goods  in  central  Europe.77 Therefore,  interest  grew  in 
conducting more Asian trade from Vienna itself. 
After the 1663-1664 war between the Austrians and Ottomans, the terms of the 
1615 treaty were renewed for another 20 years, including the trade terms.78 Emperor 
Leopold I, encouraged by certain Austrian businessmen and Czech financiers, became 
aware of the revenue other European states were generating from mercantilism. He 
created an office - the  Kommerzkollegium - to encourage commerce and reform the 
predominantly agricultural economy.79 Johann Joachim Becher was appointed to head 
75 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 7 - 9. 
76 Winkelbauer, Thomas, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht, Teil 1, pp. 460-463.
77 Spielman, The City and the Crown, Chp. 5, p. 122. 
78 Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, p. 323.
79 Fichtner, "Trade", in Historical Dictionary of Austria, p. 303; Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, p. 300.
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this office and advise the Emperor on the economy (and also alchemy). Becher and his 
colleagues set the direction of the Austrian economy for almost a century, despite  
being opposed by court nobility who were disturbed by these upstart commoners.80 
Becher pushed several  imaginative ideas,  including setting up silk farms in Lower 
Austria,  building  a  craft-house  to  train  and  employ  the  indigent  of  Vienna,  and 
reforming the restrictive policies of the guilds.  He also encouraged redirecting the 
luxury laws to tax luxury goods coming from European sources outside the Empire, as  
a way of striking at the hostile French, who supplied many luxuries, and also as a way 
of encouraging development of local manufacturing.81
In  1665,  Becher,  who  also  advised  the  Princ-elector  (Kurfürst) of  Bavaria, 
brought  to  the attention of  the court  that  a  group of  Bavarian businessmen were 
interested  in  establishing  a  silk  manufacturing  factory.82 The  company  needed  a 
source of raw silk, as well as support from Austrian merchants. The interested parties 
held discussions  that  established Bavaria  wanted a silk weaving company,  Vienna 
wanted  a  Danube  trading  company,  and  developing  manufacturers  in  southern 
Germany wanted markets for their goods. These various interests came together to 
form plans for a company with directors and investors from Vienna,  Bavaria,  and 
other Habsburg lands such as Bohemia and Lower Austria.  The directors included 
notables such as Hofkammerpräsdent (Finance Minister) Sinzendorf, and several other 
figures of the Austrian and Bavarian courts.83 However, they faced opposition from 
the Hofkriegsrat (War ministry), who objected to their engaging in contacts with the 
"arch-enemy".84 The Hofkriegsrat cited a 1544 law forbidding the trade of arms with 
the  "enemies  of  Christianity".  This  opposition  delayed,  but  could  not  halt  the 
formation of the company. In spring of 1667 the company was granted provisional  
80 Evans, Habsburg Monarchy, p. 163-164; Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht, p. 445-456; 
Pamela H. Smith, "Alchemy as a Language of Mediation at the Habsburg Court", Isis, Vol. 85, No. 1, 
(March 1994), pp. 13-14.
81 Herbert Hassinger, "Johann Joachim Bechers Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Seindenindustrie in 
Deutschland", Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Vol. 38, (1949), p. 210-213;  
Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht, p. 460-46; Evans, Habsburg Monarchy, p. 276.
82 Hassinger, "Johann Joachim Bechers Bedeutung", pp. 212-218.
83 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 11-12. 
84 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 14. "Erbfeind"
144
status  and  could  begin  preparations,  and  by  summer  of  1668  was  granted  full  
privileges by the court. Approval was provided by the Hofkammer, of which one of 
the  company  directors,  Sinzendorf,  was  the  leader.  The  charter  granted  to  the 
company in 1668 specified that it was to operate, "like the East Indian Company of 
Holland". It was to be, "In all things free and independent and subject to no one other 
than His Imperial Majesty." It was given permission to import and export goods from 
Asia,  and  to  run manufacturing sites.85 The  importation  of  silk  products  required 
alterations to the luxury laws, which, since 1518 had restricted importation of silk 
clothes.86 The company was given additional privileges to get it started: for one year it 
could transport goods through Austrian Erblande territories toll free, and the toll for  
shipping over the Hungarian border would be at half-rate.87
In July 1667, Consul Lelio de Luca led a flotilla of 9 ships down the Danube on 
an introductory mission for the company. They called on the local rulers along the 
route down river and over the Black Sea to Constantinople: Ofen, Belgrad, Adrianople, 
making trade agreements and demonstrating their wares.88 By February 1668, they had 
reached  Constantinople.  While  negotiating  with  Ottoman  officials,  de  Luca  also 
invited representatives from Persia who were in the city to meet with him. He even 
suggested that he could go to Persia with samples of the company's goods. He made 
no  such  trip,  but  trade  arrangements  were  made  with  the  Persians  anyway. He 
reported to Vienna that it  would be possible to purchase not only finished luxury 
items in Constantinople, but also raw material, both silk and cotton, sent from Persia 
through Armenian middlemen. This raw silk could supply the manufacturing industry 
growing  in  Bavaria  and  Austria.  For  this  deal  the  company  would  need  more 
investment.  He  reported  that  it  was  possible  on  the  Persian  side  to  make  a 
"Fundamental Commitment" if the company had participation from the Empire and 
the Emperor himself to provide capital.89
85 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 15; Fichtner, "Trade", Historical Dictionary , 
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86 Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht, p. 460. 
87 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 15. 
88 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 16ff.
89 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 19. 
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The  Wiener  orientalische  Handelskompagnie (Vienna  Oriental  Trading 
Company) began true trading missions with two shiploads sent down the Danube in 
May 1668. Another two ships followed in November of that year, and continued at 
intervals for the next 15 years. The exports to the east contained textiles, brass and  
iron ware, raw tin and sheet metal, and wood crafts.90 In Constantinople markets the 
company  faced  competition  from  other  European  nations  who  were  already 
established there, such as France and the Netherlands. The Viennese company had to 
compete on price, which it could do because of the agreement on lower tolls.91 On 
return, the vessels imported Asian items, mostly cloth but also oils and oranges, to 
Vienna. Since Serbian and Armenian merchants were already selling Asian carpets, 
blankets and tobacco in Vienna, the company focused the largest part of its imports on 
luxury items which were fashionable with courtly residents in the imperial capital  
city.  These  included  cotton  veils,  Persian  wool  and  silk  cloth,  taffeta,  linen,  and 
Turkish cloth dyed in many colours. The company also bought some raw Persian silk 
and  silk  yarn  to  experiment  in  silk  cloth  manufacturing.  In  the  early  years,  the 
company did not travel to Persia to buy Persian goods directly; instead, they bought 
from Armenian middle-men in Constantinople, although that eventually changed.92
In 1678, the Austrian company established direct contracts between themselves 
and  Persian  merchants.  The  company  brought  goods  "over  the  Black  Sea"  from 
Trabzon.  They were searching for  lower tolls  on goods shipped across Turkey by 
Armenian middle-men.93 Around this time, foreign merchants in Vienna were accused 
of  spying  for  the  Ottomans,  charges  which  were  promoted  in  the  Court  by  the 
company.  All  Serbian and  Armenian  merchants  were  ejected  from the  city.94 The 
concurrence of these events indicates a possible concerted effort by the company to 
seize direct control of Austrian foreign trade. Meanwhile, the Armenian silk traders 
90 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 20; Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, p. 301.
91 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 18.
92 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 22; Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, p. 301.
93 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 50, see note 156. 
94 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 39. 
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were beginning to ship their consignments through Russia, after being allowed by the 
Tsar  to  trans-ship  goods  through  Russia  in  1676,  reducing  their  supplies  in  the 
Constantinople markets.95 This mix of motivations, whether or not it was part of a 
planned effort, resulted in the first direct trade contacts between Austria and Persia. 
Although the company started with hopes of  financial  rewards,  during the 
1670s the company faced many types of difficulties, economic, political, international 
and natural. An imbalance between more imports and less exports left the company 
forced to pay for Asian goods with silver rather than reciprocal  trade goods. This  
outflow of silver strained the company's finances and worried the Court.96 The prices 
of  silk  in  Europe  fell  during  the  1670s  due  to  growing  supplies  of  Indian  silk.97 
Politically,  the company was caught in a struggle between the Hofkammer, which 
wanted  to  increase  revenues  and  whose  ministers  were  personally  linked  to  the 
company, and the Hofkriegsrat, which worried about trade with the Turkish enemy 
and restricted exports of valuable metal goods.98 Although the Ottomans were at peace 
with Austria during this decade, they warred with Poland and Russia, and these wars 
endangered shipping on the lower Danube and gave the Hofkriegsrat more license to 
limit the company's activity.99 Finally, plague hit the region in 1679, which dampened 
trade and killed the company's Constantinople resident representative.100 Thus, the 
company was already in a precarious state when in 1683 the Turks invaded Austria 
and besieged Vienna.101 It could not survive the halt in trade brought by the war, and 
its assets were sold in liquidation two years later.102 However, its legacy was the first 
commercial  contacts  between Austria  and Persia,  and in the future  these contacts  
would expand. At the end of the series of wars in which Austria pushed the Turks out  
of Hungary, the treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 stipulated the rights of Imperial subjects 
to trade freely on the Black Sea and Danube, and specifically guaranteed protection of 
95 Mathee, "Politics of Trade", p. 197. 
96 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", pp. 23-27.
97 Mathee,"Politics of Trade", p. 202.
98 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", pp. 14, 20-21, 50-51.
99 Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 37.
100Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", pp. 50-51.
101For more on the 1683 war see: Stoye, The Siege of Vienna; Barker, Double Eagle and Crescent.
102Hassinger, "Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie", p. 52.
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trade with Persia.  In  the  nineteenth century  trade between the  two nations  grew 
considerably,  and  Vienna  became  one  of  the  most  important  centres  for  trade  of 
Persian carpets.103 The groundwork laid by the first Vienna Trading Company made 
the later commerce possible. 
Religion
Another  subject  of  contact  between  Austria  and Persia  was  over  religious  issues. 
European Christian  missionaries  had  been visiting  Persia  since  the  late  thirteenth 
century  when  they  met  the  tolerant  religious  policies  of  the  Il-Khãnids.104 This 
missionary activity increased in the seventeenth century under the reign of 'Abbās I. 
Several areas within the Safavid sphere were traditionally Christian, notably Armenia 
which had an ancient indigenous Christian tradition as well  as ties to the Roman 
church.  Both  Austrian  and  Persian  courts  had  strong  religious  identities:  the 
seventeenth  century  Habsburgs  were  proponents  of  Counter-Reformation 
Catholicism, and the Safavids were promoters of Shi'a Islam. While these contrasting 
religious devotions may seem to be a source of conflict, they also provided reasons for 
contact between the two governments. Issues which gave rise to discussions included: 
recommendations for appointments to religious offices, advocacy for the activities of 
religious  communities  such  as  building  of  churches  and  teaching  of  lessons,  and 
criticism of perceived oppression of religious minorities. In many of these cases, the 
secular  officials  would  use  their  friendly  state  relations  to  smooth  over  problems 
which began in religious circles.  These contacts  occurred on a  background which 
included Habsburg support for the counter-reformation, conflict within the Armenian 
church over affiliation with Rome, and changes in the hierarchy of Safavid Shi'ism. 
103Helmut Slaby, "Austria", Encyclopedia Iranica. Online Edition, (2005, 2012).
104Lockhart, CHI, "European Contacts", p. 373.
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Habsburg Religion
The Habsburgs of the seventeenth century were devoted to the Catholic church and 
incorporated their Catholic piety into their Imperial identity.105 The Habsburg family 
had always remained Catholic, even in the sixteenth century when most of population 
of  their  realms  converted  to  some  form  of  Protestantism.  However,  Ferdinand  I, 
Maximilian II, and Rudolf II were all to degrees moderate about their faith, irenicist in 
outlook, and tolerant of other confessions. As R.J.W. Evans summarised: "As for the 
dynasty, its Humanism outran its Catholicism."106 But in the wake of the Council of 
Trent, 1563, Catholic forces from the Vatican,  Jesuit and other orders, and the Spanish 
branch of  the  Habsburg family  began a  gradual  effort  to  revive  a  more dogmatic 
Catholicism  in  the  lands  of  the  Austrian  crown.  Although  it  took  fifty  years  to 
develop, the effort succeeded when a new identity for the dynasty emerged in the 
reigns of Mathias and his adviser Bishop Khlesl:  a strong Catholic identity with a 
distinct Austrian flavour, "revivified by the example of the Counter-Reformation, ... 
yet  never  identical  with  it."107 The  dynasty's  new  ideology  was  solidified  by  the 
militantly  Catholic  Ferdinand II.  He had  been educated by  Jesuits  in his  mother's  
native Bavaria to advance the re-establishment of Catholicism. As Archduke of Styria,  
he had vowed to turn his lands into a desert rather than rule over heretics, and to this 
end he forced conversion or  exile on all  his  Protestant  subjects.108 As Emperor  he 
equated Protestantism with disloyalty, and used military force during the Thirty Years 
War to subjugate Protestant parts of the Empire.109 It was left to Ferdinand III and 
Leopold I to complete the religious unification, and while the Treaty of Westphalia 
ending the Thirty Years War legalized some forms of Protestantism in the Empire, it 
also gave the Habsburgs the constitutional backing to enforce Catholicism in the lands 
they  directly  controlled.  For  the  Habsburgs,  this  process  was  both  a  moral  and 
political necessity: moral in that as princes they were responsible for the souls of their  
105Anna Coreth, Pietas Austriaca, Translated by William D. Bowman and Anna Maria Leitgeb, (West 
Lafayette, IN, 2004), p. 1.
106Evans, Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 1-20, 39.
107Evans, Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 41-45, 59. 
108Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, pp. 238-239.
109Evans, Habsburg Monarchy, p. 68.
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subjects and they genuinely believed they were saving the people from heresy, and 
political because in their state with diverse nations and cultures, a common religion 
provided  an  element  of  unity  whereas  religious  exceptionalism  could  be  used  to 
express social discontent.110 
In the new Habsburg ethos, the family received its mandate to rule from God 
and it was their duty to promote Catholic worship by display of their own piety. Anna 
Coreth highlighted this sense of piety in her book Pietas Austriaca. She describes their 
sense of destiny: "In sum, the House of Austria at the zenith of its influence and power 
believed that its power constituted a mission entrusted to it by God alone... They were 
also convinced that their right to leadership had constantly to be earned anew by 
fidelity to the piety of their ancestors."111 Ferdinand II was well known for his personal 
piety - attending two masses each day, marching in processions in the pouring rain, 
rising at  four  o'clock each morning for  an hour of  prayer.  His  virtue was widely 
promoted by his Jesuit confessor, Lamormaini, who portrayed Ferdinand's religious 
devotion as an example for the Counter-Reformation and helped set the dynasty's new 
ideology.112 Ferdinand II's descendants carried on from him, creating public religious 
rituals from their private devotion and using such rituals to sanctify and legitimise 
their  rule.  Habsburg piety was devoted to the Roman Catholic  church, but with a 
unique Austrian emphasis. They particularly emphasised the ritual of the Eucharist, as 
well as veneration of Mary as the Immaculate Virgin. All the Emperors regularly made 
pilgrimages to the Marian shrine at Mariazell, and Mary was declared the supreme 
commander - generalissima - of the Imperial Army, with her image featured on their 
battle flags.113 The Habsburgs were devoted to the idea of a unified Catholic Church, 
but they often conflicted with the Vatican. The Pope was a rival for power and the  
Habsburg  religious  fervour  threatened  Vatican  control  of  ceremony.  The  two 
cooperated, but it was, as Evans characterised, "a balance struck in practice between 
110Bérenger, Habsburg Empire, pp. 304-311.
111Coreth, Pietas Austriaca, p. 22.
112Evans, Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 72-73.
113Coreth, Pietas Austriaca, pp. 6-7, 52. 
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two uneasy allies,  each manoeuvring to assert  itself  as the dominant power." 114 In 
addition, the Habsburgs great European rivals, the French, were also Catholic, but the 
French court was seen as secular and worldly. The distinct  pietas austrica served to 
distinguish them from the other Catholic powers. 
Armenian Religion
Armenia had an ancient Christian tradition dating back possibly to the first century of 
the  Christian  era,  and  certainly  to  the  year  301  when  Armenia  became  the  first 
country in the world to adopt Christianity as the state religion.115 Their indigenous 
church remained independent of the Roman and Byzantine church hierarchies. The 
Armenian  church  valued  its  independence  and  maintained  minor  doctrinal  and 
liturgical differences from the others. But as a small nation in a dangerous part of the 
world,  some  of  the  leaders  saw the  utility  in  forging  closer  links  with  the  more 
powerful western cultures. The Byzantine church treated the Armenians poorly, as 
heretics and schismatics, despite various attempts by the Armenian church leaders to 
reach an understanding. At the time of the Crusades, the Armenians began to develop 
links with the Catholic church and the Crusader states. Prince Leo of Cilician Armenia 
sought  a  royal  crown from the  Holy  Roman Empire,  and  for  this  to  happen,  his 
religious leader  negotiated an accommodation with the Catholic  church.  This  was 
achieved in 1198, when King Leo I was crowned by a representative of Emperor Henry 
VI.116 While  the  political  and  religious  hierarchy  sought  union  with  the  Catholic 
church,  the  clergy and population  were  not  so  inclined  -  they  neither  wished  to 
change the traditions with which they were familiar nor give up their accustomed 
independence. The accommodation with the Cilician king did not bring about a union, 
but it opened the door to greater Catholic church activity. Missionaries produced a 
few converts which created a small Catholic diocese in Armenia.
114Evans, Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 134-137.
115Vahan M. Kurkjian, A History of Armenia, (New York, 2008, first published 1958), pp. 269-270.
116Charles A. Frazee, "The Christian Church in Cilician Armenia: Its Relations with Rome and 
Constantinople to 1198", Church History, Vol. 45, No. 2, (June 1976), pp. 166-184.
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Throughout the middle ages Armenia was divided by the various empires that 
competed  over  the  region.  Through  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries  the 
Armenian church was divided and in confusion, with multiple claimants to leadership 
and corruption in the hierarchy.117 In  the Safavid era,  the Counter-Reformation in 
Europe gave new impetus to Catholic missionary efforts, and they used the disorder in 
the Armenian church to their advantage. The seventeenth century Habsburgs with 
their Catholic identity naturally tried to support the Catholic efforts in Armenia. Shah 
'Abbās I uprooted and moved the entire Armenian city of Julfa, which had become an 
important centre of trading families, to Isfahan during the war with the Ottomans in 
1604. While the immediate goal was a 'scorched-earth' strategy to deny resources to  
the enemy, the move also complemented his plans to gain control of the silk trade.118 
New Julfa, a suburb of Isfahan, became an important site for exile Armenian culture 
and trade activity. This community was given protection and encouragement during 
the reign of Shah 'Abbās I, but under later shahs they were not as privileged.119 Also, a 
renaissance in Armenian culture took place during the seventeenth century. Contacts 
with Europe produced a surge of Armenian language books, first printed in Europe 
and later locally. Armenian leaders who were opposed to the increased missionary 
efforts  also  determined  to  school  their  clergy  in  western-style  subjects  of  logic,  
rhetoric and philosophy so as to better resist the entreaties of the missionaries. They 
enlisted many of these European missionaries to help start the schools for creating the 
new educational tradition.120
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118Vartan Gregorian, "Minorities of Isfahan: The Armenian Community of Isfahan, 1587-1722", Chp. 2 
in Armenians of Iran: the paradoxical role of a minority in a dominant culture, edited by C. Chaqueri 
(Cambridge, MA, 1998), pp. 37-39; Chronicle of the Carmelites, pp. 99-100; Munshi, History of Shah 
'Abbas the Great, trans. Roger M. Savory, Bk II, pp. 859-860; Matthee, Politics of Trade, pp. 84-86. 
119Gregorian, "Minoities of Isfahan", pp. 39-46.
120Harry Jewell Sarkiss, "The Armenian Renaissance, 1500-1863", Journal of Modern History, Vol. IX, 
No. 4, (December 1937), pp. 437-442; Kurkjian, A History of Armenia, p. 289-290. 
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Safavid Religion
The Safavid regime was always concerned with religion since its  founding from a 
militant  Sufi  order  and  the  conversion  of  the  country  to  Shi'ism.  Ismā'īl  I's  own 
religious background mixed elements of Shi'a, Sunni, and heterodox traditions and the 
titles he claimed reflected Shi'a, Sufi, cultural Persian and even Christian traditions. 121 
At  the  time  Ismā'īl  declared  Shi'ism  to  be  the  state  religion,  few  in  Iran  even 
understood what the tenants of Shi'ism to be. The eclectic nature of Persian religion 
just before the Safavid rise included Shi'a elements such as admiration of 'Alī and the  
Twelve  Imams,  and Ismā'īl  was  able  to  use  these  features  to  ease  the  conversion  
process. In the early stages it was often enough for one to declare his allegiance to 'Alī  
and  his  descendants  to  be  accepted  as  a  convert,  although  groups  that  held  to 
orthodox Sunni practices were sometime ruthlessly suppressed.122 The early Qizilbāsh 
followers of Ismā'īl I were inspired in their military zeal by millenarian religious ideas,  
and many saw Ismā'īl as the return of the Mahdi. As his reign progressed, Ismā'īl  and 
subsequent rulers tried to root their legitimacy in more orthodox Shi'ism and restrain 
their hard to control early supporters.  Early Safavid religious posts were tied to the 
dynasty and dominated by 'clerical-notables', scholars from aristocratic families. Since 
many of these families owed their status to descent they traced to the Prophet it was 
easy for them to adapt to new regime in respect to adoration of the house of the 
Prophet. These 'clerical-notables' held land and had served as administrators in pre-
Safavid governments, and so they were quickly incorporated into the bureaucracy of 
the new dynasty.123 
The  Safavids  also  invited  in  foreign  Shi'i  scholars,  the  fuqahā, from Syria, 
Bahrain  and  elsewhere,  to  improve  Persian  knowledge  about  their  new  religious 
profession and to cultivate ties to the rest of the Shi'i world. These Arab religious 
121Newman, Safavid Iran, p. 13-15; Roemer, CHI, "The Safavid Period", pp. 193-200. 
122Said Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal 
Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890, (Chicago, 1984), pp. 105-107; Roemer, CHI, "The 
Safavid Period", p. 194.
123Newman, Safavid Iran, pp. 15-17;  Arjomand, Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, pp. 122-129.
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professionals had no ties to a particular state and no attachment to administrative, 
economic, or political concerns. They had a different outlook to the 'clerical-notables', 
and they were not welcomed by nor did they respect the indigenous clerical estate. 
They formed a rival religious structure which was more orthodox, less amenable to 
mysticism, folk traditions, or philosophical speculation. They were what Colin Turner 
calls 'externalist' in orientation - holding that being a good Muslim was a matter of  
following the laws and commandments of Islam, and in Twelver Shi'ism, the rulings of 
the  fuqahā as representatives of the Imam.124 While the policy of the early Safavids 
had vigorously suppressed Sunnis and organised Sufi orders which might challenge 
Safavid rule, they were tolerant, and even supportive of, individual Sufi preachers and 
minority  religions  such  as  Christians  and  Jews.  The  repression  of  rival  religious 
groups  was  more  a  matter  of  politics  than  religion;  the  groups  which  met  with 
disapproval, such as the Nuqtavi (Nuqṭawiyyah) who were destroyed by Shah 'Abbās I, 
were ones who preached a change of rulership as part of a millenarian movement and 
organised followers into a force which could challenge the dynasty.125 After all, the 
Safavids themselves had emerged from just such a movement. Individual heterodox 
preachers  and minority  groups  did  not  pose  a  political  threat  and so were  not  a 
concern for the dynasty. In fact, to broaden the support for the ruling coalition and 
secure cooperation of important groups such as Armenian traders, the Safavid rulers 
made  donations  to  support  popular  festivals  and  even  the  building  of  Christian 
churches.  However,  as the seventeenth century progressed,  the foreign jurists and 
their Iranian students gained more power. They wrote texts denouncing Sufi ideas, 
popular traditions, singing, and philosophy - concentrating education exclusively on 
hadīth  (sayings  of  the  Prophet),  fiqh (religious  legal  rulings),  and  tafsīr (Qur'an 
commentary). Although from early in the dynasty  fuqahā were appointed as prayer 
leaders in mosques and religious officials in cities, they did not have much entry into  
the top offices through the reign of 'Abbās II. Shah Suleyman renounced 'Abbās II's 
secular orientation and allied himself closer to religious sources of legitimacy, but he 
strove to keep a balance between the two religious factions - obtaining respect for 
124Colin Turner, Islam Without Allah? The Rise of Religious Externalism in Safavid Iran, (Richmond, 
Surrey, 2000), pp. 72-96; Newman, Safavid Iran, p. 24;  Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden 
Imam, pp. 129-132.
125Arjomand, Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, pp. 198-199; Turner, Islam Without Allah?, p. 100.
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defending Shi'ite  orthodoxy while  maintaining support  for  popular  folk  traditions. 
However, the dogmatic party was gaining the upper hand during his reign, and they 
became dominant under his successor Sultān-Husayn. The fuqahā Muhammad Bāqir 
Majlisi  was  especially  influential  through  his  numerous  writings  and  his  public 
positions given to him by  Shah Suleyman. He preached a rigorously orthodox and 
externalist form of Shi'ism which became the dominant dogma in Persia.126 Unlike the 
earlier times when dissension was viewed as a threat only if it threatened the political  
establishment,  the orthodox jurists wanted to stamp out all  dissenting ideas. Sufis,  
philosophers, and minority religions came under increasing pressure.127
Piromalli
Paul Piromalli  was a Dominican missionary who worked in Etchmiadzin, Armenia 
during the 1640s.  He was appointed by the Armenian Patriarch,  Philip of  Aghbak 
(patriarchate 1633-1655) to teach logic, rhetoric and philosophy in the newly-founded 
monastery school in Etchmiadzin. His appointment was part of Philip's program to 
reform the Armenian church by incorporating western learning in order to give the 
native church the intellectual tools necessary to stand up to Catholic missionaries. 128 It 
is uncertain whether Piromalli knew of Patriarch Phillip's agenda, but he seized the 
opportunity to develop the school and promote Catholic doctrine. 
In  1645,  Piromalli  travelled  to  Isfahan to  preach  and teach  to  the  Catholic  
Armenian population  there.  Piromalli  requested  a  letter  of  support  from Emperor 
Ferdinand III, and the writing of such a letter was recommended to the Emperor by 
the Hofkriegsrat.129 Ferdinand did write to Shah 'Abbās II on the 22nd of April 1645, 
asking the Shah, "in the spirit of friendship and goodwill," to allow Father Piromalli to 
126Turner, Islam Without Allah?, pp. 148-186, 249-252.
127Arjomand, Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, Chp. 5, especially pp. 151-159.
128Sarkiss, Harry Jewell, "The Armenian Renaissance, 1500-1863", Journal of Modern History, Vol. IX, 
No. 4, December 1937, p. 440.; Malachia Ormanian, The Church of Armenia, trans. G. Marcar 
Gregory, (London, 1912), p. 81.
129HHStA, "Hofkriegsrat to Ferdinand III", Persica I, Konv. 4, fol. 64. 
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preach to those of the Catholic faith and to teach in the school. He requested that  
Piromalli be allowed to live in Isfahan and given protection of the city. 130 At the same 
time, the Emperor wrote to Piromalli, informing him of the letter to the Shah and 
encouraging him in his work.131
After  a  time in  Isfahan,  Piromalli  returned  to  Rome.  He was  influential  in 
creating the first complete printed Armenian Bible, on which he collaborated with his 
friend from Etchmiadzin, Oskan Erevantsi, and over which he exercised influence to 
bring the Armenian text more in line with the Catholic Bible.132 In 1655, Piromalli was 
appointed the Catholic Bishop of Nakhchiwan (although he did not arrive in Armenia 
until 1657). His appointment was not without controversy; his appointment came at a 
time  of  increased  tensions  between  the  New  Julfa  Armenians  and  the  western 
missionaries in Isfahan. The Carmelites in Isfahan were afraid that Piromalli, known 
for evangelising Catholic doctrines to the Armenians, would exacerbate the conflicts 
between Catholic and Orthodox Armenians. They wrote, "He is of a temperament far 
too violent and vehement, and had been the cause of great ill-feeling and repugnance 
of the Armenians for us..."133 Before setting out for his new post, Piromalli spent time 
in Vienna, where he gathered support from the Imperial court, and published a text of 
theology arguing against certain Armenian doctrines. Once again, with backing from 
the Hofkammer, the Emperor wrote to Shah 'Abbās II in 1656 endorsing Piromalli's 
appointment.134 
Piromalli became bishop at a time of increasing difficulties for Christians in 
Safavid  lands,  which  will  be  examined  in  more  detail  below.  It  appears  that  he 
maintained  cordial  relations  with  the  Armenian  Patriarch,  despite  the  worries 
expressed by the Carmelites.  As pressures were mounting on all  Christians in the 
130HHStA, "Ferdinand III to 'Abbās II", Persica I, Konv. 4, fol. 66. 
131HHStA, "Ferdinand III to Piromalli", Persica I, Konv. 4, fol. 65. 
132Vrej Neressian, The Bible in Armenian Tradition, (London, 2001), p. 32.; Aikin, Morgan, and Johnson, 
"Piromalli, Paul", General Biography, Vol. 8, (London, 1813).
133Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 381. 
134Quellen zur Geschichte Afrikas, Asiens, und Ozeaniens im Österreichischen Staatsarchiv bis 1918, ed. 
Leopold Auer, (Munich, 1986), p. 40. 
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Safavid lands, the goodwill of a Catholic leader with strong connections to western 
powers may have proved more important to the Armenian Christians than doctrinal 
disputes. After nine years as Bishop of Nakhchiwan, Piromalli returned to Italy. He 
published  several  books  on  languages,  including  a  Latin-Persian  dictionary,  and 
several books and dictionaries on Armenian.135
Arachiel
Arachiel Vartapiet was named Archbishop of Erivan by the Pope in 1661. Arachiel  
himself, along with several other supporters, asked Emperor Leopold for a letter of 
recommendation for the new Archbishop to the Shah.136 This Leopold provided in the 
form of two letters: one to the "King of Persia" and one to the "Prime Minister of the 
King of Persia".137 
To the King of Persia, Shah 'Abbās II, Emperor Leopold wrote that it was their 
mutual obligation to consult with each other about relatives or friends; to that end, he 
is  commending  the  newly  appointed  Archbishop  of  Armenia  as  a  praiseworthy 
subject. He wrote that he earnestly appealed to the Shah to allow the Archbishop to 
preach  to  Christians  settled  in  Armenia  and  who  have  freedom  of  religion.  The 
freedom of religion phrase is especially diplomatic, as it indicates that Arachiel is not 
there to convert Muslims to Christianity and it emphasizes the traditional freedom of 
religion granted to the Armenians - something the Habsburgs wished to see upheld. 
The Emperor asked the Shah to uphold for the Christians of Armenia and all living 
there  protection from violence  and freedom to peacefully  attend to  their  religion. 
Leopold  frequently  references  the  past  relationships  between  his  and  the  Shah's 
ancestors, attempting to contextualise his requests as part of an established tradition 
of cooperation.138 To the Prime Minister, who would be at this time the vizier, Mirza 
135Aikin, et al., "Piromalli, Paul", General Biography.
136HHStA, "Leopold to 'Abbās II" Persica I, Konv. 5, fol. 5;  Auer, ed., Quellen im Staatsarchiv, p. 40. 
137HHStA, "Leopold to  'Abbās II", "Leopold to Prime Minister or Persia", Persica I, Konv. 5, fol. 11, 12-
13.
138HHStA, "Leopold to  'Abbās II", Persica I, Konv. 5, fol. 11.
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Muhummad Karaki, Leopold wrote much the same things, only with a more business-
like, less personal tone. He wrote that he presents the Archbishop of Armenia and a 
companion to the King of Persia, Medea and Armenia, along with letters begging for 
their  protection.  He  once  again  refers  to  the  history  of  friendship  between  the 
Emperor and the King of Persia. The Emperor wrote he puts his authority behind the 
Archbishop and wishes that he is secure and free.139 With these two letters, Leopold 
hoped he could help gain the Shah's backing and ease the Archbishop's term in office. 
In 1669, Arachiel personally travelled to Europe to seek help for his Catholic 
congregation. His Catholic church in Erivan had been demolished by Persian officials,  
as  part  of  the  ongoing  dispute  between  the  Catholic  and  Armenian  Christian 
populations. He met Pope Clement IX in Rome, and petitioned other European leaders 
for  assistance,  including Emperor  Leopold  and the  King of  Poland.  Pope  Clement 
wrote to Shah Sulaiman in strong tones requesting the Shah keep Catholics, "safe and 
secure against the plots and harm from schismatics, who are constantly raging against 
them...with savage  ill-will."140 Emperor  Leopold  wrote  slightly  more circumspectly, 
asking that Arachiel  be allowed to rebuild the church and that his community be  
protected from the violence of their rivals so that they may live quietly.141
Piromalli and Arachiel were just two examples of Christian missionaries for 
whom the Habsburg Emperors intervened with the Shahs. There were several other 
cases, for instance: in 1655, Ferdinand III wrote to the Shah of Persia, the Khan of the 
Uzbegs, and the Mughal Emperor on behalf of three Jesuit missionaries travelling to 
central Asia; in 1663, Leopold I wrote to Shah 'Abbās II recommending Antonio Tani 
as the head of the Dominican mission. In most of such cases, someone, be it the Pope,  
the head of a religious order, or another concerned European noble, would ask the 
Emperor to lend his support to the candidate with the Shah. Sometimes, a council of  
the  court  bureaucracy,  the  Hofskriegsrat  or  the  Hofkammer,  would  add  an 
139HHStA, "Leopold to Prime Minister or Persia", Persica I, Konv. 5, fol. 12-13.
140Chronicle of the Carmelites, pp. 412-413. 
141HHStA, "Leopold to Shah", Persica I, Konv. 5, fol. 36.
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endorsement. The Emperor would then write to the Shah, and as a fellow ruler ask 
that the mission be accepted in the country or that their grievances be heard.142 The 
Habsurgs' well-known reputation for their support of the Catholic religion as well as  
their friendly relations with the Persian Shahs brought to them many religious figures 
seeking assistance in Persia. 
Persecution
At times, Christians in the Safavid realm faced various degrees of oppression from the 
government and the Shi'ite clergy. These events were often manifest as pressure to 
convert to Islam, and were applied in a number of ways, especially economic. The 
Habsburgs,  as  self-styled  defenders  of  Catholic  Christianity, were  asked  and were 
happy  to  intervene  in  these  situations, using  their  diplomatic  relationship  in  an 
attempt to lessen the pressure on Safavid subject Christians. 
Shah 'Abbās I issued a decree near the end of his reign that any Christian in his 
realm who converted to Islam would inherit  all  of  his  family's  property over  any 
claims  of  his  other  Christian  relatives.  This  law  fell  particularly  harshly  on  the 
Armenian population with its family-owned trading networks. 'Abbās I soon cancelled 
his decree after outcry from the Armenian traders and western diplomats, but the law 
would be revived on a number of occasions in later years.143
Shah 'Abbās II, under the influence of his Vizier Khalīfa Sulṭān, renewed the 
inheritance law. The Shah himself was known for being respectful of other religions, 
especially Christianity, and a number of Christians rose to important positions within 
his administration.144 However, the local Christians despised his Vizier; the head of the 
142Quellen zur Geschichte Afrikas, Asiens, und Ozeaniens im Österreichischen Staatsarchiv bis 1918, ed. 
Leopold Auer, (Munich, 1986), pp. 39-42. 
143Matthee, Politics of Trade, p. 88; Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 288. 
144Roemer, CHI, "Safavid Period", p. 294.
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Carmelite mission described him as, "...a bigoted Muhammadan, and antagonistic to 
Christianity."145 Conservative Shi'a jurists had been agitating for greater influence in 
response to the perceived liberalism of the court.146 Armenians and other Christians 
were expelled from Isfahan to outside the city limits, and pressure was brought to 
bring their conversion, including reviving the inheritance law.147 This pressure was 
carried out not only in Iran, but in Safavid controlled Armenia as well. 
Christian leaders in Iran and Armenia appealed to Europe for help. The Papal  
Nuncio at the Vienna court brought the matter before Emperor Leopold in 1658. He 
asked  the  Emperor  to  write  an  official  letter  to  the  King  of  Persia  asking  for  a 
retraction of the law, and he stated that the matter is of such importance to the faith  
to be worthy of his imperial dignity.148  Leopold responded with an eloquent letter to 
Shah 'Abbās II. In it, he reminded the Shah of the long friendship of their countries 
and  that  the  word  of  the  Persians  had  been  respected  since  ancient  times.  He  
described  how Christians  have loved  his  predecessors  benevolence and have been 
friendly towards their rule. But, he wrote, he has heard how Christians face various 
persecutions. In particular he mentioned how those who deny their faith assume all 
their kindred's wealth. Leopold asked: "Abrogate this edict so all may have protection 
of  the law, so  Christians may piously exercise  their  faith,  and so they can die in 
tranquillity." He concluded by asking the Shah for a recognition of their friendship 
with a demonstration of mutual good-will, and ended with the humble "I confess to 
beseeching."149
Letters from the Emperor, the Pope, and some other Christian princes did not 
succeed in the annulment of the inheritance law; however, they did have an effect  
which for a while improved the fortunes of Christians. According to a 1669 report to  
145Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 353.
146Roemer, CHI, "Safavid Period", p. 294. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, pp. 185-
186, 200-201; Newman, Safavid Iran, p. 86.
147Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 366. Gregorian, "Minoities of Isfahan", p. 45; Roemer, CHI, "Safavid 
Period", p. 303.
148HHStA "Sekretär der Nuntiatur in Wien to Leopold", Persica I, Konv. 5, fol. 87.
149HHStA, "Leopold to 'Abbās II", Persica I, Konv. 5, fol. 85-86, 89. 
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the Sacred Congregation for Promulgation of the Faith, "the King of Persia ordered 
that all  governors should be removed from their  posts and that the people of the 
diocese  should  be  placed  under  his  own  immediate  control.  As  a  result  of  such 
decision the Christians are spared the ill-treatment the governors used to inflict on 
them by heavy impositions...The ease with which they can become apostates has been 
counteracted, seeing that at present, in order to take possession of the property of 
relatives  apostates  must  appear  before  the  king  and  bring  with  them  sixty 
witnesses."150 It would seem 'Abbās II found a way to balance his personal religious 
tolerance and the demands of friendly western dynasties such as the Austrians, with 
the pressures of conservative religious forces in his own country. There was plenty 
precedence since the time of 'Abbās I for Safavid rulers taking provinces under their 
personal control, and by doing so, 'Abbās II could ease the treatment of Christians 
while not angering the Shi'ite jurists by abrogating the law. 
Later  years  saw yet  more  issues  of  Christian  oppression  addressed  by  the 
Habsburg court. In 1680, Emperor Leopold wrote to Shah Sulaimān commending the 
Carmelite order, whose mission had been open in Isfahan for most of the century, and 
asking that they be allowed to continue their work.151 Again, in the 1690s, Leopold 
writes to Shah Sultan Husain where he asks the new Shah to protect Christians in his 
realm.152 The late Safavid Empire became increasingly hostile to Christians and other 
minority religions, and concerns over this persecution led the Austrian rulers to use 
what goodwill they had in their relationship to try to ameliorate the situation. 
As  these  examples  show,  issues  of  religion  became  an  important  arena  of 
discussion between the Habsburg Emperors and the Safavid Shahs. The Habsburgs 
were willing to lend their support to Christians and especially Catholics, in Safavid 
territories, by drawing upon their history of friendly relations between Austria and 
Persia. They were able to smooth the way for certain religious figures to take up posts  
150Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 412.
151HHStA, "Leopold to Shah", Persica I, Konv. 5, fol. 41. 
152HHStA, "Leopold to Shah", Persica I, Konv. 5, fol. 3-6, 15.
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in Safavid territory and they could try to lessen the discrimination felt by minority 
religions. However, their influence was limited because the relationship was with the 
Shahs,  not  with  the  Shi'ite  religious  figures.  While  the  Shahs  may  have  valued 
continued good relations with foreign rulers, the religious figures who pushed for a 
harsher enforcement of Shi'a Islamic rule were not so concerned. Sympathetic and 
powerful Shahs, such as 'Abbās I and II, could find ways to heed Habsburg pleas and 
protect minority religious concerns, while the later Shahs, who were less involved 
with governing, did little to restrain the religious tensions despite Habsburg requests. 
Cultural Exchange
Through the  course  of  their  interactions  by  trade  and diplomacy,  the  cultures  of 
Europe and Persia learned more about one another. 
Safavid-era Persians had a mixed attitude towards foreign cultures. It was a 
mixture of "aloofness and fascination", as Rudi Matthee titled his paper on Safavid 
attitudes  towards  the  west.  Islamic  orthodoxy  looked  down  upon  the  Christian 
foreigners, and official documents make little mention of European visitors.153 Safavid 
attitudes held that they were the heirs of a grand, ancient culture, that their lands held 
most everything they needed, and that foreign merchants should be grateful for the 
opportunity to come to Iran and purchase their goods. They had little need to adapt 
their culture to the outsiders.154 Alongside this "official" attitude of superiority, there is 
evidence of a curiosity over European culture and interest in what it had to offer.  
Many of the Shahs, most notably 'Abbās I, but also his successors, enjoyed talking 
with  European  merchants  and  missionaries.155 Europeans  were  quizzed  about 
developments in technology and science.156 
153Iskander Beg Munshi hardly mentions the numerous visits to Shah 'Abbās I, except for the English 
assistance in expelling the Portuguese from Hormuz. History of Shah 'Abbas the Great, trans. Savory, 
pp. 981-982; see Matthee, "Aloofness and Fascination", 1998, pp. 226-227 for more examples. 
154Matthee "Aloofness and Fascination", pp. 241-244.
155Matthee "Aloofness and Fascination", pp. 229-232; Chronicle of Carmelites, pp. 249-254.
156Matthee "Aloofness and Fascination", pp. 235-237.
162
Perhaps  the  field  where  European  influences  had  the  most  impact  was  in 
painting. Over the course of the seventeenth century, introduction of European prints 
and illustrated books and the clothes of visiting Europeans themselves, led to Persians 
developing  a  taste  for  European  art.  Safavid  artists  developed  a  hybrid  style,  the 
farangī-sāz, or "Europeanised" tradition. Starting with Riżā 'Abbāsī (d. 1635), a leading 
artist in the court of 'Abbās I, this school adapted European subjects, colour-palatte, 
and techniques to the traditional  Qazvin miniature  style.  Riza's  followers,  such as 
Muḥammad  Qāsim,  Muḥammad  Yūsuf,  and  Afżal  al-Ḥusainī developed  this  style 
through the 1640s and 50s, which introduced European influences on Persian art much 
as the Chinese influenced Persian art of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. They 
introduced such techniques as shading and thicker lines, but retained the Persian use 
of space rather than European perspective. The painters depicted figures in European 
dress, first in portraits of foreign visitors but then adapted to more stylised scenes. 
And they adopted European subjects, introducing such exotic and forbidden items as 
female semi-nudity, dogs, and wine drinking. Some of these paintings were copied 
from specific European prints which found their way to Persia through trade, while 
others  were  original  works  drawing  inspiration  from the  increased  knowledge  of 
European art. But all combined European ideas with the traditional Persian idiom to 
create  a  body of  work  unique  to  the  later  Safavid  period,  and  which  exercised  a  
continuing influence on later  Iranian arts.157 Many of  the Safavid artists,  including 
those mentioned, also designed patterns for the textile trade. Adaptation of European 
floral motifs into an Asian style in this field held a clear profit motive of appealing to 
the European export market.158
While most of the European influence came from French and especially Dutch 
artists, some may be traced directly back to the artistic community of Emperor Rudolf 
II's court. Rudolf assembled artists from all over Europe at his Prague court, and after 
157Sheila Canby, "Farangi Saz: The Impact of Europe on Safavid Painting", in Silk and Stone: The Art of 
Asia, The Third Hali Annual, (1996). pp. 46-59; Basil Gray, CHI, "The Arts in Safavid Times", Chp. 
16(b), pp. 900-902, 905-909.
158Gray, CHI, "The Arts in Safavid Times", pp. 902-903.
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Fig. 6. Tyrolean Landscape, by Roelandt Savery, 
Engraving by Aegidius Sadeler,
©State Hermitage Museum
Fig. 7. European-style Landscape, 
by 'Alī-Quli ibn Muḥammad,
©State Hermitage Museum
his death, when many of these artists returned to their home countries, they carried 
with them the developments in the arts created in his multicultural studios. Important 
in the world-wide spread of Rudolf's court art was Aegidius Sadeler, the engraver who 
created  portraits  of  the  Persian  ambassadors  in  Prague,  and  who  made  many 
engravings of paintings from Rudolf's court. Prints from these engravings were later 
sold by his relative Marco Sadeler in the Netherlands, and from there exported by 
Dutch traders around the world.159 One pair of works clearly shows the connection 
between  Rudolf's  court  and  later  Persian  art.  The  Persian  artists  'Alī-Quli  ibn 
Muḥammad painted a European landscape scene in 1649 showing houses, a mill and a 
bridge over a river.  This miniature was copied from an engraving by Sadeler of a 
landscape painting by Roelandt Savery, as established by L.T. Gyuzalyan. Savery was 
an important developer of European landscape painting who worked for a decade at 
Rudolf's court, and this particular painting was one of a series based on Tyrolean and 
Bohemian scenes done under Rudolf's employment. While 'Alī-Quli's work is clearly a 
copy of Savery's original, the Persian's work does not use European Perspective and 
shading, but instead employs elements from the Persian miniature style. 'Alī-Quli also 
added elements not present in the original, such as a cross atop one of the buildings 
159Dorothy Limouze, "Aegidius Sadeler, Imperial Printmaker", Philadelphia Museum of Art Bulletin, Vol. 
85, No. 362, (Spring 1989).
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and a boar  in the right  foreground corner,  perhaps to make the scene look more 
identifiably 'European' to Persian viewers.160 This one identified example was probably 
joined by others, since much of the Sadeler print catalogue was produced while in 
Emperor  Rudolf's  service,  and  these  would  be  among  the  art  exported  to  Persia.  
Therefore, Rudolf's artistic interest was affecting Persian artistic styles through the 
seventeenth century many years after Rudolf's own death. 
Safavid culture  adopted European influences in art  and use of  technologies 
such  as  clocks  and  printing.161 Austrians  were  also  interested  in  Persian  culture. 
Austrians were drawn especially to Persian books and literature. 
The  intellectual  interests  of  the  Habsburg  court  inspired  a  curiosity  about 
Persia  among  Austrian  intellectuals.  Dedication  to  alchemy  contributed  to  this 
interest,  so often what was attractive to scholars about Persia was an ancient and 
mythologized version of the country where Zoroastrian magi held secret wisdom.162 
However,  these  esoteric  interests  did  inspire  study  and  travel  which  brought 
knowledge of the real place. Another more practical concern which inspired study of 
eastern cultures was the ever-impending threat of the Turks. The need for interpreters 
for  the legates  to  the  Ottoman court  led  to  courses  in  Oriental  Languages at  the 
University  of  Vienna and the  foundation in 1674  of  the Sprachknaben-Institut  for 
language training. Two different dictionaries of Arabic, Persian and Turkish languages 
were published in Vienna about this time. Although these projects remained small 
during the seventeenth century they started a tradition of oriental language study in 
Vienna which flowered in later centuries.163 
160Piotrovsky, M. B. and Pritula A. D., eds. Beyond the Palace Walls; Islamic Art from the State 
Hermitage Museum, Islamic Art in a World Context, National Museums of Scotland, Edinburgh and 
State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg, 2006, p. 133, prints p. 134;  Gyuzalyan, L. T. Eastern 
miniature, depicting western landscape in Central Asia and Iran, Leningrad, pp. 163-169.
161Mohammad Reza (Farhad) Nourbakhsh, "Iran's Early Encounter with Three Medieval European 
Inventions (875–1153 AH/1470–1740 CE)", Iranian Studies, 41:4, (2008), 551-553. 
162Evans, Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 33-34, 436-439; Evans, Rudolf II, also discusses the Habsburg 
intellectual milieu. 
163Tremblay, X. and Rastegar, N., "Austria ii. Iranian Studies in", Encyclopaedia Iranica, Online edition, 
(2005, 2011).
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The Imperial Library in Vienna developed a collection of Persian books. Much 
of this collection was acquired by Sebastian Tengnagel, the Imperial Librarian from 
1608 to 1636. Tengnagel studied oriental languages at university in Heidelburg, and 
this specialised knowledge was one reason he was hired as an assistant by the first 
Imperial Librarian, Hugo Blotius. As the assistant librarian he helped catalogue the 
large Greek and Latin holdings as well as the few Turkish and other oriental texts 
owned  by  the  Imperial  Library.164 On  Blotius'  death,  Tengnagel  became  the  chief 
librarian.  He pursued his interest  in oriental  languages by expanding the Imperial 
holdings with texts purchased from other European libraries where he had extensive 
contacts, and from Imperial representatives in Constantinople. For instance, he wrote 
to a colleague at the Leiden Library, "I am inflammed with an incredible zeal for the 
Arabic, Persian, and Turkish languages, and I seek from everywhere material to assist 
my further education in them."165 Tengnagel convinced Emperor Matthias to assign to 
the library a Turkish slave of Baron Siegfried Preiner and provide funds for his upkeep 
so that the Turk could transcribe Turkish, Persian, and Arabic texts,  and thus the 
Imperial Library built up a large collection of manuscripts. Tengnagel also built a large 
personal book collection, covering many Middle Eastern languages. On his death in 
1636, these volumes were bequeathed to the Imperial Library.166 While Tengnagel was 
more  familiar  with  Turkish  than  Persian,  he  contributed  a  number  of  important 
Persian texts to the Imperial Library. Perhaps the most significant of these is the oldest 
extant New Persian manuscript in Arabic script, a copy of the pharmacopoeia Ketāb 
al-abnia wa’l-ḥaqāʾeq al-adwia by Abu Manṣur Mowaffaq Heravi, which was produced 
in 1056.167 Tengnagel was one of the leading scholars of oriental languages in Europe 
at the time, and he was able to convince several Emperors (he worked for Rudolf II, 
Mathias, and Ferdinand II) to support his work expanding the collection of eastern 
books in the Imperial Library. 
164Josef Stummvoll, Geschichte der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek, (Vienna, 1968), pp. 129-139. 
Tremblay and Rastegar, "Austria ii." Encyl. Iranica. 
165Stummvoll, Geschicte Nationalbibliothek, p. 138. 
166Stummvoll, Geschicte Nationalbibliothek, pp. 142-145. 
167Tremblay and Rastegar, "Austria ii." Encyl. Iranica. 
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Anti-Ottoman Alliance, Again
Through the middle of the seventeenth century, peace maintained on the Ottoman 
borders with both Austria and Persia.  After the active pursuit  of an anti-Ottoman 
alliance, which dominated relations between Austrian Habsburgs and Safavid Persians 
in the sixteenth and first decade of the seventeenth centuries, the military alliance 
drifted out of concern and the other issues mentioned above became prominent. The 
treaty of Zvita-Torok established a peace on the Austrian-Ottoman border which held 
for 60 years, and the military attention of the Emperors was focused for much of that 
time on the Central European conflict, the Thirty Years War. The Safavids continued 
wars with the Ottomans for a few decades, trading possession of Baghdad, but their  
disappointment with the failure of European alliances led them to conduct the wars on 
their own, without actively seeking European help. The Peace of Zuhãb between the 
Safavids and Ottomans, concluded in 1639, was scrupulously followed by both sides, 
held for almost a century until the Safavid collapse, and set the border between Iran,  
Iraq, and Turkey which, with minor adjustments, holds through today.168 
Towards  the  end  of  the  century  the  Ottoman  Empire  again  looked  for 
expansion into Hungary at the expense of the Austrian Habsburgs. The Ottomans and 
Habsburgs fought a brief war in 1663-4, shortly before  Shah Sulaimān's accession to 
the throne. This action was concluded before the suggestion of an alliance could be 
sent to Persia. In addition, the new Shah was anxious to maintain peace during his 
transition, so little became of it. 
The greater crisis occurred in 1683, when an Ottoman offensive led to the siege 
of Vienna. Emperor Leopold was attempting to negotiate an extension to the 20-year 
treaty which ended the 1664 war. He was more concerned about French designs for 
Germany. The Ottoman court sensed weakness, and were informed of the Habsburg 
distraction  by  disaffected  Hungarian  Protestants.  French  agents  in  Constantinople 
168Matthee, "Iran's Ottoman Diplomacy", p. 148-149.
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encouraged the Ottomans to attack Austria, although distrust between the French and 
Ottoman courts  prevented  them from launching a  joint  operation.  Still,  when the 
attack came, the Habsburg forces were unprepared and the Ottoman army advanced 
to the walls of Vienna, while Leopold and his court fled to Linz. The defenders of the  
city withstood two months of siege but were facing a final assault on the breached 
walls when a relieving army arrived. On the 12th of September 1683, a multi-national 
army from Poland, the Holy Roman Empire, and surviving Austrian forces defeated 
the Ottoman besiegers and pushed them back from Habsburg lands.  In continuing 
battles  over  the  following  years  Austrian  armies  pushed  the  Ottomans  out  of  all  
Hungary and Transylvania.169
At this time Emperor Leopold was desperate to find allies. He sent a series of 
letters to the Shah through the envoy Sebastian Knab. Knab was appointed as the new 
Archbishop of Nakhichevan by the Pope in 1682, and while on his way east to take up 
his new post he stopped in Vienna. There he asked for the Emperor's help in setting 
up  a  Dominican  convent  in  Isfahan  and  offered  his  services  as  the  Emperor's 
representative to the Safavid court.170 By the time Knab left Vienna, the spring attack 
was obvious, and so he carried letters to the Shah asking the Safavids to join in an 
attack on the Ottomans.171 Later, once the target of the attack became obvious and 
Vienna was under siege, Leopold sent more desperate letters, which caught up with 
Knab in Poland. "My city of Vienna is devastated by sword and flame," writes Leopold, 
as he describes the siege, but, "with the military assistance of the Holy Roman Empire 
and Poland" he hopes to resist.172 More letters followed in December and in 1684, after 
the siege was broken and the Turkish army was in retreat.173 Leopold tried to convince 
the Shah to join in a campaign to roll back Ottoman gains. He promised the Shah a 
chance to regain Baghdad as the Emperor retakes all of Hungary. He presented the 
169John Stoye, The Siege of Vienna, (Edinburgh, 2000, first published 1964); Thomas M. Barker, Double 
Eagle and Crescent, (Albany, NY, 1967); Andrew Wheatcroft, The Enemy at the Gate, (London, 2008); 
John P. Spielman, Leopold I of Austria, (London, 1977), pp. 42-44, 103-111. 
170Matthee, "Iran's Ottoman Diplomacy", p. 157; Chronicle of the Carmelites, p. 417, 422. 
171HHStA, "Leopold to Shah", Persica I, Konv. 5, fol. 54-55.
172HHStA, "Leopold to Shah", Persica I, Konv. 5, fol. 60-61. 
173HHStA, "Leopold to Shah", Persica I, Konv. 5, fol. 62-63, 69-70.
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endevour to  Sulaimān as  a  chance to regain the lands held by his  ancestor,  Shah 
'Abbās I. 
But Shah Sulaimān was not interested in military action. To Knab, the Shah 
replied "he did not see any greater advantage joining [an anti-Ottoman coalition] than 
living in peace with his neighbours."174 In reply to a letter from the Pope carried by 
Knab, the Shah wrote, "A long time ago this dynasty, following the precepts of justice,  
concluded peace with the monarchs of those realms (i.e. the Turkish)."175  The envoy 
from the Swedish King, Frabritius,  reported the Shah replying, "My forbears made 
peace, and I have confirmed and formalized this for all eternity. Cursed be the one 
who will first draw the sword again...We let ourselves be prompted by the Christian 
powers  to  greatly  distract  the  Turks,  but  then  the  Christian  powers  made  peace 
without so much as mentioning us once."176 It is notable that here, nearly 80 years and 
four generations of rulers after 'Abbās I  and Rudolf II,  The Safavid Shah was still  
referring with offence over the Austrian 1606 Peace of Zvita-Torok. Sulaimān was 
criticized by the European representatives for his lack of personal leadership - one 
missionary wrote, "his object and world is nothing else than wine and women."177 But 
he had to calculate the state of the Safavid army and the chance of an anti-Safavid 
coalition by the Ottomans, Uzbeks, and Muhgals.178 Sulaimān apparently was moved 
by the heroism and drama of the story of the relief of Vienna, and it is reported he had 
a  translated  account  of  it  read to  him many times.179 However,  sympathy for  the 
Austrians' plight was not enough to motivate abandonment of a policy successful in 
maintaining his realm. 
In September 1686, Leopold wrote to the Shah informing him of progress in the 
war against the Turks and highlighting the capture of Buda, the capital of Ottoman 
174Matthee, "Iran's Ottoman Diplomacy", p. 160-161.
175Chronicles of the Carmelites, p. 423.
176Matthee, "Iran's Ottoman Diplomacy", p. 160-161.
177Chronicles of the Carmelites, p. 421.
178Matthee, "Iran's Ottoman Diplomacy", p. 161-162; Persia in Crisis, pp. 133-135.
179Chronicles of the Carmelites, p. 421.
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Hungary, earlier that month.180 It was clear that Shah Sulaimān had no intention of 
breaking his treaty with the Ottomans. Nevertheless, Leopold continued to write on 
the  matter,  at  the  urging  of  his  court,  throughout  the  following  decade  as  the 
Austrians continued to wage war with the Ottomans in Hungary. 
Conclusion
The seventeenth century saw an expansion in the topics covered in the relationship 
between the Austria and Persia. Although the question of a military alliance did not 
completely  disappear,  it  became  a  minor  issue  except  for  the  brief  time  of  great 
emergency for the Austrian monarchy. Instead, issues of trade and religion came to 
the fore. This represented a maturation of the relationship, from a single issue to the 
normal interchange of nations. It also revealed the Habsburgs treating the Safavids as 
equal status to themselves. Each dynasty had multiple interests and both sides could 
work together on those interests, even when they disagreed, by maintaining a friendly 
relationship. 




Over  the  previous  three  chapters,  we  observed  the  growth  and  evolution  of  the 
diplomatic relations between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Safavid Persians. Those 
chapters explained how they first made contact in order to cooperate against their 
common enemy, how that alliance effort failed in the early seventeenth century, and 
how the countries maintained contacts but pursued new avenues of cooperation after 
that  point.  In  the  next  two  chapters  we  examine  several  questions  raised  in  the 
previous chapters in more detail. The events described in the previous chapters form 
the data with which to answer the questions in these chapters.    
In this chapter, we examine several questions surrounding the change of focus 
in the relationship, and ask how and when it came about. In Chapter Three, it was  
claimed that the first decade of the seventeenth century represented a turning point in 
the relationship;  here we examine that  claim in more detail.  We look beyond the 
Austrian-Persian relationship  to  examine  the  international  context  at  the  time,  in 
which the interactions of  Austria and Persia formed one component.  We see that 
changing attitudes on all  sides helped bring about a change. The relationship was 
originally  focused  on  military  cooperation  against  their  common enemy,  but  that 
effort  never produced an alliance. We also examine why the alliance effort  failed; 
several problems made such an alliance difficult and the combination of them doomed 
the endeavour. In comparison, the French and Ottomans managed to arrange an east-
west coalition targeting the Habsburgs,  and the contrast with this more successful 
alliance can help highlight the problems for the Austrian-Persian effort. 
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The Turning Point of the Relationship
As has been seen in the previous chapters,  the relationship between the Austrian 
Habsburgs  and  the  Safavid  Persians  changed  over  the  two  centuries  of  their 
interaction with regards to the topics  and issues  covered by their  diplomacy.  The 
critical  time in the evolution of the Persia's  dealing with Austria,  and indeed also 
Persia's dealings with the rest of Europe, occurred in the decade 1600-1610. This is 
when they came closest to forming the military alliance which had dominated their 
diplomacy over the sixteenth century. Both countries were at war with the Ottoman 
Empire at the same time, the first time the Ottomans had faced a two-front war. But 
this decade was also the time when the dream of an alliance failed.  Following the 
major effort expended at the start of the decade, it became clear that an alliance was  
not practical. After that, emphasis in the relationship turned to other topics. 
The major event leading to this change, as described in Chapter Three, was the 
failure of the Austrian-Persian alliance and the Peace of Zsitva-Torok. However, this 
event did not take place in isolation. The Persian ambassadors dispatched to Prague 
were just a part of a larger diplomatic effort by Shah 'Abbās I to connect with all the  
European leaders.  Particularly  important  was the diplomacy with the Spanish and 
Portuguese, who at that time were jointly ruled by Philip III of Spain. Several Persian 
embassies were sent to the Pope, who replied through the offices of missionaries sent 
to Persia.1 
After  this  decade  both  Safavids  and  Habsburgs  changed  their  attitudes. 
Friendly relations and cooperation still remained important to both, but the emphasis 
changed. As seen in Chapter Four, issues of trade and religion came to dominate their 
contacts. The changes in attitudes resulted from both reaction to the events of the first  
decade and adaptation to changing circumstances in each country. 
1 Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, (Chicago, 1973), passim.
172
Papal and Spanish Diplomacy 
The  Papacy  had  a  long  history  of  diplomacy  with  Persia,  but  the  start  of  the 
seventeenth century saw an increase in their activity. Anthony Sherley presented to 
Pope Clement VIII in 1601 a proposal from Shah 'Abbās I wherein Persia would form a 
Confederacy with the princes of Europe, who would act under the Pope's leadership, 
to fight the Turks. Ambassadors from the Pope and the other princes were invited to 
Isfahan,  and  'Abbās  would  send representatives  to  Rome and the  other  European 
capitals. He described "defensive war" as unsatisfactory, presumably a reference to the 
war  Emperor  Rudolf  was  fighting  in  Hungary,  and  urged  the  Europeans  to  take 
offensive actions. The plans for European action he left up to the European princes, 
although he  suggested  Syria  or  Palestine  would  be  suitable  places  for  action.   In 
exchange,  Shah  'Abbās  would  provide  privileges  and  protections  for  Christian 
preachers in his realms, and require all Christians in his territories to submit to the 
leadership of the Catholic church.2 
Pope  Clement  VIII  replied  to  Shah  'Abbās  in  a  letter  which  expressed  his 
happiness at  friendly relations,  and described the war led by Emperor Rudolf -  of 
which the Shah was already familiar. Most of all, the letter expressed enthusiasm at 
the  possibility  of  Shah  'Abbās  becoming  Christian.3 The  Pope  mistook  the  Shah's 
curiosity about religions and his willingness to make concessions as an interest in 
conversion.  The conversion of  several  members  of  the Persian embassy,  including 
Uruch Beg who took the Christian name Don Juan of Persia, furthered the impression 
that Persia was ripe for conversion.4 The editor of The Chronicles of the Carmelites in  
Persia attributes  this  misunderstanding  to  reports  from  a  Portuguese  priest  who 
visited Persia, Francisco da Costa.5 However, the notion that Persia might convert to 
2 Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia and the Papal Mission of the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, 
(London, 1939), pp. 76-78; Franz Babinger, Sherleiana, (Berlin, 1932), pp. 26-29.
3 Chronicle of the Carmelites, pp. 82-84. 
4 Uruch Beg Bayāt, Don Juan of Persia, translated and edited by Guy Le Strange,  (New York, 1973), 
On the conversions see pp. 33-36, 286-287, 292-293, 299-308. 
5 Chronicle of the Carmelites, pp. 80-81; Lockhart, CHI, "European Contacts with Persia, 1350-1736", 
pp. 388-389. 
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Christianity was a rumour that had perpetually come up in Europe since the stories of  
Prester  John  in  medieval  times.  During  the  decade,  several  tracts  were  published 
purporting to describe Shah 'Abbās' conversion, and these were popularly received 
because they justified efforts at forming an alliance to a public filled with sermons 
vilifying the  Muslim infidel.6 But  wherever  the  impression  came from,  the  Pope's 
belief  that  Shah  'Abbās  might  convert  coloured  the  Papal  reaction  to  the  Persian 
overture.
Pope Clement VIII sent two ambassadors to Persia, the priest da Costa and a 
layman Diego de Miranda. These two envoys quarrelled with one another on their  
journey. Each presented himself as the single representative to the Shah, and they 
behaved disrespectfully in front of the Shah. In one incident, Miranda produced the 
letter from his pocket, for which the Shah chided him to treat it with respect and not  
pull it from his behind. They made a poor example of Christian diplomacy, and 'Abbās 
had Miranda sent home as soon as  possible.7 At  about the same time,  a  group of 
Augustinian friars were sent by the Archbishop of Portuguese Goa to deliver a letter  
from King Philip III of Spain and Portugal, and to establish a convent in Iṣfahān. They 
made a much better impression than Miranda, and spent much time in the Shah's 
company. He then allowed them to set up their convent and even paid to help build a 
church. One of this group was Antonio de Gouveia, who who made several journeys  
between Persia and Spain for King Philip, and wrote two books describing them.8
Shah 'Abbās sent his ambassador Bastam Quli Beg to the Pope as part of his 
1603  diplomatic  initiative,  travelling  along  with  Miranda  when  he  returned.  The 
Ambassador died along the journey, but the letter he carried was eventually delivered 
to the Pope. In it, 'Abbās again expressed his desire for friendship and cooperation,  
6 Adam Knobler, "Pseudo-Conversions and Patchwork Pedigrees: The Christianization of Muslim 
Princes and the Diplomacy of Holy War", Journal of World History, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall, 1996), pp. 194-
195. 
7 Chronicle of the Carmelites, pp. 90-93; Lockhart, CHI, "European Contacts", p. 389.
8 Chronicle of the Carmelites, pp. 92-94; Rudi Matthee, "Gouveia, Antonio De", Encyclopedia Iranica, 
originally published 2002, updated 2012. 
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and his respect for the Christian community. He said that he awaited the return of his  
earlier  Ambassador -   Ḥusain 'Alī  Beg who travelled with Anthony Sherley -  and 
implied  that  he  expected  Ḥusain  to  return  with  concrete  plans  for  military 
cooperation.9 'Abbās  was  likely  disappointed  when  he  received  replies  with  no 
concrete military plans, only vague promises of encouraging European rulers to act, 
and offers to send him priests to help him learn about Christianity. In a later letter to 
the Pope carried by Robert Sherley, Shah 'Abbās criticized the European countries for 
fighting among themselves instead of joining to fight the Turks. He urged the Pope to 
force them to forget their rivalries, induce the King of Spain to invade Cyprus, and 
persuade the Emperor, the King of Poland and others to make similar attacks.10 When 
the Carmelite mission met the Shah, 'Abbās is reported to have told them, 
put it plainly to the Pope that unless action were taken, and the Christian 
Princes made war on the Sultan of Turkey, he (the Pope) should not 
afterwards complain if the King of Persia used harsh measures with 
Christians from Europe.11 
After this time, Shah 'Abbās began to act less favourably to the Christian missionaries 
visiting Persia. 
'Abbās wanted military action, and was willing to act hospitable to Christian 
missionaries to secure what he wanted. The Pope wanted religious conversion, and 
was willing to encourage military cooperation among the European ruler in order to 
achieve  what  he  wanted.  The  two  were  fundamentally  pursuing  different  goals,  
although in their diplomatic language each led the other to believe they were aligned. 
The idea had been planted with the Habsburgs and the Papacy that Persia was a site 
for religious activity, and afterwards religion was to play an increased part in their  
diplomacy, as we have seen. 
9 Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution, p. 238; Chronicle of the Carmelites, pp. 94-96; Full Persian 
text of letter in: L. Fekete, Einführung in die Persische Paläographie, (Budapest, 1977), No. 34, p. 469-
475. 
10 Lockhart, CHI, "European Contacts", p. 390; Chronicle of the Carmelites, pp. 147-149; D.W. Davies, 
Elizabethans Errant, (Ithaca, 1967), pp. 226-228. 
11 Chronicle of the Carmelites, pp. 179.
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Meanwhile, Spain and Portugal also were having difficult relations with Shah 
'Abbās. After the fighting in Hungary concluded, a new plan was conceived, originally 
by Anthony Sherley then pursued by his brother Robert, to blockade Ottoman ports 
on the Mediterranean and divert the silk trade through Hormuz.12 Shah 'Abbās was 
supportive of  this  idea,  but  despite lengthy negotiations it  never came about.  The 
Portuguese Council of India opposed the idea, as they derived a great deal of income 
from Turkish ships in the Red Sea paying protection money.13 Discussions continued, 
but to 'Abbās it became just another promise of action that the Europeans did not  
deliver. 
In 1609, 'Abbās sent another Persian diplomat, Dengīz Beg Rūmlū, along with 
the Augustinian Gouveia to the Spanish King, to discuss, among other things, the plan 
for diversion of the silk trade. They brought with them bales of silk which were to be  
sold on behalf of the Shah as a test of the market, but instead they gave them to the 
Spanish  King  as  a  gift.  On  their  return  to  Persia,  Shah  'Abbās  had  Dengīz  Beg 
executed. According to observers, his execution was because he gave the silk to the 
King of Spain without receiving a gift of equal value in return. It might also have been 
caused by the fact Dengīz Beg treated members of his embassy badly and several 
converted to  Christianity and stayed  in  Spain,  or  that  Shah 'Abbās was trying to 
impress a visiting Turkish ambassador and intimidate him into signing a treaty. Either 
way, 'Abbās questioned Gouveia over which of the items he had brought to the Shah 
were gifts and which were payment for the silk. Gouveia thought quickly and divided 
the gifts into presents and payment. But the Shah was not happy, claiming that the 
spices offered as payment were worth much less than the silk, and demanded Gouveia 
pay the difference. With Gouveia in disgrace and fearing for his life, he fled Isfahan to  
Hormuz and eventually back to Portugal.14
12 Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution, p. 264ff.; Davies, Elizabethans Errant, p. 209. 
13 Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution, p. 92. 
14 Chronicle of the Carmelites, pp. 203-206; Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 292-294; 
Lockhart, CHI, "European Contacts", pp. 391-392. 
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An ongoing source of conflict between the Persians and the Spanish was the 
island of Hormuz. It had been ruled by the Portuguese, and after the union of the 
crowns was a Spanish territory, but it was run by a corrupt and abusive Portuguese 
administration.  Shah  'Abbās  complained  repeatedly  about  abuses  to  the  Persian 
traders and the coastal population. The Carmelite missionary Father Simon reported 
charges that Persian merchants were forced to buy products they did not want at 
inflated prices; that the Portuguese seized horses and goods from the Persians; that the 
Portuguese refused to pay the ancient tribute due from the King of Hormuz, who was 
now a Portuguese puppet; and that Muslim children were taken from ships, put in 
convents and were forcibly raised as Christians.15 The Persians steadily increased the 
pressure on Hormuz throughout the first two decades of the seventeenth century. In 
1601, they took Bahrain, previously a dependency of the King of Hormuz. Then, when 
complaints  about  the  actions  of  the  Hormuz  captains  were  not  addressed,  they 
captured the island of Qeshm, from where Hormuz obtained drinking water. In 1614, 
the town of Gamrūn (later named Bandar-e 'Abbās), on the mainland facing Hormuz, 
was conquered by a Persian force under the Sultan of Shiraz, who certainly would not  
have acted without the Shah's approval. Throughout the whole series of incidents, the 
Spanish  government  remained  remarkably  imperceptive  of  the  growing  troubles, 
despite being warned by several  diplomats,  and the Portuguese captains continued 
their abuses. Diplomats were sent to 'Abbās to demand the return of captured islands 
and payment of  tariffs  when 'Abbās  was looking for  gestures  of  conciliation.  The 
Shah's  increasing  anger  reached  a  climax  in  1622,  when  the  English  East  India 
Company helped his troops invade and capture Hormuz itself.16
Change in Persian Attitudes
After the large effort expended on diplomacy at the start of the decade and the lack of  
15 Chronicle of the Carmelites, pp. 102-104. 
16 Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 250-252, 296-297, 312-323, 340-343; Luis Gil, "The 
Embassy of Don García de Silva y Figueroa to Shah 'Abbas I", in Iran and the World in the Safavid 
Age, edited by Willem Floor and Edmund Herzeg, (London, 2012), pp. 162, 166-170.
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results, Shah 'Abbās became disillusioned with western military promises. While he 
remained open to cooperation, 'Abbās no longer trusted the Europeans to keep their 
word.  While  the Austrian treaty with  the  Ottomans was a  large influence  on his  
change in attitude, it was not the only contributor. The Spanish Habsburgs made a 
string  of  promises  about  military  actions,  but  they  never  delivered.  The  Pope 
continually promised to raise a league of European countries against the Ottomans, 
but he was unable to exhort them to action. While these other issues contributed, the 
most conspicuous failure to 'Abbās was the 1606 Treaty of Zsitva-Torok. 'Abbās saw 
this as the Austrians making a separate peace and he took it as a betrayal. As shown 
in Chapter Three, Rudolf had no choice but to agree to the peace. If he did not he 
would have lost his throne, and his successor Matthias would have signed the treaty 
anyway. Rudolf's actions were never meant as a personal betrayal. However, when 
assessing the impact on their relationship, arguments justifying the treaty based on 
the Imperial political situation are not as relevant as Shah 'Abbās' perceptions. The 
treaty impacted relations between the two courts for a long time afterwards.
'Abbās resolved to make his military strategy more self-reliant. From the start 
of his reign, he had already begun reforming his army: reducing reliance on Qizilbāsh 
tribal horsemen, expanding the use of musket-armed infantry loyal to himself, and 
building  up  the  artillery.  But  partway  through  the  critical  decade,  once  he  had 
inflicted some defeats on the Ottomans and after the Austrians made their own peace, 
'Abbās began to concentrate more on trade and less on military affairs in dealings 
with the West. Through trade, he could acquire funds to build up his own military 
rather than hope for direct military assistance from Europe. He discussed plans with 
the Sherleys  and other  diplomats  to  re-direct  trade  away from Turkish controlled 
ports. It was also during this time that he determined to seize the Portuguese outpost 
of  Hormuz.17 This  move  would  give  him  more  control  over  Persia's  commerce, 
opening the country to other trading partners rather than being dominated by the 
Portuguese and Spanish. His swing to emphasizing trade coincided with the rise of the 
large western trading companies, such as the English East India Company and the 
17 A Chronicle of the Carmelites, (London, 1939), p. 169; Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution, p. 252
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Dutch VOC.  The  companies  provided  an outlet  for  the  silk  and other  goods  that 
'Abbās wished to sell, whereas before there would have been little choice but transport 
them to Turkish Mediterranean ports.  It  took more than decade to accomplish his 
plans,  culminating  with  the  1622  capture  of  Hormuz,  but  his  thoughts  of  such  a 
project began in the first decade of the seventeenth century.
Change in Habsburg Attitudes
After Emperor Rudolf II died in 1612, his successors were more interested in religious 
matters  than  in  eastern  military  actions.  Tensions  within  the  Empire  were  high 
between the religious denominations, and, for Emperor Matthias and his adviser Klesl,  
the  first  priority  was  to  restore  Imperial  authority.  They  renewed  the  temporary 
treaty of  Zvita-Torok into a more lasting agreement with the Ottomans, in order to 
concentrate their efforts on the Empire and Imperial succession. Since neither Rudolf  
nor Matthais had any children, bargaining over the succession resulted in just one 
viable candidate, Archduke Ferdinand of Styria, a cousin of Rudolf and Matthias. The 
Styrian  Habsburg  line  was  more  devoutly  Catholic,  and  Ferdinand  had  already 
demonstrated his willingness to enforce Catholicism in his territories. Once Ferdinand 
was  confirmed  as  Matthias'  heir,  Protestant  worries  over  his  reign  amplified  the 
religious tensions, and led to the revolt in Bohemia and the start of the Thirty Years  
War.18 
Habsburg military attention was now focused on Europe and the Thirty Years 
War, not on the Turkish frontier. Thus, they had little interest in building a military 
alliance with Persia. Instead, their stronger religious identity led them to promote the 
interests  of  Catholic  Christianity.  Where  there  were  Christian  minorities,  the 
seventeenth century Habsburgs saw it as their duty to defend Christian interests. 19 
18 Peter H. Wilson, Europe's Tragedy, A History of the Thirty Years War, (London, 2009), pp. 68-73, 239-
266; R.J.W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, (Oxford, 1979), pp. 44-45, 57-67.
19 Evans, Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 424-433. 
179
Because their Christian sentiments were so well known, they were asked repeatedly 
to  intervene  when  Christian  communities  needed  something  from  the  Safavid 
government,  as seen in Chapter Four.  Also, after the ravages of war the economy 
needed to be rebuilt. The administration under Leopold sought to shift the economy 
from  primarily  agricultural  to  one  more  reliant  on  industry  and  trade. 20 As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, this shift led Austrian merchants to reach out 
to the east for trading opportunities.
Therefore, both sides turned away from the military alliance and towards other 
types of contacts. The priorities of both dynasties changed. These changes occurred at  
the same time and were the results of events in the first decade of the seventeenth 
century. 
Why Did the Alliance Fail? 
Throughout  the  sixteenth  and  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth  centuries,  both 
Habsburgs  and  Safavids  wanted  a  military  alliance,  but  it  never  happened.  The 
Ottomans were allowed to only fight on one front at a time, managing their foreign 
policy to avoid splitting their forces. Two explanations can be found in the literature 
for  why  the  alliance  between  Europeans  and  Persians  was  never  realised.  I  will  
propose a third. Clearly, the truth involves a mixture of all three explanations. But, as  
each highlights different issues, they are worth examining individually. 
20 Wilson, Europe's Tragedy, pp. 795-806; Jean Bérenger, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1273-1700, 
trans. C. A. Simpson, (London, 1994), pp. 295-303.
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1. Distance and Difficulty of Travel
Distance and difficulty of travel ia an explanation found in many works which discuss 
European-Persian relations. In some works it is cited almost as a truism without much 
examination. Examples from otherwise excellent works include Laurence Lockhart in 
the  Cambridge  History  of  Iran,  who  writes,  "The  reason  of  this  failure...was  the 
extreme difficulty of making and retaining close contact between East and West with 
a hostile Turkey in between."21 Also, Bérenger in the History of the Habsburg Empire 
writes,  "As for  coordinating effective military action,  whatever the Safavids'  deep-
seated  hatred  of  the  Ottomans,  this  proved  a  quite  unrealistic  fantasy  given  the 
obstacles to communications between Ispahan and Prague."22 Certainly, in the early 
modern era it was very difficult for diplomats to travel between Europe and Persia. 
This  difficulty  was  clearly  shown  in  the  accounts  of  travellers  examined  in  the 
previous chapters. It would take a year or more to send a messenger one way, and 
then another year at least for a reply. Often, the situation would have changed by the 
time a message arrived. Sometimes the message never arrived, as several ambassadors 
died on their way. Obviously, the difficulty of travel hindered cooperation. 
There were three possible routes between Europe and Persia, each had its own 
difficulties. These were: overland through Syria and Iraq; by sea to Hormuz around 
Africa,  usually by way of settlements in India;  and through Russia and across the 
Caspian Sea. 
The  first route,  overland,  was  the  most  direct,  but  in  the  early  sixteenth 
century the region was captured by the Ottomans. The route already had dangers 
from bandits and the dessert environment, and once it was controlled by a hostile 
power it was almost impossible. The Sherleys travelled to Persia this way, disguised as 
21 Lockhart, CHI, "European Contacts", p. 374.
22 Jean Bérenger, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1273-1700, trans. C. A. Simpson, (London, 1994), p. 
247.
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Levantine merchants; however, they were not official representatives of any country. 
For a diplomat pursuing military action against the controlling power it would be far 
more treacherous. Emperor Charles V's envoy Jean de Balbi travelled this route with 
much  difficulty  and  treachery,  and  a  Venetian  merchant  who  helped  him  was 
executed by the Ottomans.23 Afterwards,  the direct  route  was not  used by official 
delegates, although letters could sometimes be passed by merchant caravans. 
The  second route, by sea, was well established in the sixteenth century and 
was used by Spanish and Portuguese. Once a year a Portuguese fleet, the Carreira da 
Índia,  left  Lisbon in early  spring,  passing around the Cape of  Good Hope to East 
Africa,  to  catch  the  summer  monsoon  winds  across  the  Indian  Ocean  to  the 
Portuguese outpost at Goa. To reach Persia, one usually waited until the the winds 
shifted in September then sailed from Goa to Hormuz, the Portuguese stronghold at  
the mouth of the Persian Gulf. The voyage took most of a year, if all the winds and 
currents were caught properly, and a round trip took three years. The Portuguese had 
a monopoly on this route during the sixteenth century, until they were challenged in 
the seventeenth century by the rise of the English and Dutch trading companies.24 
Maximilian II  of Austria tried to use this route for his embassies, but coordination 
with the Portuguese proved to be a stumbling point. 
The  third route, through Russia, down the Volga river, and over the Caspian 
Sea,  covered  a  longer  distance  and  crossed  Tartar  lands  that  were  only  loosely 
controlled by the Russian Tsar. It was a difficult journey in the best of times, as shown 
in  Tectander's  and  Olearius'  accounts.  The  journey  took  a  minimum  of  several 
months, usually most of a year, and was restricted by the freezing of the Volga during 
the  winter.  At  times  of  instability  in  Russia  it  became  far  more  hazardous,  as 
evidenced by the experiences of the Persians and Carmelites setting out from Prague 
23 See Chapter Two of this thesis, and Barbara von Palombini, Bündniswerben abendländischer Mächte 
um Persien 1453- 1600, (Wiesbaden, 1968), p. 68; Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 22-42, 
60-67.
24 K.M. Mathew, History of Portuguese Navigation in India, (Dehli, 1988).
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in 1605. Russian and Armenian traders had contact along this route between Moscow 
and Persia,  and the  English  explored it  in  1561 as  a  route  for  Western European 
trade.25 It was not until the late years of the seventeenth century that practical trade 
developed along this route. It was the primary route between Austria and Persia for 
diplomatic missions merely because it seemed less difficult than the alternatives. 
The difficulty of communicating around a hostile Ottoman Empire certainly 
hindered coordinated actions between Austria and Persia. Furthermore, in the mid-
seventeenth century, when both countries were at peace with the Ottomans, contacts 
became more frequent, reflecting the greater ease of communication once Ottoman 
territory did not have to be avoided. However, the difficulty of communication over 
long distances  cannot  be  the  only reason for  the  alliance  failure.  Throughout the 
period in question, several European states, including the Austrians' Spanish cousins, 
maintained globe-spanning empires and trade endeavours. The Spanish conquest and 
administration  of  colonies  in  the  New  World,  the  Portuguese  trade  network 
throughout  the  Indian  Ocean  and  missionary  activity  up  to  Japan,  and  the 
opportunistic gains of the Dutch and English against the established Iberian powers all 
show that  it  was possible  in the sixteenth century to coordinate  activities  despite 
distance  and  communication  difficulties.  Therefore,  we  must  look  for  additional 
explanations for the failure of an Austrian-Persian military alliance. 
2. Exploiting Turkish Respite for Other Issues
Using the diversion of Turkish attention to pursue other matters is an explanation that 
was developed in Palombini's book, Bündniswerben Abendändischer Mächte um Persien. 
Many times she highlights how both Persia and the European powers allowed the 
other to fight the Ottomans alone, despite their frequent wish for an alliance. Both 
25 Lockhart, CHI, "European Contacts", pp. 383-384.
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must bear the responsibility for allowing the Ottomans to fight one front at a time. 
Repeatedly, one side would make peace, and then Ottoman aggression would turn to 
the other. The new target would work for an alliance; but the other party, newly at 
peace with the Turks, would prefer to take the opportunity to deal with other issues - 
such as internal politics, or conflicts on other borders - rather than plunge back into 
another  Turkish  war.  Both  the  Europeans  and the  Persians  followed this  pattern. 
Andrew Hess makes much the same point in a paper looking at the aftermath of the 
Battle  of  Lepanto,  noting  how the  victorious  European  nations  each  turned  their 
attention to other issues, allowing the Ottomans to recover from the defeat.26 
The preceding chapters are full of such examples. As seen in Chapter Two, 
Archduke Ferdinand made peace with the Ottomans in 1533, and left Shah Tahmāsp to 
face  an  Ottoman  invasion  alone  the  following  year,  while  Ferdinand  dealt  with 
religious issues in Germany regarding the Reformation. In 1578, the Ottomans again 
invaded Persia,  while the 'Holy League',  which was recently victorious at Lepanto, 
broke apart and pursued other goals: Venice resumed their lucrative trade with the 
Ottomans; King Philip II of Spain focused on winning the empty throne of Portugal 
and then fighting the Dutch and English; and the newly crowned Emperor Rudolf II 
built border fortifications in Hungary. Emperor Charles V did not even reply to Shah 
Ismā'īl's first message until he concluded his war with France. On the Persian side, it  
was  shown  in  Chapter  Three  how  Shah  'Abbās  I  dealt  with  reorganising  his 
government and fighting the Uzbegs for a decade while Emperor Rudolf II was at war. 
These are just a few examples of the pattern repeated for more than a century. 
Although cooperation might have benefited both Europeans and Persians, both 
turned to other immediate problems when given the chance. A period of war on the 
Ottoman's  other  border  was  used  as  a  respite  from  the  conflict,  rather  than  an 
opportunity to combine to strike a decisive blow. The immense difficulties seen in the 
26 Andrews C. Hess, "The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History", Past and Present, 
No. 57 (Nov., 1972), pp. 66, 69-72. 
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Ottoman Empire for the few years from 1603, when both Austria and Persia were at  
war at the same time, demonstrates how decisive a combined offensive could have 
been if  cooperation had been achieved.  Yet both sides focused on their  immediate 
problems, allowing the Turkish threat to remain for centuries. As so often happens 
throughout history, short-term pressures were prioritized over long-term concerns. 
Each side wanted allies when they were facing the immediate threat, however they 
were  unwilling  to  take  the  initiative  and  commit  to  unforced  action  in  order  to 
support the other. 
3. Difference of Diplomatic Styles
Here I present another explanation, which complements the others by highlighting an 
element  which  they  are  missing.  When  contacts  between  European  and  Persian 
diplomats did occur,  cultural  misunderstandings limited their  success.  Each culture 
had a different style of diplomacy. When one side did not present themselves in the 
way the other side expected, it limited the results that could be expected. 
This effect is often subtle. Both sides were welcoming to foreign diplomats. 
Minor  mistakes  of  protocol  were  usually  forgiven  and  sometimes  the  source  of 
amusement - for instance Rudolf II's amusement when the Persians tried to kiss his  
foot, or the Persians humour at Tectander's inability to sit cross-legged.27 Never did a 
misunderstanding  result  in  a  complete  breakdown  of  relations,  even  during  the 
Spanish  and  Portuguese  clumsy  attempts  before  the  seizure  of  Hormuz.28 The 
problems of cultural difference were not simply one side making a mistake out of 
27 Both events described in Chapter Three; Die Prager Nuniatur des Giovanni Stefano Ferreri, 
Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland. Ed. by A. O. Meyer. Vol. IV. 3. (Berlin, 1913), no. 264d, p. 185; 
Victor von Klarwill, ed., Fugger News-Letters: First Series, trans. Pauline de Chary, (London, 1924), p. 
270; Georg Tectander, Iter Persicum, (Altenburg in Meissen, 1610), p. 118.
28 Luis Gil, "The Embassy of Don García de Silva y Figueroa to Shah 'Abbās I", in Iran and the World in  
the Safavid Age, eds. Willem Floor and Edmund Herzeg, (London, 2012), pp. 161-180;  Steensgaard, 
The Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 312-323.
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ignorance  which  offended  the  other.  Each  court  knew  they  were  dealing  with 
foreigners  who did not  know their  ways,  and they were willing to overlook such 
matters. The problem was that a difference in styles led to a difference in expectations. 
What  was  being  promised  was  understood  differently  by  the  participants.  These 
problems of expectations and interpretations slowed progress, and, when combined 
with the other problems of distance and divergent interests examined above, these 
proved fatal to the goal both sides desired. 
Eastern diplomacy was often conducted by men of high noble standing. The 
Persian chronicles are full  of accounts of princely delegations. One example is the 
embassy sent by the Mughul ruler Jahāngir (reign 1605-1627) to Shah 'Abbās, which 
was led by the Mughul nobleman Khan 'Alam.29 The names of the ambassadors sent to 
Europe  indicate  they  were  often  from  the  leading  Qizilbāsh tribes  repeatedly 
instrumental in Safavid politics: the Shāmlū, the Rūmlū and others. The Safavids sent 
diplomats with noble pedigrees as a way of showing respect to the recipient of the  
mission, and, conveniently, sometimes as a way to remove potential powerful political  
figures from the local scene temporarily. The European ambassadors were not always 
as  high-born.  Frequently  ambassadors  were  drawn  from  the  minor  nobility  or 
educated commoners. The higher nobility of the Empire were not interested in facing 
the rigours of foreign travel,  whereas ambitious men from the middle social ranks 
looked to foreign service as a way to advance their careers into court circles to which 
they would not otherwise have access.30 Both branches of the Habsburgs often used 
religious  figures  as  diplomats.31 From  the  Habsburg  perspective  this  policy  made 
29 Clara Cary Edwards, "Relations of Shah Abbas the Great of Persia, with the Mogul Emperors, Akbar 
and Jahangir", Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 35, (1915), pp. 255-264; Iskander Beg 
Munshi, History of Shah 'Abbas, trans. Savory, Vol. 2, p. 1190-1193
30 When Klaus Müller writes about the high nobility's role as diplomats he is referring to resident 
ambassadors in Europe, not those undertaking dangerous journeys to eastern lands. Müller 
mentions there were diplomats of all social classes, but a look at the ambassadors to Persia indicates 
these were from the lower echelons. All classes were interested in advancing future careers. Das 
kaiserliche Gesandschaftswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden, 1648-1740, (Bonn, 
1976), pp. 180-195, 355. 
31 Qualifications for diplomatic service included either military or church experience. Those drawn 
from the church, called geistliche Gesandten, included the use of Cardinals as the representative to 
Rome, as well as other lesser roles, such as those in Persia. Müller, Das kaiserliche 
Gesandschaftswesen, pp. 199, 249.
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sense,  because  promotion  of  Catholicism worldwide  was  a  major  feature  of  their 
policy. However, it caused annoyance to the Muslim Safavid Shahs. In response to the 
Spanish policy of using Augustinian friars as ambassadors, 'Abbās complained to King 
Philip III to stop sending all these priests and send "some gentlemen of note" instead.32 
Gift-giving was an established part of both European and Islamic diplomacy, 
but  with  subtle  differences.  European gifts  were  part  of  a  protocol  system which 
established  each  rulers  status  in  the  hierarchy  of  states.  Ornamental,  artistic,  or 
religiously-significant  items  were  preferred  gifts;  the  expense  of  a  gift  may  be 
significant, but it was the artistry or taste, the presentation, and the symbolism of the 
gift which was important in establishing the position of the giver and receiver.33 In the 
ancient Middle East there was a long tradition of gift-giving, which on the rise of 
Islam  generated  lengthy  debate  among  scholars  about  how  to  accommodate  this 
tradition to Islamic principles and avoid the appearance of bribes. An opinion was 
offered by the respected jurist ash-Shaybȃnȋ that gifts to the leader from foreign rulers 
should  be  considered  war-booty  and  property  of  the  community.34 Although  this 
opinion was not always followed, it coloured the practice around gift protocol, so that 
gifts were used as public signs of the power of the ruler to care for and enrich his  
people. In Safavid practice, gifts to the Shah were paraded publicly, each individual  
piece carried by a separate bearer. A greater emphasis was laid on the monetary value 
of gifts, and on reciprocity in value. Gifts to the Shah from his subjects were used as a 
form of taxation and their value was carefully assessed, while gifts to foreign rulers 
were viewed as part of business transactions.35 Slight differences in tradition led to 
several misunderstandings. Archduke Ferdinand's first two ambassadors to the Safavid 
32 Lockhart, CHI, "European Contacts", p. 392.
33 William Roosen, "Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach ", The Journal of 
Modern History, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Sep., 1980), pp. 452-476 ; Suzanne B. Butters , "The Uses and Abuses 
of Gifts in the World of Ferdinando de' Medici (1549-1609)" , I Tatti Studies in the Italian 
Renaissance, Vol. 11 (2007), pp. 243-354 .
34 Franz Rosenthal , "Gifts and Bribes: The Muslim View" , Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society, Vol. 108, No. 2 (Apr. 15, 1964), esp. pp. 135, 138-139. 
35 Anthony Cutler, "Significant Gifts: Patterns of Exchange in Late Antique, Byzantine, and Early 
Islamic Diplomacy", Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 38(1), (Winter 2008), pp. 79-101. 
Rudi P. Matthee, "Gift Giving IV - In the Safavid Period", Encyclopaedia Iranica, originally published 
2001, updated 2012. 
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court,  Pietro  de  Negro  and  Simon  de  Lillis, did  not  bring  gifts  for  the  Shah,  as 
described in Chapter Two. The oversight could have been because Ferdinand saw the 
Persian ruler as outside the hierarchy of European rulers and thus not part of their 
system of giving. While the mistake was forgiven, the ambassadors were chided by 
Shah Tahmāsp. Confusion over the silk given to the Spanish King by Dengīz Beg led 
to the execution of the Persian ambassador and disgrace of the European envoy, as 
described earlier in this chapter. Shah 'Abbās embarrassed the succeeding ambassador 
by demanding an accounting of what was a gift and what was payment for the Persian 
silk, and then arguing that the value of the Spanish gifts were less than the Persian  
silk.36 In both examples, misunderstandings over gift protocol added friction to the 
relationship at times of critical negotiations.
Europe at this time was developing new rules for diplomacy.37 Expectations for 
diplomats behaviour were being codified. Credentials became important; for instance, 
the Safavid ambassador to Charles V was held for a year before given an audience 
because they could not verify his credentials. So while the Europeans enjoyed seeing 
the  exotic  eastern  diplomats,  the  effectiveness  of  eastern  diplomats  was  reduced 
because they did not properly fit into the developing bureaucratic system. Europe's 
system of permanent or resident ambassadors was evolving at this time, but these 
were not yet universal. Such an idea could have been valuable in a situation like with 
Persia, where communications took so long; but the idea was not fully established nor 
was it extensively used by the Austrians in the 16th century. In the 17th century they 
did start appointing resident representatives at  the Safavid court,  but by that time 
pursuit of an alliance was no longer the top priority.
The  Persian  diplomatic  tradition,  with  its  greater  emphasis  on  personal 
authority and trustworthiness, was more likely to consider a statement of friendship 
as  a  pledge to action;  whereas  the more bureaucratic  European tradition required 
36 Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution, pp. 70, 292-293.
37 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, (London 1955). 
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detailed  plans  and  legal  terminology  if  it  was  to  be  binding.  This  statement  is  a 
simplification of both sides, but it expresses the divergent tendencies between them. It 
was another difference in style that led to misunderstandings. For example, in Chapter 
Two we saw how Shah Ismā'īl wrote to Charles V saying simply 'attack in this year',  
and expected that to be enough of a plan. In Chapter  Three, Shah 'Abbās proposed 
friendship and joint action to Emperor Rudolf II,  and Rudolf  meticulously avoided 
promising never to enter peace negotiations with the Turks. However, 'Abbās, reading 
with  his  Persian  perspective  and  not  a  European  legal  outlook,  received  Rudolf's 
enthusiastic  reply and then his  return embassy and inferred the deal  was agreed. 
Neither side was wrong; neither was being naive. They were simply interpreting the 
exchanges  from different  cultural  backgrounds  and  reaching  different  conclusions 
about promises made. 
Combining Effects
The  difficulty  in  communicating  over  long  distances  hindered  efforts  to  form  an 
alliance. However the participants may have been able to overcome this difficulty if 
they had tried. A simple agreement between Persia and various European powers to 
attack on all  fronts in a common year,  and to continue the pressure until  a clear  
victory had been achieved, would have put the Ottoman Empire in considerable peril.  
However, because the different cultures negotiated in different ways they could not 
reach an agreement, and because they preferred to attend to other issues while the 
Ottoman military was occupied elsewhere, they did not seriously try to reach such an 
agreement. It took a century of fruitless attempts for the frustration of failed alliance 
offers  to  outweigh  the  hope  of  what  could  be  achieved  if  such  an  alliance  was 
successful. In the first decade of the seventeenth century the frustration reached a 
tipping point.  The  Treaty of Zsitva-Torok was the final signal  that Persia and the 
Habsburgs were not able to set aside their local issues and finalize a military alliance. 
With that realization, they diverted their energies to other issues. 
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The French-Ottoman Alliance
It may be instructive to compare the failed attempt at an Austrian-Persian alliance 
with  the  more  successful  French-Ottoman  alliance  of  the  same  era.  The  French 
maintained a functioning military alliance with the Ottoman Empire throughout much 
of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries.  From  the  time  of  their  conquest  of 
Constantinople  in  1453,  the  Ottomans  had  been  involved  in  European  diplomacy. 
They  regarded  themselves  as  the  rightful  heirs  of  the  Roman  legacy,  by  right  of 
conquest of the Byzantine capital, and, therefore, that they were an integral player in 
European affairs. Various Italian states requested their intervention when threatened 
by a dangerous neighbour. Ottoman involvement in European politics was generally 
accepted at the time, although complaints about 'treating with infidel' were used in 
the propaganda by the opponents of those who sought assistance. When Charles V 
came into his  inheritance  of  the  many Habsburg lands  and looked to  assemble  a  
'universal  monarchy',  it  left  the King François  I  of  France feeling surrounded and 
threatened.  When  Charles  was  elected  Holy  Roman  Emperor  over  François,  the 
French  king  turned  to  the  Ottoman  Sultan  Süleyman,  whose  imperial  goals  of 
dominating the Mediterranean also ran against Habsburg power, as a counterweight 
to Charles' expanding power. After François was taken captive at the Battle of Pavia in 
1525,  the  French  established  contact  with  the  Ottomans,  which  led  to  an  official 
embassy to Constantinople.  The French requested Süleyman attack the Habsburgs, 
"claiming that if the imprisoned François were forced to agree to Charles V's terms it 
would 'make him [Charles] master of the world'."38 Süleyman responded favourably to 
the embassy, and the following years saw the first siege of Vienna and increased naval 
fighting  between  Spanish  and  Ottoman fleets.  Following  Charles'  1535  capture  of 
Tunis, when he was being hailed by some as the defender of Christianity, François 
sent a new ambassador, Jean de la Forest, to the Sultan. La Forest became the first in a 
38 Christine Isom-Verhaaren, Allies With The Infidel, The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth 
Century, (London, 2011), p. 36; quoting Ernest Charrière, ed. Négociations de la France dans le 
Levant, (Paris, 1848), Vol. I, pp. 112-115; also, De Lamar Jensen, "The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth 
Century French Diplomacy", The Sixteenth Century Journal, Vol. 116, No. 4 (Winter, 1985) pp. 452-
453. 
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long  series  of  French  resident  representatives  in  Constantinople.  He  negotiated  a 
commercial treaty which gave some exclusive trading rights to French flagged vessels, 
and he encouraged the Ottomans to attack the emperor. The Ottoman fleet wintered 
in the French port of Toulon in 1543, so as to spend more of the campaigning season 
in the Western Mediterranean. Under François' successors the alliance continued: the 
French fleet sometimes wintered in Ottoman ports, their fleets frequently operated 
together,  and  the  French  continued  to  encourage  Ottoman  action  against  the 
Habsburgs. The alliance continued, with a few breaks,  throughout the seventeenth 
century,  when the  French were important  in convincing the Ottomans  to  besiege 
Vienna in 1683.39
The  French  and  Ottomans  were  more  successful  in  forming  a  West-East 
alliance than were the Austrians and Persians. Several differences in the situations 
allowed for easier French-Ottoman success, and these reasons all relate to the reason 
for the Austrian-Persian failure given above. 
The difficulties of travel and communication were less severe for the French 
and Ottomans  than they were  for  the Austrians and Persians.  The Mediterranean 
provided  a  natural  highway  between  France  and  Ottoman  territories.  This  route 
allowed them to communicate and send ambassadors  relatively quickly and safely 
compared to the difficult journeys required between Austria and Persia.  While the 
Spanish fleet patrolled the Mediterranean and would certainly stop a French courier if 
given the chance, the nature of sixteenth century galleys meant they were capable of 
short  bursts  of  speed but  unsuited to  prolonged chase.40 Thus,  ambassadors  could 
travel past the enemy with relative ease, especially compared to the difficulty Austrian 
agents  had  crossing the  intervening Ottoman land to  Persia,  with  its  bandits  and 
39 Isom-Verhaaren, Allies With The Infidel, pp. 23-48, 114-140; John F. Guilmartin, Gunpowder & 
Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the 16th Century, revised edition, 
(London, 2003), pp. 59, 137; J. C. Hurewitz, "Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System", 
Middle Eastern Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, (Spring 1961), p. 145; Jensen, "The Ottoman Turks in 
Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy", pp. 455-457.
40 Guilmartin, Gunpowder & Galleys, pp. 209-232, esp. p. 218.
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Ottoman patrols. Simply the possibility for faster and safer communication made the 
French-Ottoman alliance more viable, but the Mediterranean also provided an arena 
for joint action that the Austrians and Persian did not have. The Ottoman and French 
fleets operated together in raids, and each fleet made use of the other's ports to extend 
their range. Since Persian and Austrian armies were too widely separated, there was 
nothing they could do to coordinate other than fight on different fronts at the same 
time, facing the Ottomans with a choice of where to deploy their forces. Conversely,  
the French and Ottomans had the chance for real cooperation. This advantage offered 
the opportunity for tangible planning, making it more likely each side would stick to 
their commitments. 
The  French  did  take  advantage  of  Ottoman  military  action  distracting 
Habsburg attention in order to rest their own forces, although this did not disrupt 
their relationship as much as the problem affected the Austrian-Persian relationship.  
For  example,  in  1538  an Ottoman attack  on  Venetian Corfu  led  to  an alliance  of 
Venice, Charles V and the Pope. This was the same Holy League that sent  Michele 
Membré to Persia, as described in Chapter Two. François I feared this league would be 
turned against him, so he made peace with Charles V and let the League fight the 
Ottomans. François sent a special ambassador to Süleyman to notify him, "in the most 
favourable  way  possible  about  his  peace  with  Charles  in  order  to  preserve  the 
friendship of the sultan." After the Ottomans defeated the Holy League at Preveza, the  
League split apart and the French ambassador helped negotiate a treaty between the 
Ottoman Empire and Venice.41 But French use of Ottoman action against their enemies 
as a respite for themselves did not damage their relationship. Süleyman saw value for 
his own ends in sowing dissension in Europe; even the potential of an alliance with 
the French helped his cause. As he correctly observed, the two countries remained in 
close contact and would work together again in time. The Habsburgs faced greater 
problems with  this  issue  in their  relationship  with Persia.  The Persians were  less  
understanding of  such  interruptions,  and,  due  to  the  difficulty  in  communicating,  
41 Isom-Verhaaren, Allies With The Infidel, pp. 40-41; on the Battle of Preveza see Guilmartin, 
Gunpowder & Galleys, pp. 57-71; on Michele Membré see Palombini, Bündniswerben, 76-82.
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negotiations to achieve further cooperation in the future were difficult. Once a chance  
was lost it was easy to imagine another would not come again. The Habsburgs also 
tried to assemble broad coalitions, with Austria, Spain, Venice, the Pope and various 
German states.  Any of  these  forces  could  pull  out  at  any  time,  deciding  to  avail 
themselves of the respite provided by the others occupying Ottoman attention. Such 
unstable coalitions looked poor alliance partners to the Persians. 
Although  the  French  and  Ottomans  were  susceptible  to  misunderstandings 
based on differences in diplomatic styles, these were managed. They did come from 
different diplomatic traditions: French in the European tradition and Ottomans based 
on the Islamic tradition. However, the Ottoman Empire had more extensive contact  
with Europe and was more familiar with European diplomacy than the more easterly 
Persians. After the capture of Constantinople, the Ottomans thought themselves heirs 
to the Eastern Roman Empire; they considered themselves a European power. Their 
lands  included  south-east  Europe  and  the  population  included  many  southern 
European  Christians.  Plus,  they  had  extensive  dealings  with  western  European 
countries, including the French specifically. In the late fifteenth century, Sultan Cem 
contested with his brother, the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid, and when he lost he fled to 
Europe where he was held as a prisoner by the French kings. Cem was used as a pawn 
in  Mediterranean  politics  and  as  an  excuse  to  launch  an  attack  on  the  Ottoman 
Empire. Because of this, the Sultan Bayezid sent ambassadors to France to negotiate 
Cem's return; there he made an offer, which was not accepted at the time, to ally with 
French King Charles VIII against France's enemies.42 Venice and the other Italian states 
had complicated relations with the Ottomans, with the Italians both desiring trade, but 
feeling threatened by Ottoman expansion. In the sixteenth century all the European 
powers established permanent ambassadors in the Ottoman capital, although France 
was the first to do so. The Ottomans were therefore quite aware of developments in 
European diplomacy, and they could have sent return resident ambassadors if they 
wished.  However,  the  sultans  felt  the  unilateral  system  served  to  acknowledge 
Ottoman superiority, and it forced the Europeans to remain in Constantinople only on 
42 Isom-Verhaaren, Allies With The Infidel, pp. 82-113. 
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the sultan's  tolerance.43 The  Ottoman administration,  although founded on Islamic 
traditions,  absorbed many European practices,  adapted them, and created a hybrid 
system system of  government unique to their  Empire.44 Greater  familiarity  helped 
reduce  misunderstandings  and  misplaced  expectations.  When  François  I  made  a 
separate peace with Charles V, bringing the joint endeavour with the Ottoman fleet to 
an  end,  Süleyman  was  not  surprised.  Although  he  might  have  been  personally 
angered, he maintained the alliance because he saw it served both countries interests 
and joint operation would continue soon enough.45 For the Persians, particularly Shah 
'Abbās, such actions were considered to be a betrayal, because they were less familiar 
with the personalities of European rulers. 
This comparison of the French-Ottoman alliance emphasises the reasons for 
the failure of an Austrian-Persian alliance. For each of the suggested reasons for this 
failure given above, those same issues are seen to be curtailed in the French-Ottoman 
case. This observation indicates that our reasons for the Austrian-Persian failure are 
indeed correct. The French-Ottoman alliance was not perfect; their relationship also 
had tensions and mistrust, and the participants sometimes found their counterparts 
hard to understand.  But their  relationship developed under much more favourable 
circumstances than the Austrians and Persians. 
In  one  other  aspect  the  French-Ottoman  alliance  and  the  Austrian-Persian 
relationship  were  similar.  Both  started  from the  issue  of  military  cooperation  but 
expanded into other issues as the military urgency receded. The Treaty of Cateau-
Cambrésis in 1559 halted direct conflict between France and the Spanish Habsburgs, 
and  therefore  reduced  the  value  of  the  French-Ottoman  military  alliance.  Their 
relationship was further strained by the Ottoman siege of Malta, where the defending 
Knights  of  St.  John  were  led  by  a  French  grand  master.  However,  the  alliance 
43 J. C. Hurewitz, "Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System", pp. 145-147; Jensen, "The 
Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy", pp. 457-458. Austrian diplomats were 
often arrested or expelled before the Ottomans went to war in Hungary. 
44 Isom-Verhaaren, Allies With The Infidel, pp. 49-56.
45 Isom-Verhaaren, Allies With The Infidel, pp. 139-140.
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continued because of the economic importance of their trade. After the alliance was 
founded in 1536, French ships were allowed to sail into Constantinople's harbours.  
The proceeds to the French port of Marseilles dramatically increased as a result of this 
trade. In 1569, despite the troubles with military issues, the French negotiated a new 
trade agreement which gave them even more exclusive rights.  Merchants of other 
nations had to pay to sail under the French flag, the only European vessels allowed to 
enter Turkish ports. The Turkish trade income was vital to French survival during its 
turbulent period in the late sixteenth century, but also brought great profits to the 
Turks.46 The broadening of the relationship from military to other interests mirrors 
that of the Austrian-Persian relationship shown in previous chapters, and points to a 
characteristic pattern in international relations. 
46 Jensen, "The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy", pp. 458-465. Treaty of 





At first glance, the story of the Austrian-Persian relationship seems to lack interest, an 
alliance that did not happen. However, as we have seen in previous chapters, even the 
attempts at an alliance resulted in cultural exchanges and increased contacts which 
could adapt to new challenges, and thus is of importance to study. Another reason to  
study such unexamined areas of history is the effects these subjects have on the field 
of historiography. Looking into such areas can illuminate aspects which have gone 
unnoticed  in  previous  studies.  Here  we  show  how  the  Persian  diplomatic  effort 
reveals a strong Austrian interest in the East, something often overlooked in much 
historiography. Revelations of the Austrian's knowledge of eastern cultures impacts 
on that famous work of cultural commentary upon Middle Eastern studies:  Edward 
Said's  Orientalism. Said largely ignored Austrian and German studies of the east, as 
well  as  those  conducted  in  the  early-modern  era.  But  perhaps  he  should  have 
examined them, for they reveal a different pattern than that he described. Both of 
these issues could be the subjects for lengthy studies of their own. Here, I provide a  
brief introduction based on this study of Austrian and Safavid contacts. 
Re-orienting Austrian History
Austrian historiography has typically concentrated more on Austria's relations with 
western Europe.  Habsburg Austria  was a  great  power in European politics  of  the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and these events attract much of the attention 
from historians.  The  Turkish  wars  are,  of  course,  acknowledged  in  any  Austrian 
history, but in some they are treated more as an occasional distraction from European 
affairs. For example, even Bérenger, who is relatively even-handed, concentrates his 
commentary on relations with the Ottoman Empire in two chapters devoted to the 
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topic, and is not mentioned in other places.1 Very few look further afield than the 
Ottoman Empire in Austria's eastern diplomacy; relations with Persia and other Asian 
nations  are  rarely  examined.  In  contrast,  the  Habsburg monarchy paid  significant 
attention to eastern affairs. This is essential to recognise for a complete picture of 
their reign.  While the quantity of diplomatic actions with the East was not as large as 
those with Europe, it still represents a substantial amount of activity. Records in the 
Vienna Staatsarchiv show the many countries with which Austria corresponded.2 
The development of the Great Power system in European international politics 
during the eighteenth century focused the attention of Austria - and historians - on 
Austria's role in Europe. Austria participated in the many wars and shifting alliances 
between the major European countries, drawing the Habsburgs' attention away from 
eastern affairs. Historians since that time have noticed the Austrian focus on western 
Europe and have followed that gaze by writing primarily about Austria's relations 
with  the  west.  The  eighteenth  century  and  later  perspective  is  often  projected 
backwards in time. However, it was eastward expansion, pushing back the Ottomans 
and control over Hungary and south-east Europe, that made Austria a Great Power in 
the eighteenth century. Austria was able to compete with richer states such as France 
and Great Britain through the resources and manpower brought from Hungary and 
the  Balkan  territories.  Interestingly,  while  Austria's  participation  in  the  European 
Great  Power  system  distracts  some  historians  from  noticing  Austria's  substantial 
eastern activities, scholars writing specifically on Austria's place in that system have 
well recognised the importance of Austria's eastern frontier.3
Ferdinand I, who began the Austrian branch of the Habsburgs, felt that his 
1 Jean Bérenger, A History of the Habsburg Empire: 1273-1700, translated C.A. Simpson, (London, 
1994), orig. pub. 1990. See Chap. 15, "The Struggle against the Ottoman Empire", pp. 185-195, and 
Chap. 24, "The Re-birth of the Turkish Peril and the Siege of Vienna", pp. 318-337. 
2 Quellen zur Geschichte Afrikas, Asiens, und Ozeaniens im Österreichischen Staatsarchiv bis 1918, ed. 
Leopold Auer, (Munich, 1986). 
3 On the Great Power system see: Derek McKay and H. M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-
1815, (Harlow, 1983), esp. pp. 67-76; H. M. Scott, Birth of the Great Power System, 1740-1815, 
(Harlow, 2006), esp. pp. 20-24, 117-142; On Austria's eastward expansion see: Michael Hochedlinger, 
Austria's Wars of Emergence, (Harlow, 2003), esp. pp. 48-77, 153-167, 349-359.
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family's  destiny  was  in  the  east,  creating  an  empire  stretching  the  length  of  the 
Danube.  He  tried,  with  little  success,  to  convince  his  brother  Charles  V  of  this 
outlook.4 Yet parts of  his vision remained alive within the Austrian branch of the 
family.  Maximilian  II  and  Rudolf  II  both  devoted  considerable  energy  to  eastern 
affairs, through pursuing diplomacy as well as strengthening border defences. They 
each  fought  wars  against  the  Ottomans  and  they  dreamed  of  expanding  their 
influence eastward through victory, although at best they achieved stalemate. In the 
seventeenth century, Ferdinand II and III were faced with the Thirty Years War and so 
were forced to concentrate their attention on Europe. However, Transylvania and the 
Balkans were an important  secondary  theatre  of  this  war,  so eastern affairs  were 
never forgotten. They also found time to correspond with eastern rulers, such as the 
Safavid Shahs, as described in Chapter Four. When Leopold diverted his attention to 
Europe  and  rivalry  with  France,  allowing  the  eastern  borders  to  languish,  the 
Ottomans  took  advantage  and  besieged  Vienna.  After  the  siege  was  broken,  the 
Habsburg monarchy again focused on their eastern border, expanding their lands at 
the expense of the Ottomans and pursuing the dream of a Danubean empire their 
founder envisioned. The Habsburgs were reminded time after time that they ignored 
eastern affairs at their peril. 
Recognition of this fact led them to create things like the Imperial Library's 
Oriental  Collection  and  the  Oriental  Academy  for  Eastern  Languages.  Improved 
knowledge of eastern cultures was important to the survival and enrichment of the 
dynasty. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the Imperial Librarian Sebastian Tengnagel 
had a great interest in Middle Eastern books, and he built up the Imperial collection of 
important  oriental  texts.  In  the  1660s,  men  associated  with  the  Habsburg  court 
published on Middle Eastern languages: Franz Meninski set up a press in Vienna to 
publish his Arabic-Turkish-Persian dictionary and helped produce a catalogue of the 
Imperial  Library's  oriental  manuscripts,  while  Giovanni  Podestà compiled  several 
books on the languages of the Ottoman Empire. That Meninski was also a member of 
the War Council shows how closely intertwined knowledge of eastern cultures was 
4 Paula Sutter Fitchner, Ferdinand I of Austria, New York, 1982, p. 81.
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with strategic concerns.5
The threat of the Ottoman Empire and the lure of expansion into the Balkans 
were the impetus for the Habsburgs' eastern policies, although their policies reached 
beyond  those  immediate  neighbours.  Understanding the  allies  and enemies  of  the 
Ottomans was a matter of strategic importance. With the Danube as their primary 
transport link, developing trade opportunities along the river and beyond promised 
sources for economic growth. The monarchy's sense of religious devotion urged them 
to study  cultures  of  the  Biblical  lands. Interest  stretched  as  far  as  China,  where 
central-Europeans  joined  the  Jesuit  activity  in  the  Chinese  court,  such  as  the 
Austrians Bernhad Diestel and Johan Grueber who journeyed to the Chinese capital 
by way of Persia. Some Habsburg subjects translated western theological works into 
Chinese, while others wrote works on Chinese philosophy, flora and art which were 
dedicated to Emperor Leopold.6 These motivations drew Habsburg attention further 
than just the immediate threat and on to all of Asia, including Persia. 
Austria's relationship with Safavid Persia reveals that the Habsburg court had a 
more subtle understanding of eastern and Islamic culture than is often credited. Their 
understanding  may  indeed  be  more  nuanced  than  they  themselves  were  aware. 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Habsburgs sponsored extensive 
anti-Turkish propaganda to encourage the population to fight the Ottoman invasions 
and to tolerate the sacrifices  asked by the regime.  Paula Sutter Fitchner examines 
Habsburg rhetoric in her book  Terror and Toleration.7 In this book, she shows how 
numerous levels of representation of the Turkish threat - literary, artistic, sermons, 
educated and popular culture- all reinforced the message: the Turks and their religion 
of Islam were evil and must be resisted. While the accounts of Turkish war atrocities - 
5 R.J.W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy: 1550-1700, (Oxford, 1979), p. 428; Tremblay, X. 
and Rastegar, N., "Austria ii. Iranian Studies in", Encyclopaedia Iranica, Online edition, (2005, 2011).
6 On China: Evans, Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 430-432. 
7 Paula Sutter Fitchner, Terror and Toleration: The Habsburg Empire confronts Islam, 1526-1850, 
London 2008, Chap. 1, "An Enemy Real and Imagined", pp. 21-71. The rest of the book explores 
changes to rhetoric in later years to come to an accommodation with their former enemy.  
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such as massacres and slavery - may have been sensationalised, they were at least 
reporting on actual events attributed to the Ottoman army. However, many works 
attacked the Islamic religion as the basis for the difference between their civilizations. 
Islam was decried as an "evil" religion, and the Koran as a manual of "Black Magic".  
The terms 'Turk' and 'Muslim' were often used interchangeably, and both synonymous 
with  'Evil'.  With  this  mass  of  propaganda  casting  all  Muslims  as  wicked, 
unreconcilable enemies, it at first appears unlikely that Austrian society sought an 
informed,  discerning view of  Middle  Eastern cultures. On the  contrary, Habsburg 
actions reveal an understanding and attention to the distinctions in the eastern world 
that belies their rhetoric. 
The educated and courtly community understood some of the complexity of 
Middle Eastern and Islamic societies. For one thing, they were aware of the Sunni-
Shi'a division. Although they may not have understood all the theological differences 
between the two,  they were certainly cognizant  of  the effect  on political  conflict.  
Abraham Ortelius,  in his 1570 world atlas  Theatrum Orbis Terrarum,  described the 
Sunni-Shi'a division as a source of conflict between the Ottomans and Safavids. This 
work was widely reprinted and translated into many languages, so the information 
expressed  within  it  can  be  considered  readily  available  to  any  educated  person.8 
Certainly, conflict due to sectarian division within a religion was something to which 
Reformation-era Europe was well attuned.
The court commissioned studies of the Ottoman-Safavid conflict in order to 
better  understand  the  strategic  situation  and  pursue  an  alliance.  Broadsheets 
illustrated battles between the Ottoman and Safavid armies, so even at the popular  
level  there  was awareness  of  the conflict.  One example from 1535 was printed in 
Venice but in the German language for distribution in Austrian lands, and while the 
illustration  may  bear  little  resemblance  to  the  actual  soldiers  the  very  fact  of  its 
8 Cyrus Alai, General Maps of Persia, 1477-1922, (Leiden, 2005), pp. 64-69, text on Persia, plate 39a, p. 
66.
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publication  is  worth  note.9 The  Habsburg  court  conducted  diplomacy  with  other 
central Asian nations, such as the Uzbegs and the Tartars, and while these dealings 
were not  as extensive as those with the Safavids,  they show a recognition of  the  
complicated alliances in the region.10 Knowledge of  the region was limited,  as the 
sources available at the time were few in number. But the decision-making classes 
made an effort to understand eastern civilizations as far as their sources would allow 
them, to learn more about the region, and to integrate this information into their 
strategic planning.
One area in which the Habsburg court's  distinction of  Persians from other 
Middle Eastern cultures can be seen is artwork. Art from the Habsburg court reveals 
different  attitudes  towards  different  nationalities.  The  portraits  of  the  Persian 
ambassadors in Prague, discussed in Chapter Three, are very different from those of 
Turks from the same time. Leaving aside manifestly propagandistic pieces which show 
Ottoman armies committing atrocities and depicted as wild beasts or devils, portraits  
of individuals in the same style as those of the Persians, a style which purportedly 
produced  accurate  representations,  still  reveal  differences.  A  Turkish  general  was 
depicted in dark shadows with  shifty  eyes  and an untrustworthy expression.  The 
Persian ambassadors are portrayed as exotic but interesting men, the kind with whom 
deals can be made. No better example exists that whatever the rhetoric may have 
declared about  all  of  Islam being evil,  distinctions were made in practice between 
different nationalities. 
Part of the Habsburg interest in Persia and a source of their distinction from 
other  Middle  Eastern  cultures  stemmed  from  mythological  roots.  Austrian 
intellectuals imagined Persia as the land described in Herodotus and the Bible, the 
home of Cyrus and Zoroastrian Magi. This romanticised vision appealed to the court, 
which  was  steeped  in  educated  magic.11 Olearius  wrote  poetically  about  his 
9 Thomas Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit un Fürstenmacht, (Vienna 2003), p. 348. 
10 Quellen im Österreichischen Staatsarchiv. ed. Auer. 
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disappointment when the reality did not meet the classical image:12
How we always seek the ancient splendours
Which are subject to the ravages of time. 
I sought to find Persia in Persia, 
And, because of this, have come to curse my journey a hundred-fold.
But despite his disappointment, Olearius threw himself into documenting the existing 
reality.  Memories  of  Timur,  or  at  least  the  romanticised  European  image  of 
Tamburlaine,  also  heightened Austrian interest  in  Persia.  The Safavids  themselves 
helped  encourage  this  connection  as  their  own  political  propaganda  worked  to 
heighten their Timurid connections.13 Austrian views of Persia may have been formed 
and distinguished based on a mythologised image; however, their interest led them, 
like Olearius, to discover and engage the real civilization of their time. 
A Commentary on Said
Edward Said's 1978 book Orientalism was very influential upon Middle Eastern studies 
and writings about east-west relations.14 Therefore, it is appropriate to address how 
Said's work intersects with the findings in this thesis. Said makes sweeping claims 
about how westerners stereotype their view of eastern society, claims which do not 
match with what has been observed in this thesis about Habsburg views. We have the  
chance to critique Said's theory and expand upon his work; however, his ideas can still 
help point up important issues. 
11 R.J.W. Evans, Rudolf II and his world, (Oxford, 1973, 1997), passim; and The Making of the Habsburg 
Monarchy: 1550-1700, (Oxford, 1979), Chapter 10, "The Compromise with Educated Magic", pp. 346-
380.
12 Adam Olearius, translated in Gerhard H. Weiss, In Search of Silk: Adam Olerius' Mission to Russia 
and Persia, Minneapolis 1983, pp. 27-28. 
"Was suchen wir doch viel die alten Herrlichkeiten
Die unterworfen sind den fresshaftigen Zeiten.
Ich habe Persien in Persien gesucht
Und durch das meinen Weg wohl hundertmal verflucht."
13 Sholeh A. Quinn, Historical Writing During the Reign of Shah 'Abbas: Ideology, Imitation and 
Legitimacy in Safavid Chronicles, (Salt Lake City, 2000), esp. pp. 86-91.
14 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (Harmondsworth, 1985), orig. pub. 1978. 
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Said contends  that  'Orientalism',  which  originally  designated  a  field  of 
scholarship about  eastern cultures,  became a system of  discourse shaping western 
views and attitudes about an inscrutable 'Oriental' culture. "Orientalism is a style of 
thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the 
Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident'."15 Eastern-Oriental culture was defined 
as the antithesis of Western-Occidental-European culture, each having distinct, innate 
characteristics. The East was perceived to be the opposite of the West. If the West was  
to be regarded as rational, strong, and creative, the Orient must be irrational, weak, 
and  tradition-bound.  This  image  of  the  East  was  then  employed  in  supporting 
Europe's imperialist actions, bringing enlightenment to the backwards people of the 
Orient.  Scholars  believed  they  could  study  'the  oriental  mentality',  and  ascertain 
qualities of character common to members of eastern cultures. In Said's interpretation, 
Europe's preconceived archetype links all eastern societies as similar to one another. 
Many people have published critiques of Said's book on various grounds. It is 
beyond the scope of this work, and not germane to the primary topic, to survey all of 
these  critiques.  Daniel  Martin  Varisco  wrote  a  intellectual  history  of  the  debate 
surrounding Said's  work with  an extensive  bibliography,  and Robert  Irwin covers 
many of the prominent critiques.16 Here we examine one small point in particular, that 
Europe  viewed  the  East  as  a  monolithic  cultural  entity.  Said claims  Orientalism 
examines Orientals as "a Platonic essence". He wrote,
One of the convenient things about orientals for Cromer was that 
managing them, although circumstances might differ slightly here and 
there, was almost everywhere nearly the same. This was, of course, 
because Orientals were almost everywhere nearly the same.17
The similarity of all eastern people is a corollary to the "we" versus "them" mentality  
Said perceives.  If  Europe is  politically differentiated from the east,  then "the East" 
must be an ontological unit. Individual foreign people are, "either a figure of fun or an 
15 Said, Orientalism, p. 2.
16 Daniel Martin Varisco, Reading Orientalism, Said and the Unsaid, (Seattle, 2007), pp. xi -xiii, 20 
Varsico describes his goals; Robert Irwin, For Lust of Knowing, The Orientalists and Their Enemies, 
(London, 2007), first pub. 2006, pp. 277-309.
17 Said, Orientalism, pp. 37-38.
204
atom in an undifferentiated type called Oriental, African, yellow, brown, or Muslim."18 
Said believed Orientalist  scholars  extrapolated this  perceived uniform,  unchanging 
Oriental culture by transforming small textual details into generalisations about "the 
oriental mentality". The pronouncements of these scholars were then used by political 
leaders to enforce control over eastern countries. 
The analysis in this thesis of Austria's relations with Safavid Persia shows that 
this undifferentiated view of the  east was not the case in early-modern Austria. As 
demonstrated earlier in this chapter, the Habsburg government understood there were 
different nations, cultures and religions in the east, and they held different relations 
with  various  countries.  The  educated  literature  discussed  distinctions  between 
Persian, Ottoman, Tartar and other cultures. Popular-press broadsheets depicted the 
Persians  conflict  with  the  Turks.  Even  when the  wartime  rhetoric  used  language 
equating Turks and Islam, the actions of the court indicated they still distinguished 
between  cultures.  Portraits  showed  distinctions  in  attitudes  towards  the  different 
peoples. Although their knowledge about the east was limited, they were still curious 
and eager for more information. 
While the term 'Turk' was used as a generic term for Muslims, on that alone it 
should not  be concluded the early-modern Austrians had no understanding of the 
complicated  politics  of  the  Middle  East.  Bernard  Lewis  claims  Europeans  used 
pseudonyms for Muslims to avoid lending legitimacy to their religion, and therefore 
called the followers of that religion by the name of the most important Muslim state:  
Saracens and Moors in the middle-ages or 'Turks' in the early-modern period.19 But 
this may be reading too much into a common linguistic phenomena of synecdoche 
(replacement of  part-for-whole).  In a similar fashion, twentieth century Americans 
referred to all citizens of the Soviet Union as 'Russians', a linguistic shorthand that 
most educated speakers understood. Similarly, as Lewis observes, Muslim writers use 
similar  terms  about  Western  European  Christians.  Persians  called  all  Europeans 
18 Said, Orientalism, p. 352.
19 Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West, (Oxford, 1993) p. 7. 
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Farangiyān, from Farang meaning 'Europe' and ultimately derived from the 'Franks', 
but they held separate opinions about the various European nations.20
Publications of the time, outside of wartime propaganda which generally only 
demonized the Turks, transmitted developing knowledge of the Middle East. Travel 
literature became very popular in the sixteenth century, inspired by discovery of new 
lands. To Said, travel literature was part of building a stereotyped discourse about the 
Orient, reflecting Europe as the centre of civilization in contrast to the strangeness of 
the periphery. "From travellers' tales, and not only from the great institutions like the 
various  India  companies,"  he  wrote,  "colonies  were  created  and  ethnocentric 
perspectives  secured."21 But  readers  of  the  time  were  craving  authentic  accounts, 
eschewing medieval fantasies for first-hand realism.22 Europeans at that time were still 
trying to understand their place in a newly-expanded world,  and they thristed for 
reliable knowledge to help accomplish that task. Tectander contrasted Persian, with 
Tartar,  Turkish,  Armenian  and  Russian  cultures.  Olearius,  did  as  well,  and  he 
humanised his facts and observations with accounts of the lives of individuals from all  
stations of life. Another publishing endeavour was the polyglot bibles, one of the first 
outputs of true Orientalist research. The most ambitious was the Antwerp Polyglot 
Bible, published in 1569-72 under the patronage of Philip II, the Habsburg King of 
Spain.  It  contained parallel  Latin,  Greek,  Hebrew, Aramaic  and Syriac texts.23 The 
existence of  these different languages and cultures,  and of Christian groups living 
amongst the Islamic population were well known to people of the sixteenth century.
Study and writing about Persia was done as a way to further cooperation and 
partnership, not to dominate and control the east, as Said contends was the purpose of 
Orientalist  scholarship.  He  wrote,  "the  European  representation  of  the  Muslim, 
20 Rudi Matthee, "Between Aloofness and Fascination: Safavid Views of the West", Iranian Studies, 
Vol. 31, No. 2, (Spring 1998), p. 231.
21 Said, Orientalism, p. 117.
22 Peter Hulme and Tim Youngs, "Introduction", in The Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing. eds. 
Hulme and Youngs, (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 2-4;  Irwin, For Lust of Knowing, pp. 62-64. 
23 Irwin, For Lust of Knowing, pp. 73-75. 
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Ottoman, or Arab," - he leaves out Persian - "was always a way of controlling the  
redoubtable  Orient."24 But  the  Habsburgs  looked  to  Persia  for  allies  and  trading 
partners, not subjects. The 'relations' by Tectander and Olearius were written after 
journeys  of  friendship.  Catholic  missionaries  travelled  with  the  original  intent  of 
converting Persia's religion. This seems to confirm Said's assertion, "the Orientalist 
makes it his work to be always converting the Orient from something into something 
else."25 But soon after their arrival in Persia they learned that they were unlikely to  
convert many of the Persian Muslims to Christianity. "Till now there has been small 
success,"  wrote  the  head  of  the  Carmelite  mission.  "[Persians]  will  not  eat  with 
Christians,...  nor  do  they  have  any  other  dealings  such  as  Turks  have  with 
Christians."26 Instead,  they  decided to  shift  their  primary mission from converting 
Muslims  to  supporting  those  Christians  already  living  there.  A  small  amount  of  
experience convinced them they could not control or change the Persians. 
The Ottomans were a source of fear; they presented a existential threat to the 
Austrian Habsburg line, just as they had extinguished the prior Hungarian dynasty.  
While Said recognizes the encounter with Islam as "a lasting trauma" for Europe, he 
trivializes it. His description of the Turks being depicted in London stage shows being 
used in a way to diminish the threat by symbolically capturing it, does not work for  
Austria  where  the  threat  was  real  and  deadly.27 The  representations  of  Turks  in 
Habsburg proaganda was grotesque and terrifying, better to stiffen the resolve of the 
population for resistance. Symbolic representation was not what was most needed by 
the dynasty; hard facts were. Thus, the letters of Busbecq, Ferdinand I's representative 
to the Ottoman court, were a treasury of information about life and customs of the  
enemy. His viewpoint was no more detached than any other - he was a representative 
of his country and defended their interests; but he also openly admired many aspect of 
Turkish life, particularly their meritocracy.28 The language institutes in Vienna and 
the oriental texts acquired for the Imperial Library were supported by the Habsburgs 
24 Said, Orientalism, p. 60.
25 Said, Orientalism, p. 67.
26 Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia and the Papal Mission of the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, 
(London, 1939), pp. 164-166.
27 Said, Orientalism, p. 3.
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in order to train representatives to Constantinople,  but the linguists and librarians 
were acting out of love for the subject. The two interests intersected, not in the service 
of colonial control, but survival. While Said identifies this merging of academic and 
political  interests,  he  misunderstands  the  motivation  and  seriousness  of  their 
endeavour. And, in the different motives towards study of the Ottomans and Persians,  
he misses one more sign that the Habsburgs realized the diversity of cultures in the  
Middle East. 
 Said is clear that his writing is primarily about nineteenth century Britain and 
France, not sixteenth and seventeenth century Austria. However, he draws examples 
from all of history - from classical Greece to modern headlines - when they suit his 
argument.  "This  Orientalism  can  accommodate  Aeschylus,  say,  and  Victor  Hugo, 
Dante  and  Karl  Marx."29 Since  he  pulls  examples  so  widely,  he  must  be  held 
accountable for periods that don't fit his theory. The situation in early modern Europe 
was more complex than an East vs. West clash of civilizations, as the participants 
were well aware. France was a constant ally to the Ottomans and used them as a 
counter-weight  to Habsburg power in  Europe.  Venice  alternated between trading-
partner and enemy of the Turks, rarely willing to commit to decisive action in fears of 
damaging their lucrative commercial connections. Austria, under frequent threat from 
the Turks, sought allies among other nations of the east. Early-modern Europe was 
not in a position of power strong enough to think of controlling the Middle East; a 
century of Ottoman expansion had taught them the exact opposite, that Europe may 
become colonised by an Islamic power. This point has been observed by others before. 
Bernard  Lewis,  writing  about  the  development  of  Orientalism out  of  Renaissance 
humanism,  notes  that  French  and  English  scholars  were  studying  Islam  in  the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, before those countries' Imperialist projects were 
started.30 Paula Sutter Fitchner makes a similar argument in the introduction to her 
book on Austria's relations with the Ottomans. She writes, "As the Ottomans reeled 
28 Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Imperial Ambassador at 
Constantinople, 1554-1562, trans. Edward Seymour Forster, first pub. Oxford, 1927, (Baton Rouge, 
2005).
29 Said, Orientalism, pp. 59-63.
30 Lewis, Islam and the West, p.126.
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off one victory after another, Europeans had no reason to believe that they would end 
up on top in the scenarios of domination and subordination that colonial relations 
suggested to later Frenchmen and Britons."31 This mismatch between Said's theory and 
the realities of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries actually serves to highlight the 
extraordinary  changes  that  took  place  in  world  power  in  the  eighteenth  century. 
While the differences over the centuries do not alone invalidate Said's work, they do 
indicate that his theory is not as universal as he sometimes pretends. 
The early-modern scholars arguably had a better balanced image of eastern 
cultures  than  many  people  hold  today.  Modern  political  writers  like  Huntington 
describe  an  inevitable   'Clash  of  Civilizations'  between  'Western'  and  'Islamic' 
cultures.32 They may use the Habsburg wartime rhetoric as evidence, but from their 
post-imperialist  perspective  they  miss  the  early-modern  cultural  outlook  which 
understood that rhetoric as such. They ignore the many attempts at  cross-cultural 
cooperation. Early-modern Central Europeans were aware of the Sunni-Shi'ite divide, 
an  issue  some  modern  media  and political  figures  seem not  to  understand.  Their 
intellectual atmosphere reveled in understanding the diverse and exotic, as reflected in 
cabinets of curiosities, which reached their zenith in Rudolf II's  Kunstkammer.  This 
attitude was attuned to the diverse cultures across Asia, finding a myriad of curiosities  
in the many different cultures.  Today we have vastly more information about  the 
world. But we have passed through the era of colonial imperialism, when Europe's 
power outpaced other countries and colonialism's corrupting influence has narrowed 
our vision. It is this divide which  Said wrote about, and whatever the flaws in his 
presentation, the impact of colonialism on our representations is important to call to 
mind. 
31 Fitchner, Terror and Toleration, p. 17. 
32 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New York, 
1996), pp. 48-54;  Said was highly critical of Huntington in the article "The Clash of Ignorance", The 
Nation, (October 21, 2001); as was Amartya Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value", J. of Democracy, 
Vol. 10, No. 3, (July, 1999), pp. 3-17, where he argues that "diversity is a feature of most cultures in 
the world".
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The early-modern Habsburgs and their scholars operated in an environment of 
myth and ignorance about eastern cultures. Although they were curious and sought to 
learn more of  the cultures,  they were not  unblemished seekers  of  objective  truth. 
Throughout the early-modern era, all commentary was influenced by deep religious 
convictions. At the start of the sixteenth century, the fantasies of John Mandeville and 
tales of Prester John were as popular as more sober sources. Over time more reliable 
information was gathered,  but the old myths still  left  their  influence.  The Safavid 
Shahs were not literally believed to be connected to the Kingdom of Prester John, but 
the resonance of the myth encouraged contacts and helped lead churchmen to believe 
Persia might convert to Christianity. Olearius disputed the stories of strange peoples 
found in Pliny and repeated by Mandeville  -  such as men with no heads or  with 
enormous feet - but he pointed out real cultures which he claimed may have given rise 
to the myths.  Olearius left  a detailed description of  Persia and the other areas he 
visited, but he made no effort to hide his opinions. He gave stereotypes of the Persian 
character which were not all  flattering; he explained the tenets of Islam, but then 
called Mohammed a false prophet. But throughout he reported what he saw, or he 
explained  his  reasons  for  trusting  those  from  whom  he  received  additional 
information.  Throughout  the  preparation  of  his  text  he  worked  closely  with  his 
Persian friend who stayed in Germany after the return mission. He did not attempt to  
be neutral, but he did attempt to be thorough and open about his own perceptions.  
Tectander, whose book is less detailed and more naive, is perhaps all the more reliable  
because of it. He always gave his opinions and direct observations, and his reports 
dealt with more observable behaviours - how people entering a mosque wash their 
feet  -  rather  than  more  philosophical  discussion  of  their  beliefs.  Their  texts  are 
decidedly  value  laden,  but  not  with  the  values  Said attributes  to  later  Oriental 
scholars. Tectander and Olearius describe the region populated with a multitude of 
different  cultures,  which  have  both  noble  and  repulsive  qualities.  Habsburg 
propaganda demonized the Turks, but extolled the Persians. The submerged myth of 
Prester  John  encouraged  belief  that  there  were  other  powerful  and  friendly 




In the previous chapters,  it  has been shown how the Austrian Habsburgs and the 
Safavid  Persians  maintained  a  diplomatic  relationship  throughout  the  Safavid  era, 
which evolved with the changing circumstances  of  the countries.  In the sixteenth 
century, the primary issue in their diplomacy was the effort to coordinate military 
action against their  common enemy, the Ottoman Turks.  While both sides desired 
such  an  alliance,  they  were  unable  to  arrange  such  action.  At  the  start  of  the 
seventeenth century, the military alliance came as close as it  ever would to being 
realized. For a short time, both sides were at war with the Ottomans simultaneously,  
and several delegations travelled between the courts in the span of a few years - the 
most  concentrated  diplomatic  activity  between  the  two.  However,  circumstances 
within Austria forced the Emperor Rudolf to end his war - an act Shah 'Abbās saw as a 
betrayal.  Military  alliance  between  the  two  countries  after  that  was  no  longer  a 
realistic  possibility,  yet  at  the  same  time,  Christian  missionary  activity,  cultural 
curiosity, and international trade policies were opening new avenues of contact. As 
the  seventeenth  century  progressed,  these  issues  became  the  leading  diplomatic 
concerns. Although interchange between Austria and Persia remained small, it set a 
pattern of contact which would grow in later centuries. 
Post-Safavid Contacts
In the years after the Safavid era, contacts between Austria and Persia continued and 
expanded.  Commercial  activity,  which  was  limited in Safavid times,  grew in  later 
years.  In the dangerous environment of  nineteenth century European imperialism, 
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Austria  became  an  important  friend  to  Persia  because  Austria  did  not  harbour 
territorial  ambitions  in  the  region.  To see  the  outcome of  the  relationship  which 
started in the Safavid era, we look briefly at events after the dynasty's fall. 
In 1722, an Afghan invasion led to the fall  of Isfahan and the abdication of 
Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain. This effectively marked the end of the Safavid period, although 
for  the  next  fifty  years  various  Safavid  princes  and pretenders  would  be  used  as 
puppet-rulers by characters intent on gaining power.1 One of these, Nādir Shāh, was a 
general who ruled in the name of Sulṭān Ḥusain's son Ṭahmāsp II, and then Ṭahmāsp's 
infant son, 'Abbās III, before taking the throne for himself. His reign was violent and 
did  not  leave  a  lasting  dynasty  after  his  passing.2 In  general,  Persia  endured  a 
turbulent time until the rise of the Qajar dynasty in 1785. 
Commercial  relations  expanded  upon  the  beginnings  forged  by  the  first 
Austrian Oriental Trading Company of Vienna, as discussed in Chapter Four, although 
it took some time before significant volumes of trade were exchanged. The 1718 peace 
treaty of Passarowitz, between the Habsburgs and Ottomans, finally united Hungary 
under Habsburg rule. It also established the right for Habsburg subjects to trade freely 
throughout the Ottoman Empire, on the Mediterranean, the Danube, and the Black 
Sea. It specifically protected trade to and from Persia, which indicates the degree of 
interest Austria had in expanding Persian trade. A second Oriental Trading Company 
of Vienna was formed, but after 25 years of operation, financial difficulties forced it  
into  liquidation.3 In  the  early  nineteenth  century,  Austrian-Persian  trade  rapidly 
expanded.  Austrian-flagged  ships  sailed  to  the  port  of  Trabzon,  either  from  the 
Danube or from the Habsburg Adriatic port of Trieste, and then goods were carried 
overland to Tabriz. Goods sent to Persia included woollen cloth, glassware, ironware, 
steel goods, matches and wine; goods brought to Austria included carpets, fruit and 
1 Roemer, CHI, "The Safavid Period", pp. 324-330. 
2 for the history of Nādir Shāh see Michael Axworthy, The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from Tribal 
Warrior to Conquering Tyrant, (London, 2009). 
3 Helmut Slaby, "Austria", Encyclopedia Iranica, Online Edition, (2005, updated 2012).
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cotton. The Danube Steamship Service started regular passenger service to Trabzon in 
1837, and later added service to the Persian Gulf. By the 1860s, Austria was the fourth 
largest  trading partner  with  Persia,  after  Great  Britain,  Turkey and Russia,  all  of  
whom had direct access or substantial colonial interests in the area.4 An official trade 
agreement was delayed for several years by complications of Austria's membership in 
the German Confederation and Customs Union, but in May 1857 representatives in 
Paris  signed  the  "Austro-Persian  Friendship-,  Trade-,  and  Shipping  Treaty". 
Consulates were established in each country to promote trade. To this day Vienna 
remains an important market for the distribution of Persian carpets into Europe. 
Persian  independence  was  threatened  in  the  nineteenth  century  by  the 
imperialism of Great Britain and Russia. In the face of these moves, Persia sought to 
strengthen its ties to Austria, a European country which could serve as a counter-
balance to the colonizing powers. In an attempt to resist growing British and Russian 
pressure,  in  1850,  the  Grand  Vizier  Amir  Kabir  founded  a  polytechnic  school  in 
Tehran,  to introduce modernization with the use of  foreign instructors.  He sent a 
representative to Vienna to recruit instructors for the new school. Austria obliged and 
sent military instructors, although not officially, to avoid the appearance that Austria 
might have colonial ambitions in the area. Also recruited to the school were Austrian 
clothmaking and mining specialists.5
Persia was invited to present  an exhibit  at  the 1873 World Fair  in Vienna. 
Official  permanent  diplomatic  relations  were  established  at  this  time.  The  first 
Austrian minister to the Persian court invited Shah Nāṣer-al-Din to make an official 
visit to the fair. The Shah accepted and became the first Shah to visit Europe. He was 
received by Emperor Franz Joseph and treated with courtesy. On the visit, the Shah 
requested Austrian help in reorganising his government administration and military. 
The Austrians promised to help, although they were cautious not to upset Russia over 
4 Charles Issawi, ed., The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914, (Chicago, 1971), trade items: pp. 115, 
137-140; steamship service: pp. 93, 99-106; trade volume: p. 134.
5 Issawi, ed., The Economic History of Iran, pp. 292-297; Slaby, "Austria", Encyclopedia Iranica.
213
military aid.6 They started by helping reorganise the Persian Postal Service and the 
Mint. After five years the Persians renewed their request for military assistance. By 
this  time,  Austrian relations  with  Russia  had  been damaged by Russia's  increased 
strength after the 1877 Russian-Turkish War, and over Austria's annexations in the 
Balkans. Austria, no longer concerned with avoiding  offense to Russia, was pleased 
with a chance to weaken Russian influence in the Middle East, and so agreed.7
The Shah visited Vienna again in 1878 to sign agreements over military aid. He 
toured the Arsenal  and viewed weapon demonstrations.  The Persians purchased a 
large quantity of Austrian made arms, which increased the already flourishing trade 
links. Austria also sent a team to Persia to train an "Austrian Corps" for the Persian 
Army. They trained 7000 soldiers for this corps; however, plotting and intrigue at the 
Persian  court  undermined  their  efforts.  The  commander-in-chief  of  the  Persian 
military was a Russian client, and he made the situation difficult for the Austrians.8 
The  official  Austrian  mission  ended  after  three  years,  although  Austrian  officers 
continued to enter Persian service under private contracts. In the 1880s, when Russia 
and Britain took large portions of Persia into protectorate status, Shah Nāṣer-al-Din 
requested  intervention from Austria  and Germany.  Both countries  had  to  decline,  
stating they were unable to provide assistance because the distance made intervention 
impossible, although in reality they could not challenge the larger Empires which had 
entrenched interests in the area. 
Even after that refusal, Austria continued trading with Persia and supplying 
arms to what was left of their military. Nāṣer-al-Din's son visited Vienna several times 
after he took the throne. The relationship remained cordial. Even in recent times, the 
Republic of Austria has maintained relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite  
6 A Diary Kept by His Majesty the Shah of Persia, During His Journey to Euorpe, trans. Albert Houton 
Schindler and  Baron Louis De Norman, (London, 1879), pp. 231-272; Slaby, "Austria", Encyclopedia 
Iranica.
7 Slaby, "Austria", Encyclopedia Iranica; On reform of the mint: Issawi, ed., The Economic History of 
Iran, pp. 354-355. 
8 Stephanie Cronin, "Building a new army: military reform in Qajar Iran", in War & Peace in Qajar 
Persia, Implications Past and Present, ed. Roxanne Farmanfarmaian, (Abingdon, 2008), pp. 61-63.
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efforts of the United States to have Austria join a boycott. 
In Summation
In  this  thesis,  I  have  examined  the  changing  relationship  between  the  Austrian 
Habsburgs and the Safavid Persians throughout the Safavid period (1500-1722). No one 
has done a comprehensive study of this relationship before. Some, such as Palombini, 
have  examined  part  of  the  time period;  others,  such  as  Rota,  have  looked at  the 
Safavid relations with other countries.9 I have examined the arc of the relationship: 
tracing its development from its beginnings in the search for a military partner in the 
perilous, early periods of both dynasties; through the intensive diplomatic effort at the 
time of the Safavid's greatest ruler; to the changes that were induced by the failure of 
that  effort  and  the  changing  priorities  of  each  country.  I  have  used  original 
manuscripts from the Austrian archives, which some authors, such as Steensgaard, 
have  not.  This  primary  research  I  incorporated  with  those  studies  of  particular 
elements that have been conducted before, such as Hassinger's study of the Vienna 
Oriental  Trading Company.10 This approach has  revealed a process  of  change and 
development. As the relationship between the Safavids and Habsburgs matured, new 
subjects  of  negotiation entered into what  started as  a  a  mono-focused effort.  The 
relationship  itself  became  more  important  than  a  single  issue.  This  pattern  has 
occurred  in  other  international  relationships:  we  saw  relations  between  medieval 
Europeans  and  the  Ilkhāns,  and  with  Tīmūr,  and  between  the  French  and  the 
Ottomans in the sixteenth century also started as an attempt at military cooperation, 
but evolved to focus more on trade and other issues. A study focused on a single issue, 
such as warfare, trade or religion, or on a short time interval around a critical event 
would miss this dynamic. By viewing the full timespan of their relationship, we can 
9 Barbara von Palombini, Bündniswerben abendländischer Mächte um Persien 1453- 1600, (Wiesbaden, 
1968); Giorgio Rota. “Diplomatic Relations between Safavid Persia and the Republic of Venice, an 
Overview”, in: The Turks. Vol. 2. (Ankara, 2002).
10 Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, (Chicago, 1974); Herbert 
Hassinger, "Die erste Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie 1667--1683". Vierteljahrschrift für 
Sozial- und Wirtschafts- Geschichte, Vol. 35, (1942). p. 6. 
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reveal the course of its evolution and see that this fits a wider pattern. 
Significance
The significance of  the Austrian-Persian relationship lies not in its  military 
outcome, but in its very attempt. If the Habsburgs and the Safavids had formed an 
alliance to decisively defeat the Ottoman Turks, the event would be in every history 
textbook. However, while they did not fulfil their stated goal, the fact that they made 
the attempt and connected on many other issues is still important. The encounter with 
the foreign culture expanded the cultural knowledge of both sides. Travellers from 
Europe wrote of their journeys, thereby increasing their countrymen's understanding 
of  the  wider  world.  Artists  in  both  cultures  commemorated  the  encounter  and 
incorporated foreign elements into their styles. The influx of new information added 
to the shift from an understanding based on legend to one based on direct experience. 
Cultural  knowledge  of  the  other  was  imperfect  on  both  sides,  but  they  began to 
recognize  the  reality  of  foreign  cultures.  This  shift,  from  medieval,  legendary 
apprehension to a more modern, experience-based knowledge had a huge impact on 
intellectual history. 
In addition, through the examination of this relationship, we have illuminated 
the study of history itself. I have shown that Austrian history, as written by western 
European  authors,  has  too  often  focused  on  European politics,  and  not  examined 
enough the significant eastern aspect of Habsburg policy. I have also shown how the 
early-modern  Austrian  relationship  with  the  Middle  East  diverges  from  certain 
interpretations of Europe's image of the east. European orientalism's conceptualization 
of the east is a topic fraught with controversy, and which has topical significance for 
current events. Through the study of an actual international relationship, one which 
was quite different than those of nineteenth century maritime powers, I hope to have 
added a certain amount of clarity to the vast polemic on the topic. A comprehensive 
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view of a previously unexamined relationship, such as I have produced in this thesis, 
reflects on the study of history as a process and allows it to advance. 
Further Studies
There are several ways in which the work in this thesis could be expanded. These are 
large projects in themselves, beyond the scope of this work. 
Work  on  the  Austrian-Persian  relationship  could  be  integrated  into  a  full 
international  context.  I  tried to provide some of  this  context  here,  although space 
limitations  precludes a  full  reckoning.  The wars  of  the Ottoman Empire  were the 
motivation for the Austrians and Persians seeking an alliance; however, the French-
Habsburg  conflicts,  the  French-Ottoman alliance,  and  the  development  of  oceanic 
trade were all  essential components of the international dynamics in the sixteenth 
century.  In  the  seventeenth  century  the  development  of  international  trading 
companies and the shift in international trade dominance from Spain, Portugal and 
Italy,  northwards  to  England  and  the  Netherlands  has  a  major  impact  on  world 
relations. I have mentioned all of the topics using secondary sources by other scholars;  
however, there are many archives with primary documents which could be integrated 
into  this  study.  Also,  throughout  most  of  this  work,  I  have  treated  the  Ottoman 
Empire as an unexamined 'Other' - an implacable enemy of both my main subjects. 
However, the Ottoman Empire was itself a complicated, multi-national empire, with 
its  own internal  motivations and arguments.  In future study, the Turkish archives 
could also be included. Here I have concentrated on the two main partners; but they 
were  part  of  a  larger  world,  one  which  was  becoming  more  interconnected,  and 
eventually all of these topics mentioned should be combined into a larger tableau.11 
11 Bert Fragner provides some thoughts along these lines in his "The Safavid Empire and the 
Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Political and Strategic Balance of Power within the World 
System", in Iran and the World in the Safavid Age, ed. Willem Floor and Edmund Herzig, (London, 
2012), pp. 17-29. 
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In Chapter Six, I made the case for an eastward-looking Austrian history. Such 
a project could examine Habsburg relations with the east, both the near neighbours 
such as the military frontier, south-east Europe and Russia, as well as more distant 
contacts such as Persia, Tartary and beyond. In addition to the actual events which 
occurred between the Habsburgs and eastern countries, this study could also explore 
attitudes  towards  eastern  cultures  and  their  influences  upon  Austrian  society.  To 
carry this project out would require archival research on the diplomatic initiatives 
with many other eastern countries, documentation of which does exist in the Austrian 
State  Archives.12 Also of  relevence would be the study of  intellectual  history,  and 
perhaps artistic and commercial history topics. With all of these elements it be a large 
study,  but  it  would be a  valuable  contribution to Austrian history.  Some of  these 
topics  have  been  investigated  separately  by  scholars  already,  but  they  may  be 
combined with primary research still to be conducted to produce a synthesis.
When examining documents in the Austrian State Archives, I found numerous 
sources related to the economics of diplomacy. These covered such items as salaries of 
diplomats,  lodging  and  upkeep  for  foreign  visitors,  requisition  of  supplies  for 
travelling missions en-route, and disputes regarding the costs borne by diplomats and 
the rewards from foreign service they received. I have mentioned some of these topics  
briefly while recounting the various diplomatic episodes. Since economics was not the 
primary focus of my thesis,  much of this information remained accessory, but the 
documents  exist  to  examine  the  funding  of  diplomatic  missions.  Funding  of  the 
Persian diplomacy would be a first step, but it could be expanded into a more general  
study of the economics of diplomacy.13 This could bring interesting new insights into 
early-modern diplomacy and government. 
12 For a summary of what document exist see Quellen zur Geschichte Afrikas, Asiens, und Ozeaniens im  
Österreichischen Staatsarchiv bis 1918, ed. Leopold Auer, (Munich, 1986).
13 The financing of Habsburg Imperial diplomacy has been examined in Klaus Müller, Das kaiserliche 
Gesandschaftswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden, 1648-1740, (Bonn, 1976), 
Chapter 5, pp. 162-179.
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Final Thoughts
In the Safavid era, Persia was strong enough and its government was stable enough to  
stand as an equal with the countries of Europe. Austria and Persia sought each other 
out  as  potential  partners  against  the  threat  of  the  expanding  Ottoman  Empire.  
Although they had very different cultures, the common enemy gave them a point of 
similarity upon which to build a relationship. This relationship survived even when 
the  original  justification,  the  anti-Ottoman  alliance,  was  no  longer  pursued.  It 
survived because the leaders were familiar with one another and made efforts to keep 
their contacts alive. 
At  the start  of  the era,  neither  side  knew much about  the other,  but  they 
developed knowledge through their interaction. Austrian diplomats returned home to 
publish books; Persian diplomats observed western customs for the Shah. Knowledge 
of the other was important for diplomacy, but it also expanded cultural awareness. 
New artistic styles opened in both countries, and new opportunities for trade were 
explored. The relationship brought benefits beyond those originally searched for in a 
military alliance. 
The Austrian Habsburgs and the Safavids maintained an attitude of mutual 
respect  even  when  the  relationship  faced  difficulties.  Agreement  was  not  always 
possible  due  to  other  circumstances,  but  they  maintained  the  relationship  despite 
disagreements. As their relationship expanded from a single issue to multiple avenues, 
they had a reasons to stay in contact even when there was disagreement on certain 
things. 
In modern times, the relationship between Iran and most Western countries 
has been strained. Persia endured several centuries of domination and exploitation by 
European powers. Iran views the West with suspicion learned through hardship, and 
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western countries view Iran as a threat to their accustomed dominance in the Middle  
East. But it has not always been this way. In the Safavid era, Persia and European 
countries attempted to work together.  Their  efforts at  cooperation despite cultural 
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